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The Triumph of the Always-Heard Word 
A Dogmatic Inquiry into God as Hearer 
 
 





What does it mean that God hears? The Christian tradition has emphasized God as a 
speaker, attending to God’s speech, word, and voice, but it has neglected the Biblical motif 
of God as a hearer. Yet Holy Scripture frequently testifies to God hearing, listening, and 
inclining God’s ear. It is the objective of this thesis to redress this neglect by reflecting 
dogmatically on God’s hearing. I argue that God’s hearing is a form of attention that is 
characterized by the loving and just nature of the triune God and that it is accomplished by 
the significant personal presence of God among God’s creatures. Following Karl Barth, I 
propose that the asymmetry of divine and human agency entails the priority of God’s 
hearing as antecedent to human speech, and that this antecedent prioritization is the source 
of human confidence in God’s hearing. I then seek to relate this understanding of God’s 
hearing to the doctrines of creation, anthropology, and christology. Concerning the doctrine 
of creation, I argue that God’s ontological alterity permits the establishment of a theological 
grammar whereby God’s hearing must be spoken of analogously, neither identical to nor 
altogether unlike creaturely hearing. God’s hearing is not merely human hearing writ large, 
but is positively characterized by God’s perfection and is, as such, infinitely proximate to 
human speech and is given as an uncompelled, gratuitous gift. Concerning anthropology, 
this understanding of God’s hearing is argued to entail real-world consequences for the 
becoming of those who are heard by God, and that especially for those heard from the 
“wilderness”. Concerning christology, I argue that the incarnation, death, resurrection, and 
ascension inform the character of God’s hearing, demonstrate its salvific effects, and 
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 Reflecting on hearing inevitably forces us, at some point, to acknowledge how 
much we have received from others—that what we speak is inescapably wrapped up with 
what we have heard. To reflect on hearing for half a decade is to raise the stakes 
considerably! It is, then, with overwhelming gratitude that I acknowledge those whom I 
have had the privilege to hear and be heard by.  
 It was in the fall of 2014 that a brief but disproportionately generative conversation 
with Kevin Vanhoozer produced in me a theological interest in God’s hearing. Fleeting 
though the conversation was, this thesis and its title find their genesis and seed there. And 
insofar as my comprehension of “the breadth and length and height and depth” of the love of 
God has increased as I have sought to understand God’s hearing—even if ever so 
incrementally—it is the fruit of the seed planted then and there. 
 If being heard by others is a gift that profoundly changes the one who is heard, then 
I have received a gift of inestimable value from Mike Higton and Karen Kilby—both of 
whom have heard me with great patience, generosity, attentiveness, and encouragement. To 
be “gifted” by their hearing and speaking has, indeed, been profoundly formative. I am 
grateful for the frequent conversations, thoughtful engagement, careful reading, gentle 
correction, and enduring support that I have received from them both. Each has been a gift 
in significant and unique ways. Indeed, one of the delights of working on this thesis has 
been the astonishment by others that I had been gifted with such a “dream” supervisory 
team—a gift for which I am enduringly grateful. 
 I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of institutions and people which have 
provided supportive experiences and valuable dialogue, respectively. The Society for the 
Study of Theology has proven to be a consistently gracious and hospitable environment in 
which to hear and be heard. Among the many kind and helpful conversations therewith, I 
am especially grateful for those with Ashley Cocksworth, whose interest in my thesis and 
willingness to offer constructive suggestions on the Barth chapter prevented me from 
wandering into more precarious territory. Additionally, I am grateful to the Herzl Institute 
and the Templeton Foundation for the opportunity in 2017 to think about God’s hearing in 
dialogue with Jews and other Christians within the context of Jewish philosophical 
theology. That the experience came with such a view of Mount Zion made it all the more 
enriching. For that, many thanks are due to Yoram Hazony, Joshua Weinstein, and Dru 
Johnson for crafting such an academically stimulating and personally formative experience. 
I am also indebted to the International Journal of Systematic Theology and Adam Johnson 
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for the opportunity to constructively engage with two books which informed my argument 
in substantial ways. 
 Numerous friends have made this thesis possible through their encouragement and 
support. Brian McCollister has been an unwavering personal and institutional support during 
this time. Karlo “Bacho” Bordjadze, a fellow Johnian, blazed the trail for me, pursuing a 
PhD from Durham while in full-time, vocational ministry. Jason Hoffman has been a 
consistent support and interlocutor for sharpening and clarifying my thinking, and supported 
my efforts even to the extent of photocopying pages from my library for me when I was 
required to travel. Nick Stapleton has been a constant source of vision and encouragement. I 
am grateful to Christy Spader who sacrificed to support my twice-annual travel to England 
and to work around my challenging schedule. Her frequent desire to hear “the longer 
version” of my argument with an unmatched inquisitiveness and sincerity has doubtless 
sharpened my thinking and improved what follows. Many have opened their homes to me 
over these years, providing warm and hospitable environments to write during extended 
travel or sabbatical. Andy and Amy Brandt, Aaron and Katie Golby, and Jordan and Nikki 
Shirkman have made it possible to work on a PhD thesis while living occasionally as a 
global nomad. I am grateful to Emily Baumhoer and Ellie McCollister who were willing to 
serve as copy editors for some portions of this work. The errors that remain are, of course, 
my own. 
 Finally, it is to my wife, Christy, to whom gratitude is owed in abundance. She has 
been a motivating presence in my life in ways that few will understand. Her loving patience, 
support, and sacrifice have made this work possible. That loving sacrifice was multiplied by 
orders of magnitude in 2018 when our daughter, Lydia, was born. When parenting and 
pandemic required adjustments to our “PhD deal”, thereby preventing her from traveling 
with me, her support and encouragement continued unfadingly, steeled by the challenges. 









Hear, O LORD, and be gracious to me! 
O LORD, be my helper! 
 
You have turned my mourning into dancing; 
you have taken off my sackcloth and clothed me with joy, 
so that my soul may praise you and not be silent. 








For Christy  
and for our daughter, Lydia,  







At the temple of Isis in Pompeii, in the niche situated on the rear wall of the cell, there once 
stood a marble statue of Dionysus Osiris (Bacchus), the god of, among other things, wine. 
There he stood, pouring wine into the mouth of his panther. Behind him, stuccoed on the 
wall, were two ears. These ears, like their many counterparts around the ancient Graeco-
Roman world, stood as symbols to the belief that the gods could hear. Of course, Dionysus 
sports his own set of ears, but the secondary temple accoutrements are emphatic—a 
statement that not only do the gods hear, but that the worshiper has arrived at the place 
where the god hears. 
 The ubiquity of such symbols in antiquity is a testimony to the widespread, if tacit, 
belief that any god worth worshipping is one who will hear. And yet it is the very 
“tacitness” of that belief which must account, in part, for its near absolute neglect in 
Christian theology. The neglect is startling on account of not only the two millennia of 
theological reflection in which such attention might have been paid to God’s hearing, but 
also on account of the more than one-hundred-fifty Biblical references to God hearing, 
listening, inclining God’s ear, and so forth. These are petitions to be heard and to have one’s 
petitions heard; but they are also declarations that the God of the Bible, the God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God and Father of Jesus Christ, is a God who has and does 
hear. It was with surprise, then, that I heard Nicholas Wolterstorff announce in his 2013 
Kantzer Lectures in Revealed Theology that he was unable to find any theologian or 
philosopher who had given systematic treatment to God’s hearing.1 And, while there are 
some who have given sustained reflection to the topic (who will be engaged subsequently), 
the point remains: given two millennia of Christian theological reflection, there remains a 
startling dearth of engagement with the ears of God. Why the neglect? Even if the 
“tacitness” and ubiquity of the belief that God hears contributes to the theological neglect, 
there remain no less than two additional causes internal to the Christian theological 
tradition, namely, the dominance of God’s word or speech, and the focus on divine actuality. 
First, on the dominance of God’s word and speech, Amy Plantinga Pauw: 
Many human body parts are metaphorically ascribed to God in Scripture, but it is 
God's mouth and vocal cords that have had a preeminent hold on Christian 
theology, especially in its Protestant versions. The metaphor cluster of God's voice, 
God's speech, and God's words has had an outsized influence on how we think 
                                                          
1 Nicholas Wolterstorff, The God We Worship: An Exploration of Liturgical Theology (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2015), p. 71.  
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about God's relating to humanity, and indeed to all that God has made. Verbal 
divine communication has been our central theological paradigm for how we know 
God and for how God relates to us. On the one hand, this is not surprising, given 
the centrality of Scripture for Christian life and the importance of words and speech 
to human life in general. On the other hand, this is a bit surprising, given how little 
of the Bible is actually said, in context, to be utterances of God.2 
The theological value of focus on divine speech is certainly warranted. The Bible begins 
with a God who speaks. The pre-incarnate Christ is the Johannine Word. Christian theology 
has long believed, albeit with great variety of meaning, that the Bible is the revealed word of 
God. “Long ago God spoke to our ancestors in many and various ways by the prophets, but 
in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son” (Heb. 1:1-2). The historical and theological 
emphasis on divine speech is, thus, for good reason. Yet as will be shown, the abundance of 
Biblical testimony to God’s hearing certainly demands greater attention than it has 
henceforth received relative to divine speech. Second, the focus on divine actuality has 
produced a relative neglect, or even aversion, to considerations of divine receptivity. Put 
alternatively, if the Christian theological tradition has focused on divine simplicity, 
eternality, immutability, and the like, it has, at times, done so without reckoning with the 
Biblical testimony to divine receptivity; if God is actus purus, then there need be no 
attention paid to potentiality or receptivity, so it seems. One result of this neglect: the many 
reactions that have generated “open” and “di-polar” theologies which seek to give 
potentiality and receptivity their due. Commendable are the efforts of these theologies to 
take the language of Holy Scripture with utter seriousness. If the Bible speaks of God 
hearing prayer, changing God’s mind, undergoing temporal succession, etc., then some 
theological account is demanded for how this is the God in whom there is “no variation or 
shadow due to change” (Jas. 1:17). Without directly engaging theologies that prioritize 
potentiality and receptivity, it will become evident that I take their either-or arrangement of 
actuality and potentiality to be misguided. Yet this either-or arrangement has contributed to 
the neglect of receptive themes like divine hearing within the Christian theological tradition. 
 It is, thus, the argument of this work that the Triune God revealed in Holy Scripture, 
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, is the 
God who hears—and that not like Dionysus.  
That the God of the Bible hears is, on the one hand, by no means a novel claim. On 
account of the Bible’s unrelenting testimony to God’s hearing, it is likely that only the most 
contrarian-styled readers of Holy Scripture will have considered that God might do 
                                                          
2 Amy Plantinga Pauw, “The Voice of God in Israel’s Wisdom Literature” in The Voice of God in the 
Text of Scripture, ed. by Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2016), pp. 
78-79. Italics original. 
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otherwise. On the other hand, that the God of the Bible hears will be shown to generate 
constructive insights for both Christian theology and Christian living. For when God’s 
hearing is understood to be the act and possession of this God, the One who has self-
revealed in the pages of Holy Scripture and in Jesus Christ, then the nature and contour of 
that hearing is illumined.  
The subsequent inquiry is, then, not intended as an esoteric or peripheral pursuit of a 
minor Scriptural theme. It is not the pursuit of novelty for its own sake; nor is it the 
prioritizing of some obscure background theme. I take the following dogmatic reflections on 
God’s hearing to be, fundamentally, reflections on the good news of salvation accomplished 
by God through Jesus Christ. God’s deliverance and redemption throughout Holy Scripture 
is frequently seen to be affected by God’s hearing those who cry out to God. It was God’s 
hearing of the cries of the Egyptian captives which resulted in deliverance (Ex. 2:24; 3:7). It 
is with astonishing frequency that the Psalmist cries out to be heard and is delivered on 
account of God’s hearing. On account of his obedience, Hebrews reports that Jesus Christ 
was heard by the Father (He. 5:7) and thus delivered from death. The argument that follows 
is that God hears our cries and that that hearing is fundamentally, if broadly, salvific. In 
short, that God hears is fundamental to the divine act of salvation for God’s people. Those 
who cry out to the God who has self-revealed in Jesus Christ as the God who hears—these 
will find good news in the pages that follow: that God hears their prayers, and that in a way 
characterized by the plentitude of love and goodness that characterize the very life of God.  
A word about my method is necessary. Given the dearth of potential interlocutors, I 
have sought to chart my own course in order to offer a constructive proposal for 
understanding God’s hearing. While it will become clear that Karl Barth has said quite a bit 
about God’s hearing, I have resisted being pulled entirely into his orbit. I have done so, not 
because Barth has nothing to offer here—quite the contrary, as will be seen—but because a 
thesis on Barth’s account would mean embracing a focus and accompanying restrictions that 
would curtail my ability to say all that I hope to say. Rather than embracing the strictures 
that accompany a singular interlocutor, I have attempted to bring a breadth of theological 
voices from the Christian tradition into the conversation. I have done so in the hope that 
these voices will offer a richer, fuller theology of God’s hearing as it is portrayed in Holy 
Scripture. Insofar as I have successfully accomplished this aim, my more general and ad hoc 
approach will be justified. Generally, I have sought to frame God’s hearing within the 
historic Christian theological tradition, what some have come to call, even if pejoratively, 
“classical theism”. This is not due to a personal penchant for history and tradition. Rather, it 
is on account of my conviction, despite the claims of its detractors, that this received 
understanding of God remains the most attractive metaphysical proposal insofar as it 
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corresponds to God’s self-revelation in Holy Scripture and is the best account of the Triune 
God of the Christian faith. I have sought to gesture, when possible, toward the reasons for 
which I find the received metaphysical tradition most attractive, even if in so doing I have 
run the risk of playing the antagonist, thereby provoking its detractors. Nonetheless, it is my 
hope that my argument will make evident, even if indirectly, the strength of the Christian 
metaphysical tradition to elucidate God’s hearing.  
Before outlining the argument to follow, it is necessary, first, to acknowledge the 
important concerns of deaf theology. It might be objected from the outset that a theological 
reflection on God’s hearing runs the risk of alienating and further oppressing deaf people. 
Resisting oppression and alienation at the hands of the church has been the impetus for deaf 
liberation theology3 and research into the theological beliefs of deaf people.4 Deaf people 
have been alienated from the discourse of the church, and have been forced either to 
assimilate to its particular linguistic culture or to remain at a distance. Thus, to magnify the 
Biblical language of God’s hearing might be seen as one more act of marginalization. To 
think theologically about the God who hears might be understood as irreconcilable with a 
theology of a “Deaf God”.5 And yet sympathetic readers will find, perhaps surprisingly, 
considerable overlap between my project and the aims of deaf theology. While my 
theological reflections are, at one level, an attempt to make sense of the language of Holy 
Scripture, these attempts to reflect theologically on that language produce an understanding 
of God’s hearing that transcends the spatio-temporal bounds of creaturely acoustics. The 
anthropomorphic language of speaking and hearing, when predicated of God, produces a 
speaking and hearing characterized by its subject, who speaks and hears not like creatures. 
As deaf theology has sought to make sense of how the deaf experience can relate to the God 
of the Bible, it has concluded that God, too, is “physically deaf” insofar as God is beyond 
the categories of hearing and deafness.6 It has also argued that God is “culturally deaf”, 
thereby suggesting that God “knows how to relate to Deaf people and he understands their 
culture.”7 The understanding of God’s hearing for which I argue here will, I am convinced, 
support those same conclusions and, in that sense, be no less good news to deaf people than 
to hearing people. If I must face the accusation of magnifying a marginalizing theme in 
Scripture, my only recourse is to concede that the language is unavoidably given and that 
                                                          
3 See Hannah Lewis, Deaf Liberation Theology (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007). 
4 See Wayne Morris, Theology Without Words: Theology in the Deaf Community (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008). 
5 Ibid., pp. 137-156. 
6 Ibid., pp. 148-151. 
7 Ibid., p. 152. 
15 
 
my theological interpretation of that language is, I believe, good news to the deaf and 
hearing, the mute and the speaking, to all who wish to be known by God, regardless of 
ability. And while I have adopted the language of speaking/speaker and hearing/hearer as a 
conventional shorthand, that “speaking” and “hearing”, I have labored to make clear, need 
not be vocalized or audible. Indeed, speaking to and being heard by God need not be 
linguistic, as evinced in Scripture’s reference to inward groans (Rom. 8:23) and sighs that 
are too deep for words (Rom. 8:26). Yet I have sought to faithfully explore the depth and 
riches of God’s self-revelation as a “hearer” and to follow that revelation wherever it may 
lead. 
 The argument begins with an attempt to carefully listen to the testimony of 
Scripture. If God hears as God, then it is important that God be given the first and 
authoritative word on God’s hearing. The danger lurking in the background of any 
theological claim is the risk of pure projection. Of course, the use of human language makes 
some degree of projection unavoidable. But the risk is especially high when 
anthropomorphic talk of “hearing” and “ears” is involved, heightening the human 
imagination to conceive of God as one who hears like a creature. And yet if theology is not 
to be reduced entirely to anthropology, as Feuerbach might have it, then God must be given 
the first and last word on God’s ears. Such is the case when any consideration is made of 
God’s relation to creation. For, “any account of the relation of God’s perfect life in himself 
to created reality will be adequate to the degree to which it is shaped and normed by the 
Biblical canon. Any such account will have to commend itself by a capacity to illuminate 
that by which it is illumined, namely, Holy Scripture.”8 It is, then, by a careful listening to 
Scripture that Scripture itself is to be illuminated, in order that the form and content of 
God’s hearing might be understood as God has revealed it to be. Thus, the aim of Chapter 1 
is to develop a theological framework and working definition to better understand 
Scripture’s testimony to God’s hearing. The framework and definition are the result of 
sustained listening to both the text of Scripture and to those who have engaged it. With 
particular focus on the Abraham-Sarah-Hagar narrative, the Psalms, and the Lazarus 
narrative, I have sought to demonstrate some of the richness of Scripture’s testimony to this 
neglected theme, while also making a constructive proposal for how it should be conceived. 
With particular dependence on Simone Weil and Eleonore Stump, God’s hearing is 
conceived of as God’s significant personal presence that is accomplished by means of a 
loving and just attention. As a reflection on God’s self-revelation in Holy Scripture, the 
                                                          
8 John Webster, “Perfection and Participation” in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or 
the Wisdom of God?, ed. by Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2011), p. 388. 
16 
 
theological framework and working definition are developed with an orientation toward 
God’s pro nobis activity to and for creation. The framework and definition are, then, best 
understood within the economic frame of God’s opera ad extra. The extent to which these 
constructive proposals are relevant to God’s immanent and eternal life is picked up in 
Chapter 3. The framework and working definition lay the foundation for the subsequent 
argument and are returned to in chapters three, four and five, where they receive 
confirmation and their implications considered for the doctrines of creation, anthropology, 
and christology, respectively. In this way it is my intention to prioritize God’s self-
revelation in Holy Scripture as my primary interlocutor and to bring the witness of Scripture 
to bear on those other dogmatic loci. 
 Chapter 2 is a sustained engagement with a potentially surprising interlocutor: Karl 
Barth. Barth’s reputation among some as a theologian who is uncompromisingly committed 
to divine actuality makes his work an unlikely place to reflect on God’s hearing. And yet 
Barth has had more to say about God’s hearing than any other theologian, modern or 
ancient. His work, therefore, serves as an excellent example of the way God’s hearing can 
be understood within a theological frame that takes both actuality and receptivity seriously. 
After situating Barth’s understanding of God’s hearing of creatures within his doctrine of 
creation, I move to show how Barth’s understanding of hearing illumines his understanding 
of the arrangement of divine and human agency. This understanding of God’s hearing and 
agency do not abrogate human speech unto God, but rather arms those who speak to God 
with unswerving confidence in prayer. I seek to show that Barth’s understanding does 
considerable theological work for him, especially in his consideration of divine constancy. 
For Barth, God’s hearing is at the center of a complex knot of questions concerning the 
relationship between the immutable, sovereign creator and sinful, finite creatures. As Barth 
brings God’s hearing to bear on the nature of God’s constancy, the promise of God’s 
hearing as a theologically illuminating concept is opened up, showing that it can do work 
not only for understandings of the economy of salvation and the creator-creature relation, 
but may also illumine the nature of God, ad intra. 
 Chapter 3 takes up this promise through consideration of the doctrine of creation 
with specific focus on the nature of the creator-creature relation. I seek to develop a 
grammar by which one may properly speak of God as a hearer while maintaining both 
God’s distinction from and relation to creation. Put concisely, I am asking, How can God 
hear not-God? The objective is to frame ways of speaking of God’s hearing which are 
illumined by and consistent with a non-contrastive account of transcendence that maintains 
the uncompromising ontological alterity of God while insisting that this alterity is the 
grounds for the radical proximity of the God who hears creatures. This understanding of the 
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creator-creature relation raises the question of God’s self-correspondence. What is the 
relation between God’s act and being? If God is a hearer, ad extra, what does this mean for 
God’s immanent life, ad intra? Here I depart from Barth and his methodological 
commitment to the order of knowing, preferring to follow Aquinas. Doing so, I propose that 
there are good reasons to consider that there is a kind of “hearing” in the immanent life of 
God. It is my contention that God eternally “hears” God, ad intra. As such, hearing is 
prevented from becoming some new divine activity, or an activity that is confined to God’s 
economy and contingent upon the creative act. The theological grammar is then developed 
such that a positive characterization of God’s hearing may be given. I argue that God’s 
hearing is an uncompelled and gratuitous gift that is analogous to, but ultimately dissimilar 
from, human hearing that is finally ordered toward human creatures’ participation in God’s 
superabundant life of love. 
 The fourth chapter focuses on theological anthropology and makes an argument for 
the formative effects of being heard by others and by God. In reliance on Alistair 
McFadyen’s anthropology, I propose that human becoming is wrapped up with being heard 
by others. Whether or not I am heard determines who I am and who I understand myself to 
be. By engaging with other disciplines, I seek to show how being heard by another is 
positively formative. To be heard by another leaves the speaker changed in distinct and 
concrete ways that are advantageous and contribute to the project of self-understanding and 
identity formation. I also argue for the negative formative effects of going unheard or even 
silenced. The malformative results can be tragically damaging and undermine the project of 
self-understanding. When the formative anthropological effects of being heard are brought 
within the purview of God’s hearing, there results existential and pastoral resources for 
those who cry out to God from the wilderness. I juxtapose a theology of God’s hearing 
alongside what I label “passibilist-liberationist” strategies. In contrast to these strategies, I 
propose that God’s hearing is advantageously formative and more existentially and 
pastorally satisfying than passibilist-liberationist approaches. Through a theological 
interpretation of Psalm 22, I propose that God’s hearing is understood to produce a concrete 
response, both in the sufferer’s circumstances, externally, and in the identity formation, 
internally, of the sufferer who cries out to God to be heard. Understood in this way, God’s 
hearing is a profoundly liberating soteriological reality. That God hears is the good news 
that delivers Israel from Egypt into the land of promise; it is the good news of return from 
exile; it is the good news of the resurrection that follows from the cross. As such, it is, in 
one sense, at the very heart of the gospel. 
 The fifth and final chapter is a focused reflection on christology and its bearing on 
God’s hearing. If God’s hearing is to be understood as the hearing of the Triune God of the 
18 
 
Bible, then it must be shaped and normed by the person and work of Jesus Christ. Further, if 
to be heard by God does, in fact, produce salvific outcomes, such outcomes are 
unimaginable apart from the person and work of Christ. So, in four christological 
moments—incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension—I seek to think God’s 
hearing through christologically. The incarnation, which is the supreme manifestation of the 
significant personal presence of God, reveals that God’s hearing finds its locus in this 
incarnate one. In the crucifixion, the character of God’s hearing is revealed. In the 
resurrection, the incarnate and always-heard Word is vindicated. In the ascension, God’s 
hearing triumphs as the incarnate, crucified, resurrected Word, who is always heard, takes 
humanity with him into God’s place. In these four christological moments, I seek to 
demonstrate that the Word is not only the one who is always heard by the Father, but is the 
one by whom the Father hears those united to Christ by faith. 
 The conclusion reflects back on some of the metaphysical and theological claims of 
the argument by way of their appearance in the book of Job. It also briefly gestures toward 
some of the ethical implications of God’s hearing for those who claim to be heard on 
account of Jesus Christ. In a world where words are the weapons of war, there is a desperate 
need for the kind of listening characterized by the Always-Heard Word who is also the King 
of Peace. 
So, into the theological void, it is the objective of this work to speak, to contribute 
to a needed conversation about God’s hearing. In the light of the dominance of speech, the 
irony is palpable. And yet I hope it will be evident that the subsequent words about God 
have resulted from concerted and careful listening—to Holy Scripture and to the voices of 
others. There is no final word to be delivered on God’s hearing. Only by continually 
listening—the kind conditioned by and a reflection of the patient, just, and loving character 
of God’s listening—may God’s hearing be theologically illumined. Insofar as I have strived 




1. SCRIPTURE: AN AUSCULTATION OF HEARING 
 
“Listening must be examined—itself auscultated—at the keenest or tightest point of its tension and its 
penetration. The ear is stretched by or according to meaning—perhaps one should say that its 
tension is meaning already, or made of meaning…”1 
 
Bodies are objects that can be heard. Physicians use stethoscopes to auscultate bodies. 
Attention is usually paid to the heart, lungs, or bowels in order to evaluate the health and 
functioning of the body. Diagnoses are made and future complications are predicted and 
prevented by such attention. Conversely, inadequate attention to one or more bodily systems 
may result in undiagnosed illness of the neglected system, and may even prove detrimental 
to other bodily systems. The situation is no different for the theologian, the doctor of the 
Church of Jesus Christ, whose attention is given to a different corpus, albeit it, a textual one; 
and it is the driving concern of this work that theologians have paid insufficient attention to 
the ears of this body. 
 Ironically, the ear, too, must be auscultated, and that more fully than it has 
henceforth. Scripture speaks of God listening, hearing, inclining God’s ear, and so forth. It 
is the contention of this work that when better theological attention is given to God’s 
hearing, there results important insights that not only illumine God’s relation to creation, but 
also provide theological resources scarcely utilized. Put another way, when the theological 
doctor of the church attends to the ears of the corpus, she learns more about the auditory 
system of that body, but also about how to use her own stethoscope.  
 What makes the ironic task of listening to God’s listening so important? It must be 
remembered that the doctor of the church is always listening to a second corpus—the 
Corpus Christi—and that that Body needs doctors who have listened carefully to God’s 
hearing, learned from it, and can teach credibly about listening. Two millennia of Christian 
tradition have observed the voice of the Church wax and wane with varying historical, 
cultural, and political circumstances. Might it be that the Church’s loss of voice is 
sometimes preceded and caused by a loss of hearing? Prolonged deafness always 
compromises speech. When the doctors of the Church better auscultate God’s hearing in the 
                                                          




corpus of Scripture, they thereby serve the Corpus Christi by taking up the ministry of their 
Lord, who “even makes the deaf hear and the mute speak” (Mk 7:37). 
 In what follows, it is my intention to take some initial soundings of God’s hearing in 
the corpus of Scripture. First, in an exploration of the first truly dialogical divine-human 
interaction in the canon, the Abraham narrative will provide a theological framework for 
interpreting God’s hearing. God’s covenantal relationship with Abraham, as well as God’s 
dealings with Hagar and Ishmael, supply a framework that runs with surprising consistency 
across the entirety of the corpus of Scripture. After developing the framework, second, I 
turn to the Psalter to examine the divinely revealed human experience of God’s hearing. 
Carefully listening to the cries and pleas of the Psalmist furnishes a working definition of 
God’s hearing. Of course, this “definition” can only be proximate and is inescapably 
plagued by the finitude and failings of the world in which it is formulated. Yet it makes 
possible an intelligible way of speaking of God’s hearing—a speaking that is shaped by both 
Biblical testimony and the revealed testimony of the Biblical authors. 
 Of course, speaking about God’s hearing inexorably surfaces the question about the 
extent to which such overtly anthropomorphic language reliably signifies divine reality. This 
and related issues will be taken up in more detail in subsequent chapters. Here, I must 
register what space will prohibit from becoming anything more than assertions. First, God’s 
simplicity and transcendence mean that no language about God’s hearing, no matter the 
level of description, can be univocal.2 Any working definition or description, despite 
moving away from descriptions of ears and sound waves, remains unavoidably 
metaphorical. God is wholly Other, thereby making univocal theological predication 
impossible. Second, anthropomorphism need not reduce to metaphysical nihilism or mere 
Feuerbachian projection. Aquinas dealt with this through his account of analogy.3 Calvin 
argued for divine accommodation, wherein God “lisps” when self-revealing in Scripture.4 
Janet Martin Soskice has argued for the conceptual possibility of theological realism built 
upon experience.5 There are numerous ways of articulating a correspondence between God’s 
                                                          
2 Insightfully, Langdon Gilkey has warned against the modern slide toward univocity. See, 
“Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language” in God’s Activity in the World: The 
Contemporary Problem, ed. Owen C. Thomas (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983).  
3 Thomas Summa Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.13.5. I am mindful that David Burrell has concluded 
that Aquinas did not have a coherent theory, per se. David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 55. See also, William C. Placher, The 
Domestication of Transcendence (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), Chs. 2, 5.  
4 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.13.1.  




self-revelation in Scripture and the reality to which it points. Third, because God has chosen 
to self-reveal in the canon of Scripture, the written record of experiences in the Psalter is 
reliably revelatory of a divine reality. These assumptions make possible the explication of 
God’s hearing from the experience of the authors of the Psalter.  
 Finally, I will turn my attention to the New Testament, with special attention given 
to the Lazarus narrative of John 11, to ask in what way the developed framework and 
working definition are supported and transformed in light of the incarnation and the 
relationship of the Son to the Father in that particular narrative. A final, more developed 
christology will be the focus of the final chapter of this work. 
 One remaining cautionary note: while doing the stethoscopic work of auscultating 
the text, it is important to remember that the doctor of the Church does not stand 
authoritatively above the text, stethoscope in hand, evaluating, note-taking, and making 
diagnoses, but rather under the text and its authority. The metaphor breaks down if we 
forget that the theologian is not only doctor, but patient. What is heard when listening to the 
ears of the text has authority over all of its listeners, even—or perhaps especially—the 
theologian. Thus, with an auscultation of the text comes not only the responsibility to hear, 
but also to heed; not only to listen, but to obey. In this way, hearing the text becomes a 
moral act that will bring with it moral obligations, if the theologian is to be faithful not only 
to the text, but to God, the source of and authority behind the text. 
 
1.1 Abraham and the Covenant: An Interpretive Framework 
Genesis 15 is the Bible’s first canonically-ordered account of divine-human dialogue.6 As 
such, it offers insights into the shape and meaning of God’s hearing and is a fitting place to 
start for an auscultation of God’s hearing. Indeed, elements of the Abraham narrative in 
Genesis 15-16 surface critical theological issues and furnish a preliminary framework for 
understanding God’s hearing that will be informed and expanded by the balance of the 
Biblical canon. Here the intention is to clarify the relationship between God’s hearing and 
the covenant with Abraham. It will be argued that God’s listening ear is the special privilege 
of the covenant people of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; yet it is not exclusively 
theirs. This conclusion anticipates the relationship between God and Israel that will take 
                                                          
6 While Genesis 3:8-19 has the appearance of divine-human dialogue, it is best understood as a 
judgment narrative that merely calls Adam and Eve to account for their actions. God questions, and 
Adam and Eve respond. Yet there is no indication that God’s response is conditioned by their 




shape across the remainder of the Hebrew Bible, as well as God’s relationship with those 
who are not members of the covenant.  
A literary analysis of Genesis 15 reflects a dialogical form between God and 
Abram. There are two structurally parallel scenes. The first in vv. 15:1-6, and the second, 
longer, scene in vv. 15:7-21. The first scene is initiated by a revelation of the LORD to 
Abraham in a vision. In this vision God assures Abraham, “Fear not, Abram, I am your 
shield; your reward shall be very great” (15:1, ESV). Thus, it is God who chooses the 
medium of communication, that is, the vision, and God who speaks first. The divine 
utterance is best characterized as a promise. Abraham responds to the promise with a 
question that is an implicit request for some evidence (15:2-3). His question need not be 
understood as motivated by doubt or faithlessness, for Abraham’s faith is praised in 15:6 
and functions as a salutary model later in the Scriptures. What is remarkable about 
Abraham’s question is not merely how God responds, but that God responds at all. Abraham 
has asked a question of the “Sovereign Lord”, and God responds. Put another way, the 
narrative characterizes God’s subsequent speech as conditioned by Abraham’s request. 
While it is not stated explicitly in the passage that God “heard” him, the fact that God did so 
is evidenced by the response: God speaks reassurance to Abraham and gives him a sign 
(15:4-5). God’s response is a direct and specific response to Abraham’s question and request 
for a sign. If God had not responded at all, or had responded in a way that lacked continuity 
with Abraham’s questions, then God’s hearing would be in question. The fact that God’s 
response is a specific and direct reply to Abraham’s question demonstrates the narrative’s 
intent to portray a dialogue between God and Abraham that is analogous to human-to-
human dialogue. Thus, the pattern is as follows: God speaks, Abraham speaks, God hears 
and responds. In this way, God and Abraham have carried on a dialogue, the likes of which 
had not yet occurred in the Biblical record.  
The second scene is longer, but of a similar structure. Again, God utters a promise 
to Abraham (15:7). Abraham directs his question to the “Sovereign Lord”. It is, again, a 
request for evidence for the truth of God’s promise (15:8). That God hears Abraham’s 
question is again evidenced by the specific way in which God responds. In a series of 
mysterious actions which have received a variety of interpretations, God instructs Abraham 
to gather a number of sacrificial animals which Abraham then cuts into halves and lays 
transversely. Abraham then falls into a deep sleep. God speaks a direct response to 
Abraham’s question, by referring to the coming period of Egyptian slavery and the eventual 
return to the land promised to Abraham’s descendants. This declaration of coming events is 
a word of assurance addressing Abraham’s question. As in the previous scene, the word of 
assurance is followed by a sign. This sign, however, is more dramatic and of greater 
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significance for Abraham’s relationship with God. For, despite the meaning of many details 
remaining unclear, what is certain is that the smoking pot and flaming torch passing 
between the animals is consistent with covenant-making activity.7 Through this activity, 
God has cut a covenant with Abraham that binds Godself to fulfill the actions promised. The 
pattern is again clear: God speaks, Abraham speaks, God hears and responds.  
This divine-human dialogue and its role in the establishment of God’s covenant 
people evinces a correlation between God’s listening and God’s covenant relationship. 
Hitherto Genesis has described God’s engagement with creation in general and with 
humankind in particular, in the mode of speech. God’s word has brought forth creation. 
God’s word has pronounced judgement on Adam, Eve, the Serpent, the generation of Noah, 
and the builders of the Babel tower. Yet it is here with Abraham that God’s ear is active. 
God listens to Abraham’s questions and requests.8 Beginning here, with Abraham, God 
inclines God’s listening ear for dialogical purposes. This makes plausible the suggestion that 
this mode of engagement is associated with those with whom God makes covenant. 
This privileged mode of God’s engagement can be further traced along covenantal 
lines. Moses spoke with God as one does a friend, face-to-face (Ex 33:11). In contrast to the 
gods of other nations, Deuteronomy 4:7 boldly proclaims, “For what other great nation has a 
god so near to it as the LORD our God is whenever we call to him?” Here Israel experiences 
the nearness of being heard when they call to God. In the giving of the law—a significant 
moment for the covenant people of God, if ever there was one—Israel communicates to 
Moses great fear at God’s giving of the Decalogue, at which point the latter responds, “The 
LORD heard your words when you spoke to me, and the LORD said to me: ‘I have heard the 
words of this people, which they have spoken to you; they are right in all that they have 
spoken’” (Deut 5:28). Indeed, there are dozens of passages throughout the Hebrew Bible, 
which state indicatively that God has heard the people of Israel.  
As a collection of texts recording the history of Israel’s relationship with the LORD, 
it should come as no surprise that the Hebrew Bible narrates accounts of God listening to 
                                                          
7 Cf. Jeremiah 34:18. Wenham cites an eighth-century treatise that takes a similar form. Though, 
Wenham acknowledges the numerous interpretations this passage has received. See Gordon J. 
Wenham, Genesis 1-15, Word Biblical Commentary Series (Waco, Tex.: Word Books, 1987), p. 332. 
Westermann’s argument that God’s activity is not an act of covenant-making but akin to an oath is 
unconvincing. See Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), p. 225. 
8 While it could be argued that God was listening in the Garden or to the Babel tower-builders, for 
example, these cases lack the dialogical character of the Abraham narrative. The events that precede 
the Abraham narrative may involve a kind of divine response to human activity, but none implies 
divine hearing. More often it is implicitly or explicitly communicated that God sees (e.g., When God 
sees that each day of creation is good.). 
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Israel. Yet in order to establish that God’s listening ear is the special privilege of the 
covenant people, more must be said. Put another way, to come to this conclusion, it is 
necessary to demonstrate God’s willingness to hear the covenant people; but alone, that is 
insufficient to demonstrate God’s listening ear as their special privileged possession. A 
thorough auscultation of God’s hearing must listen carefully to what is said about God’s 
listening to those outside of the covenant. Here, continuing to read the Abraham narrative 
offers surprising insights that further establish a framework for understanding God’s 
hearing. 
 Hagar’s relationship to Sarah, Abraham, and the covenant with the LORD have too 
often been the victim of hasty theological judgement. The influence of Paul’s allegorical 
reading presented in his letter to the Galatians has produced interpretations that too tidily 
sort Sarah and Hagar and their descendants into covenant and non-covenant members, 
respectively. In doing so, they often dismiss or minimize Hagar’s role in the narrative. 
Sometimes the Hagar narrative is construed as merely background material to the Abraham-
Sarah-Isaac narrative. Or it has been suggested that their function is merely literary: 
protagonists need antagonists.9 However, to read too quickly over the Hagar sub-plot would 
be to overlook substantial contributions to a thorough auscultation of God’s hearing. In 
contrast, when the ear is attentive to the setting and details of the narrative, surprising 
themes can be heard, and rather loudly!  
 In Genesis 16 barren Sarah has an Egyptian slave, Hagar, whom she gives to her 
husband Abraham in order that she might bear children. Hagar conceives and, in pride, 
looks with contempt upon her mistress Sarah. The oppressed becomes the oppressor. In 
retribution, and with Abraham’s permission, Sarah deals harshly with Hagar, such that the 
latter flees into the wilderness in the direction of Egypt. It is at the spring on the way to Shur 
that the messenger of the LORD ( ְך ָ֛ה ַמְלַאַ֧ ְיהו  ) meets Hagar, commands her to return to Sarah, 
and announces the forthcoming birth of a son from whom a great multitude of people will 
issue. In the annunciation, the messenger supplies the reason for this divine blessing: the 
LORD has listened to her affliction. More than that, the son whom Hagar bears is to be 
called Ishmael (אל ע ֵ֔  or “God-Hears.” In response, Hagar declares, “you are a God of (ִיְשמ 
seeing” ( ה ָּ֖ ל ַאת  ֵ֣ י א  ֳרִאִ֑ ) and names the spring “the spring of the living one who sees me” ( ר ֵ֥  ְבא 
י י ַלַחָּ֖ ֹרִאִ֑ ). Later, in Genesis 21:8-21, after the birth of Isaac, Sarah urges Abraham to dismiss 
Hagar and Ishmael to avoid compromising Isaac’s inheritance. Abraham sends Hagar out, 
again into the wilderness, where she and Ishmael struggle to find water. Facing the likely 
                                                          
9 von Rad argues that they serve to “retard the action of the main narrative and to heighten the 
suspense.” Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (Philadelphia, 1972), p. 196. 
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death of Ishmael, Hagar cries out to God, who responds, first, by declaring that God has 
heard the voice of Ishmael and, second, by opening Hagar’s eyes to available water. 
 What can be gathered from the Hagar narrative about God’s hearing and about its 
relationship to the covenant? First, there is God’s obvious self-description in the naming of 
Ishmael—that the LORD is a God who hears. This overt declaration about the activity of 
God, by God, is easily lost on English readers, buried in the meaning of the Hebrew name. 
God names the son of Hagar, God-Hears because God has heard her affliction (16:11). So 
significant is the naming of Ishmael and the declaration that God has heard Hagar that 
Westermann sees it as the goal of the entire Hagar narrative.10 The theme is a recurring one 
as, later, the text engages in overt word play when God is said to hear the voice of the boy 
(21:17). God hears the voice of God-Hears. Both the early canonical position of this divine 
self-predication, as well as its placement in Israel’s founding narrative—these establish the 
character of the God of Abraham as one who hears.  
 Second, it should be noted that Hagar is an Egyptian. It has been argued 
persuasively that Hagar’s ethnic identity is not a superfluous textual detail, but an 
intentional, ironic echo to Israel’s Egyptian slavery.11 Israel’s time of slavery in Egypt was 
already anticipated in Genesis 15:13. Here Sarah, who is to become the mother of the 
covenant people, enslaves and oppresses Hagar, the Egyptian.12 This ironic, self-critical 
interpretation makes a hero out of Hagar the slave and turns Sarah into Pharaoh.13 Dozeman 
asserts that “The ethnic identity of Hagar as an Egyptian certainly has a theological function 
in the text to provide self-criticism of the ancestors and reversal during the exodus.”14 There 
is then, in God’s hearing of Hagar, an anticipation of how God will listen to Israel when 
under Egyptian oppression. There is further evidence of the overt echo to Israel’s Egyptian 
slavery in Hagar’s declaration that God has seen her and in her corresponding naming of the 
spring. In Exodus 2:24 God “hears” the groaning of God’s people and “sees” them. That 
God heard God’s people in Egyptian slavery is a recurring theme in the Hebrew Bible (Ex 
                                                          
10 Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 249. 
11 See esp., Thomas Dozeman, “The Wilderness and Salvation History in the Hagar Story” in Journal 
of Biblical Literature, Vol. 117, No 1 (Spring, 1998), pp. 23-43. Also, for an understanding of 
Hagar’s representation of the fruitful and constantly tempting Egypt, see Iain Duguid, “Hagar the 
Egyptian: A Note on the Allure of Egypt in the Abraham Cycle” in Westminster Theological Journal, 
Vol. 56 (1994), pp. 419-21.  
12 Cf. David Daube, The Exodus Pattern in the Bible (All Souls Studies 2; London: Faber & Faber, 
1963), pp. 23-38; M. Tsevat, “Hagar and the Birth of Ishmael,” in The Meaning of the Book of Job 
and Other Biblical Studies: Essays on the Literature and Religion of the Hebrew Bible (New York: 
Ktav, 1980) pp. 69-70. 
13 Thomas Dozeman, “The Wilderness and Salvation History in the Hagar Story,” p. 28. 
14 Ibid., p. 29. n. 17. 
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3:7, 6:5; Num 20:16; Neh 9:9). Here, in the Hagar narrative, God hears the affliction of the 
Egyptian who is enslaved and afflicted, just as God will hear Israel. The two narratives are 
linked by shared circumstances and God’s listening ear. Taken together, they also forecast 
the way in which God may hear those unjustly treated by the covenant people, to be 
discussed below. 
Third, the setting of Hagar’s encounter with the messenger of the LORD is the ר ִ֑  ִמְדב 
(“wilderness”). The wilderness takes on social and political connotations in the Hagar 
narrative due to its echo of Israel’s exodus experience.15 Again, the intertextual echoes of 
Israel’s experience are palpable. Hagar flees from her slave-master into the wilderness two 
times. In both, the LORD is encountered and hears her cries of affliction. Hagar’s wilderness 
experience anticipates Israel’s. As Dozeman concludes, “The points of contact between 
Hagar and the exodus are undeniable, as is the self-critical nature of the literature.”16 Even at 
this early point in the Pentateuch, the wilderness—the place where fear, uncertainty, 
instability, and isolation erupt into desperate cries to God—is already the place where God 
becomes present and hears. It would appear that God’s listening ear is especially attentive to 
wilderness-circumstances.  
 Finally, while it is doubtless that Isaac is the child of promise from whom the 
covenant people issue, the Hagar narrative ends with Ishmael being circumcised (17:22-27). 
Ishmael, God-Hears, is marked with the sign of the covenant, as is Abraham’s whole 
household, including those foreigners belonging to it. This act of obedience on the part of 
Abraham makes Ishmael’s covenant status at least ambiguous. It might be argued that he 
was incorporated into the covenant people by this act, even if his descendants were not. Yet 
even if there remain compelling exegetical or theological reasons for concluding otherwise, 
Ishmael’s circumcision, along with the wilderness setting and Hagar’s ethnic identity 
frustrate neat and tidy divisions between the lines of Sarah and Hagar that too easily dismiss 
the latter’s contribution to fruitful theological reflection.  
 How is it, then, that the Abraham narrative and the Hagar sub-plot contribute to a 
theological framework for understanding God’s hearing? What conclusions can be drawn? 
The following will propose four elements of a theological framework, derived from the 
narrative, which, if correct, will be supported by the remainder of the Hebrew canon and 
will clarify the relationship between God’s hearing and the covenant. 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 29. 
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 First, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the covenant people of 
Israel, is the God who hears. God’s self-revelation as Ishmael functions as a definitive act of 
divine disclosure that predicates a particular activity of the God of the Hebrew bible. This 
revelation demonstrates, by way of naming the offspring of Abraham and Hagar, one mode 
by which this God engages with creation. As a listener, this God self-reveals as capable of a 
kind of responsiveness or receptivity to human speech. Of course, to speak of divine 
responsiveness is to raise numerous questions that must await further treatment below. At 
this juncture, God’s revelation of God in the narrative stands to establish a particular 
oikonomia in God’s relationship with human speakers. And this God, who self-reveals as 
Ishmael, remains the hearing God, beyond the bounds of the narrative. This self-revelation 
is not limited by the scope of the Hagar or Abraham narratives; nor is it circumscribed by 
Genesis or even the Pentateuch. The God of Abraham is revealed, in the constancy of God’s 
nature, to be a God who hears.  God heard that Leah was hated (Gen 29:33). God heard 
Rachael’s request for children (Gen 30:6). God heard the Israelites groaning in slavery (Ex 
2:24, 3:7, 6:5; Num 20:16; Deut 26:7). God heard the complaints of the Israelites in the 
wilderness (Num 11:1, 18; 12:2; 14:27, 28). God heard Solomon’s dedicatory prayer for the 
temple (1 Ki 9:3; para. 2 Chron 7:12). God heard Elijah’s petition to raise the widow’s son 
(1 Ki 17:22). God heard the cries of the Psalmist, which gave way to rejoicing (Ps 66:19) 
and is addressed as “you who hear prayer” (Ps 65:2). God heard the prayer of Hezekiah in 
his illness (Is 38:4-5). God heard Jeremiah’s lament (Lam 3:55). God heard all the words of 
Daniel (Dan 10:12). The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is the covenant God who hears. 
It is this consistent, self-revelation of God in Scripture that allows Moses to exclaim, “For 
what other great nation has a god so near to it as the LORD our God is whenever we call to 
him?” 
 Second, the God who hears is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the 
covenant people of Israel. Put another way, God’s listening ear is the special privilege of 
God’s covenant people. The God who hears has bound Godself by way of a covenant to a 
particular people in such a way that God’s ear is inclined to them. This God not only speaks 
to Abraham, but listens to him. When God hears Israel’s groaning under Egyptian slavery, 
God remembers the covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Ex 2:24). The God who 
hears their groaning has promised to be their God (Ex 6:7). When Solomon dedicates the 
newly built temple to the LORD, he prays, “O LORD, God of Israel, there is no God like you 
in heaven above or on earth beneath, keeping covenant and steadfast love for your servants” 
and proceeds to ask the LORD to hear the prayers of the covenant people in a vast variety of 
situations. The temple, the dwelling place of the God of Israel, becomes the place from 
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where God hears prayer.17 Indeed, part and parcel to God’s covenant with descendants of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is the privilege of God’s listening ear.  
Yet this God is not only the God of the covenant people, but also the “King of all 
the earth” (Ps. 47:7). Sarah’s unjust and oppressive treatment of Hagar is the first example 
of God’s covenant people failing to be faithful covenant partners by neglecting their duty to 
reflect the mercy and justice of God to others. It is significant that God hears the cries and 
groans of the covenant people as sojourners in Egypt, because this is transformed into a 
reminder that Israel, who was once the oppressed, ought not to become the oppressor. For 
just as God heard the cries of Israel, God will hear the cries of sojourners, widows, and the 
fatherless (Ex 22:21-24) who are oppressed by Israel. If they are unjustly treated, their cries 
will invite God’s wrath on their oppressors. Thus, just as God’s listening ear gave rise to 
God’s justice and compassion for Israel in Egypt, now Israel is to be sensitive to the cries of 
others and act justly and compassionately toward them. God’s hearing of Hagar, as well as 
God’s commitment to hear the sojourner dwelling among Israel, suggests that God’s ear is 
inclined toward the groans of the oppressed, regardless of their covenant status. Already the 
blood of Abel has cried out to God from the ground (Gen 4:10). Solomon even prays at the 
dedication of the temple that God would hear the temple-directed prayer of the foreigner 
who will come to know of Israel’s great God. God’s listening ear is the special privilege of 
the covenant people, but this does not mean God’s ear is stopped to others (1 Ki 8:41-43; 2 
Chr 6:32-33). So, God hears the cries and groans of the oppressed, regardless of their 
covenant status. God also hears the cries of those outside the covenant who experience the 
effects of Israel’s covenant failings, namely, Israel’s failure to treat others with the mercy 
and compassion with which God treated them. God will hear not only for but also against 
the covenant people. 
 Third, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the covenant people of 
Israel, is the God whose ear is especially inclined to those in the wilderness. This God is 
willing, and does in fact, incline God’s ear to those in the wilderness. Hagar’s wilderness 
experiences demonstrate the way God hears the cries of those who find themselves in the 
place where fear, uncertainty, instability, and isolation erupt into desperate cries to God. 
God’s compassion to Hagar, prompted by God’s hearing, becomes paradigmatic for all 
those who share her experience of oppression and alienation. In light of the ironic and self-
critical nature of the Hagar narrative, Hagar may be understood as a type of Israel, running 
                                                          
17 Samuel Ballentine, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-Human Dialogue 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 82. 
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from her slave-master into the wilderness, whose cries of affliction are heard by God. In this 
way, she anticipates God’s compassionate hearing of the covenant people in the wilderness.  
If God’s ear is especially inclined to those who cry out in the wilderness, what does 
the wilderness look like? While not exhaustive, there are a few distinct and prominent 
themes in the Hebrew Bible.  
There is a surprising correlation in the Hebrew Bible between God’s listening ear 
and what can be generally described as “barrenness narratives”. These are difficult passages 
which reflect the stigmatization of childlessness in the ancient world and can continue to 
stigmatize and marginalize today. And yet they give special insight into God’s hearing. 
Ishmael, God-Hears, is named in the larger context of Sarah’s barrenness. God hears 
Hagar’s cry, but the result is Abraham’s firstborn son, who was the will of Sarah’s decision. 
Similarly, in the relationship between barren Rachael and unloved Leah, God hears Leah’s 
affliction and she gives birth, first to Reuben (ן ִ֑ -whose name means Behold- or Look-a ,(ְראּוב 
son,18 and then to Simeon (ִשְמֽעֹון), or Hearing-with-acceptance19 (Gen 29:32-33). Shortly 
thereafter, Rachael conceives and declares, “God has […] heard my voice and given me a 
son” (Gen 30:6). Then, in 1 Samuel 1, barren Hannah must endure rival Peninnah’s 
provocations. The former pours out her soul before the LORD in the temple and is 
remembered. She conceives and gives birth to a son, whom she names Samuel (ל  1) (ְשמּוא ֵ֔
Sam 1:1-20). The etymology of Samuel’s name has received various interpretations.20 
However, the Hebrew bears phonological similarity to Ishmael’s name. So, “[a]lthough the 
names are associated with different roots, שמע ‘to hear’ and שאל ‘to ask’, the phonological 
likeness of the names אל ע ֵ֔ ל and ִיְשמ   should not be dismissed, since up to this point these ְשמּוא ֵ֔
stories have developed along a similar line.”21 Nikaido has argued that “given the strong 
background of persecution in these narratives, the attentive reader may have easily heard the 
echo of the root שמע, which is regularly identified with stories of affliction in biblical 
literature.”22 Whether there is etymological evidence in Samuel’s naming, it is clear that, 
                                                          
18 Francis Brown, Samuel Rolles Driver, and Charles Augustus Briggs, Enhanced Brown-Driver-
Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 910. 
19 Wilhelm Gesenius, and Samuel Prideaux Tregelles, Gesenius’ Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the 
Old Testament Scriptures (Bellingham, WA: Logos Bible Software, 2003) p. 837. 
20 For the available options and a discussion of the lexical issues, see Morris Jastrow, “The Name of 
Samuel and the Stem לאש” in Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol 19, No. 1 (1900), pp. 82-105. See 
also, Scott C. Layton, Archaic Features of Canaanite Personal Names in the Hebrew Bible (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1990), pp. 78 ff. 
21 S. Nikaido, “Hagar and Ishmael as Literary Figures: An Intertextual Study” in Vetus Testamentum, 




like Hagar before her, Hannah’s prayer has been heard by God. Thus, childlessness, in the 
Hebrew Bible, is a kind of wilderness experience to which God’s ear is inclined. Given that 
“[f]or a married woman to be without children in the patriarchal world is a misfortune of 
overwhelming proportions,”23 it is no surprise that this acute pain erupts into desperate cries 
that are heard by God. 
 Broadly speaking, the wilderness is also the place of cries for deliverance, either 
from danger of enemies or from God’s judgment, if these can be categorized as distinctly 
different. Fear of imminent danger is often the source of cries to God, to which God’s ear is 
inclined. God listened to Moses when he interceded on behalf of Israel after the golden calf 
incident (Deut 9:19). God listened to Joshua when he asked that the sun stand still for the 
sake of the battle against the five Amorite kings at Gibeon (Josh 10:14). God listened to 
David when he cried out for deliverance from Saul and his enemies (2 Sam 22:7). God 
listened to Hezekiah’s request to remember him in his illness (Is 38:5). So frequent is God’s 
hearing in such circumstances that often there is expressed a great confidence that God will 
hear in similar circumstances. Jehoshaphat is confident (with echoes of Solomon’s temple 
dedication prayer) that if sword or judgement or pestilence or famine come upon Israel, God 
will hear their cries for deliverance (2 Chron 20:9). Micah declares confidently that his 
looking to the LORD and waiting thereupon will result in God’s hearing (Mic 7:7). The 
Biblical precedent for God’s listening also gives way to frequent requests for God to hear in 
those circumstances. The Psalms, which will be treated below, are saturated with these 
requests. Hezekiah asks God to hear the mocking words of Sennacherib and to deliver Israel 
from his hand. (2 Ki 19:16; Is. 37:17). Nehemiah asks God to hear his prayer before he 
approaches Artaxerxes (Neh 1:11) and to hear the taunts of Israel’s enemies (4:4). Jeremiah 
asks God to hear both his own prayer, as well as the malicious plotting of his enemies (Jer 
18:19). Solomon’s temple-dedication prayer asks God to hear the prayers of the covenant 
people in a panoply of circumstances, which includes when they go out to battle foreign 
enemies (1 Ki 8:44-45; 2 Chr 6:34-35). Across the Hebrew Scriptures, God is asked to hear, 
and is said to have heard, Israel’s cries for deliverance from enemies and divine judgement.  
 Deliverance from God’s judgment or from the danger of enemies is often 
accompanied by an acknowledgement of and repentance from sin. When Israel has violated 
covenant, the presence or threat of divine judgement provokes contrite repentance that is 
often characterized by the desperate tone associated with the wilderness. These are not 
infrequently accompanied by explicit requests to be heard. Isaiah assures Israel that God is 
certainly and patiently waiting to hear their cry of repentance (Is 30:18-19). Nehemiah prays 
                                                          
23 Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36, p. 237. 
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“O LORD God of heaven, the great and awesome God who keeps covenant and steadfast 
love with those who love him and keep his commandments,” and goes on to ask that God 
hear him as he confesses the sins of Israel (Neh 1:5-6). With an almost verbatim 
invocation24, Daniel confesses, at length, the sins of Israel that have brought upon them the 
Babylonian destruction, and then cries out, “listen to the prayer of your servant. […] Incline 
your ear, O my God, and hear. […] O Lord, hear.” (Dan 9:4-19). Returning to Solomon’s 
prayer of dedication at the temple, he asks that God would forgive sin and hear the cries of 
Israel in four distinct circumstances: defeat by an enemy (1 Ki 8:33-34; 2 Chr 6:24-25), 
drought (1 Ki 8:35-36; 2 Chr 6:26-27), famine by any number of causes (1 Ki 8:37-40; 2 
Chr 6:28-31), and exile (1 Ki 8:46-53; 2 Chr 6:36-39). Such passages suggest a relationship 
between God’s willingness to hear and repentance from covenant violations. The 
relationship receives its definitive statement in the 2 Chronicles account of the temple 
dedication, in which the LORD responds with specific reference to the divine punishments 
of drought and famine, stating, “if my people who are called by my name humble 
themselves, pray, seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from 
heaven, and will forgive their sin and heal their land” (2 Chr 7:14). 
 From 2 Chronicles 7:14 all of the preceding principles of the framework that 
appeared in the Abraham narrative are concisely restated. God hears. God hears God’s 
people who are called by God’s name. God hears those in the wilderness, the place where 
fear, uncertainty, instability, and isolation erupt into desperate cries to God. Yet these three 
principles of the framework imply a fourth, even if it is not explicitly stated in the Abraham 
narrative. 
 Fourth, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the covenant people of 
Israel, will refuse to hear those who are unfaithful to the covenant. The significance of 
divine hearing is established by the reality, in both Israel’s teaching and religious 
experience, that there are circumstances wherein God does not hear. God’s refusal or 
unwillingness to hear under some circumstances infuses with meaning those moments in 
which God does. While the covenant God of Israel does hear the covenant people, there are 
times when, due to Israel’s violation of the covenant that God will choose to turn a deaf ear. 
While not isolated to the prophetic literature, it is no surprise that the majority of 
declarations of divine unhearing occur there, where prophetic voices are appropriated to call 
Israel to return to covenant obedience. In Isaiah’s indictment of Judah, the voice of the 
LORD declares, “When you stretch out your hands, I will hide my eyes from you; even 
                                                          
24 Daniel addresses God as “Adonai, the great and awesome God…” instead of Nehemiah’s “O LORD 
God of heaven, the great and awesome God…” (Neh. 1:5-6).  
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though you make many prayers, I will not listen; your hands are full of blood” (Is 1:15). 
Similar to the aforementioned prohibitions on oppressing sojourners, God’s covenant people 
are prohibited from oppressing or unjustly treating their labor force, lest God turn a deaf ear. 
Israel asks, “Why do we fast, but you do not see? Why humble ourselves, but you do not 
notice?” Isaiah responds, “Look, you serve your own interest on your fast day, and oppress 
all your workers. Look, you fast only to quarrel and to fight and to strike with a wicked fist. 
Such fasting as you do today will not make your voice heard on high” (Is. 58:3-4). Isaiah 
goes on to prescribe the characteristics of the fast that the LORD prefers: liberating the 
oppressed and meeting the material needs of the impoverished. “Then,” Isaiah declares, 
“you shall call, and the LORD will answer; you shall cry for help, and he will say, ‘Here I 
am’” (Is. 58:6-9). But in the absence of such covenant faithfulness, Isaiah instructs, “See, 
the LORD’s hand is not too short to save, nor his ear too dull to hear. Rather, your iniquities 
have been barriers between you and your God, and your sins have hidden his face from you 
so that he does not hear” (Is 59:1-2). Isaiah helpfully articulates a cause-effect relationship 
between contra-covenant living and God’s unwillingness to hear. Significantly, God’s 
unwillingness to hear is not a failure on God’s part, but on Judah’s. God’s ear is not dull. 
God’s ability to hear is in no way inhibited or curtailed by covenant violations. Rather, it is 
God’s willingness. In this way, God’s unwillingness to hear belongs to a kind of divine 
judgment for sin and covenant violation. 
 The Book of Jeremiah is no less clear. After an indictment for a litany of covenant 
violations, including oppressing the sojourner, the fatherless, and the widow, God instructs 
Jeremiah, “As for you, do not pray for this people, do not raise a cry or prayer on their 
behalf, and do not intercede with me, for I will not hear you” (Jer 7:16). Interestingly, here, 
God refuses to hear even the prayers of a third party on behalf of God’s unfaithful people, 
due to the latter’s continued covenant violations. In response to these violations, God 
promises to bring about military defeat. Judah has refused to listen to the LORD. Thus, God 
is going to bring judgement upon them. Then, “though they cry out to me, I will not listen to 
them” (Jer 11:11). Repeating the injunction that Jeremiah not expend prayer on Judah, God 
declares, “I will not listen when they call to me in the time of their trouble” (Jer 11:14). 
Because God will not hear, not even intercession by Jeremiah is permitted on behalf of 
Judah. Because God is committed to remembering iniquity and punishing sin, Jeremiah’s 
intercession can only be offered in vain. The injunction is uttered a third time: “The LORD 
said to me: Do not pray for the welfare of this people. Although they fast, I do not hear their 
cry, and although they offer burnt offering and grain offering, I do not accept them; but by 
the sword, by famine, and by pestilence, I consume them” (Jer 14:11-12). God’s judgement 
of Judah is so certain that God will not entertain any petition to alter the divine plan to mete 
out punishment on the unfaithful people. Jeremiah changes strategy once Judah begins to 
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plot against him. Then, Jeremiah’s plea is no longer for deliverance from punishment, but 
for the very judgment God has been promising. In his prayer for judgement on Judah in 
Chapter 18, Jeremiah begins by crying out, “Give heed to me, O LORD, and listen to what 
my adversaries say” (Jer 18:19). He then goes on to pray that famine, violence, death, and 
pestilence would come upon Judah. Thus, it would seem that Jeremiah, though having been 
censored by God for his intercession that ran contrary to the divine plan, is now making 
another go at it by praying for the very judgement and justice that God had promised to send 
upon Judah. While God will turn a deaf ear to covenant unfaithfulness, it may be that God 
will hear cries for judgement and justice upon those who violate the divine decrees. 
 Among the other prophets, Ezekiel is no different. After God reveals to Ezekiel all 
of the ways that Judah has desecrated the temple, God declares, “Therefore, I will act in 
wrath; my eye will not spare, nor will I have pity; and though they cry in my hearing with a 
loud voice, I will not listen to them” (Ezek 8:18). Amos similarly indicts Israel for covenant 
unfaithfulness, warning those who pray for the day of the LORD, because God’s visitation 
will mean judgement rather than mercy. Sin has so dominated the life of the people that 
feasts and holy gatherings, burnt, grain, and peace offerings are all to no avail. “Take away 
from me,” God demands, “the noise of your songs; I will not listen to the melody of your 
harps” (Am 5:23). Sin has corrupted melody and turned it into cacophony. God will not 
listen to their sin-tainted worship. Rather, justice and righteousness are what are desired 
(Am 2:24).  
That God will close God’s ear to sin and unfaithfulness is the declaration of Israel’s 
prophets, but it is also present in the religious experience of the covenant people. Proverbs 
15:29 declares, “The LORD is far from the wicked, but he hears the prayer of the righteous.” 
The prayers of the Psalms imply the same division: “When the righteous cry for help, the 
LORD hears, and rescues them from all their troubles” (Ps 34:17). Similarly, “If I had 
cherished iniquity in my heart,” the Psalmist believes that “the Lord would not have 
listened” (Ps. 66:18). As representatives of popular Hebrew religion, Job’s friends suggest 
the same economic conditionality of God’s hearing. In Job 22, Eliphaz responds to Job that 
if the latter will but agree with God, receive instruction, repent, forsake wealth, then God 
will hear him (Jb 22:21-27). Even young Elihu, in condemning Job’s perceived pride, insists 
with regard to men of such arrogance that “they cry out, but he does not answer […] Surely 
God does not hear an empty cry, nor does the Almighty regard it” (Jb 35:12-13). Thus, it 
was common belief that personal and corporate iniquity were barriers to the divine audience. 
What makes God’s dialogue with Abraham and God’s self-revelation to Hagar as the 
hearing God so significant is that God does not always hear. God’s hearings is not to be 
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assumed or taken for granted, even by the covenant people. In God’s economy, covenant 
faithfulness by God’s own is a prerequisite for God’s hearing. 
 Having listened to the Abraham narrative and isolated four principles of a 
theological framework for understanding God’s hearing, the material content or meaning of 
God’s hearing must now be examined.  
 
1.2 Hearing in the Psalms 
In 1938, Friedrich Heiler published his magisterial Das Gebet: Eine religionsgeschictliche 
und relgionspychologische Untersuchung. There, Heiler asserted that “prayer is the heart 
and centre of all religion”25 and set out to explore prayer employing the 
religionsgeschictlich method that was then in vogue. His study begins with so-called 
“primitive prayer” by examining recorded prayers, personal testimony about those prayers, 
and third-party accounts about prayer experiences. Heiler observed, “Every prayer opens 
with an invocation to the divine being […] The attention of the god is thus called to the 
presence of the worshipper, or the god is summoned from a distance to hear him. Sometimes 
a loud cry precedes the god’s name, or to it is added some such word as ‘Hear!’”26 
Invocation has always been the doorstep into prayer. 
The ubiquity of the invocation, even in the primitive prayers, establishes that prayer 
is and always has been accompanied by a tacit belief that any god worth petitioning is one 
who can be called forth as one who will hear. This calling forth, as Heiler observes, may be 
a request for increased propinquity or for a special kind of attention. The petitioner desires a 
certain kind of relationship with the god wherein the god will hear the petition. Heiler goes 
on to state that such primitive prayers imply a rather crude and underdeveloped 
understanding of God, and that this is carried over into the Hebrew Scriptures.  
The language of the Old Testament has preserved in a remarkable way the sensuous 
anthropomorphism of the primitive conception of God when it speaks of God’s 
eyes and ears, mouth and hands. God sees, hears, and smells. He perceives, like 
every human being, by means of His organs or sense. Man comes before Him in 
                                                          
25 Friedrich Heiler, Das Gebet: Eine religionsgeschictliche und relgionspychologische Untersuchung 
(Oxford: OUP, 1932). All citations come from the 1997 English edition, Prayer (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 1997), p. xv.  
26 Ibid., p. 16. 
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prayer with the reverent demeanour and gesture; God sees him and addressees him 
by name; God hears his voice.27 
Heiler’s work is both dated and deeply troubling in its understanding of so-called 
“primitive” invocation. Yet it raises questions that remain relevant. Specifically, his work 
surfaces theological questions with respect to God’s hearing that must be asked, not only of 
early, extra-Biblical prayer, as was Heiler’s concern, but also of the revealed religion of 
Holy Scripture. These questions run along two themes. First, What is the relationship 
between God’s hearing and attention? What sort of attention is being requested when God is 
asked to hear prayer? What expectations does the petitioner believe accompany such 
attention? What circumstances usually warrant such attention? Second, What does God’s 
hearing mean for God’s presence or absence? Is the invocation and request to hear a 
petition for a certain kind of presence? Is there an experience of absence that motivates such 
a request?  
Answering these questions will allow the development of a working definition of 
divine hearing. It is an attempt to auscultate God’s hearing in the belief that carefully 
attending to the revealed testimony of the Psalmist’s experience will fill out a material 
definition of divine hearing. The intent is to arrive at a clearer understanding of what the 
Psalmist, and thereby more generally the authors of the Hebrew Scriptures, believed about 
the God to whom Israel prayed, and what it meant for that God to hear those prayers. The 
Psalms, while obviously not the only Hebrew Bible testimony to God’s hearing, constitute 
the overwhelming majority of requests for God to hear. The abundance of petitions for God 
to hear makes the Psalter an obvious text to investigate the content of such requests.  
 What is the relationship between God’s hearing and attention? Are the two one and 
the same, with the former being a conceptually unsophisticated and earthier substitute for 
the latter, more philosophically refined if less obvious, anthropomorphism? Some clarity 
may be achieved by examining the Hebrew Psalter because the Psalms are replete with 
requests for God to hear, see, consider, or answer. These petitions may all be considered 
attention-seeking;28 but by examining to what God is being asked to attend, it becomes clear 
that hear-petitions have a particular character that set them apart from other attention-
seeking petitions. 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p. 55. 
28 Patrick Miller, They Cried to the Lord: The Form and Theology of Biblical Prayer (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1994), p. 97. 
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 So, to what is God being asked to attend, when the Psalmist requests that God hear? 
The object of the petition is, “in the great majority of cases words referring to the prayer, 
such as  תפלתי ‘my prayer’ Pss 4:2, 39:13, 54:4, 55:2, 61:2, (84:9), 86:6, 102:2, 143:1;  רנתי 
‘my cry’ Pss 17:1, 61:2, 88:3, 142:7; קול( תהנוני) ‘(the voice of) my supplications’ Pss 28:2, 
 ,my voice’ Pss 64:2‘  קולי ,to the voice of the petitioner ;(תהנונותי) 86:6 ;1 ,143 ,140:7
(119:149), 141:1."29 These requests for God to hear point beyond themselves to a 
subsequent request being made by the petitioner. The literary emphasis shifts from the 
request to hear to the subsequent request or requests being made of God. A similar shift is 
made when God is asked to hear the petitioner himself,  לי/אלי “(incline your ear) to me" 
(Pss 31:2, 2:2, 102:3; 17:6, 55:3).30 
 The invocation-to-petition shift of these hear-petitions is very common and belongs 
to what Herman Gunkel, in his introduction to the Psalms, called the “initial plea”.31 
Because requests for God to hear so rarely appear alone, Gunkel understood them to be 
merely preparatory, a sort of formal invocation that “prepared the way for the actual 
petitions coming later.”32 However, Anneli Aejmelaeus has argued that the request to hear 
should not be considered merely preparatory, and that for three reasons.33 First, such 
requests sometimes appear in the middle (Ps 86:6, 140:7, 142:7) and at the end (Ps 39:13) of 
some psalms. Second, some psalms request God’s hearing with no subsequent request to be 
heard (Ps 88; 130). Third, even when at the head of the psalm, the request to hear is often 
combined with additional petitions or a more complex invocation such that it does not stand 
on its own. Thus, Aejmelaeus seems correct in her conclusion that the request for God to 
hear should “be understood as a humble prayer for contact with [the LORD];”34 and, contra 
Gunkel, when the request appears at the head of the psalm, it “should be regarded as the first 
full prayer of the psalm, by no means simply preparation for a further prayer.”35 
                                                          
29 Anneli Aejmelaeus, The Traditional Prayer in the Psalms (New York: de Gruyter, 1986), p. 27. 
Versification is based on the Hebrew bible. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Herman Gunkel and Joachim Begrich, Einleitung in die Psalmen: Die Gattungen der religiösen 
Lyrik Israels (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1933), pp. 218-219. 
32 Aejmelaeus, The Traditional Prayer in the Psalms, p. 28. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 110. 
37 
 
 Thus, requests for God to hear are not merely formal decorum placed at the head of, 
or scattered throughout, the Psalms.36 Rather, these requests may be understood and 
evaluated independently as prayers that reveal something of the petitioner’s concept of God. 
They are requesting a particular kind of attention from God.  
 This becomes more evident when hear-petitions are examined vis-à-vis requests for 
God to see, answer, and remember. See-petitions are less frequent and only begin appearing 
more often in texts written at a later date.37 Answer-petitions do not request only verbal 
responses, but are more often requesting broader responses to specific petitions. Thus, 
answer-petitions are broader than hear-petitions in the scope of their request.38 Remember-
petitions share some similarities with hear- and see-petitions but lack the immediacy and 
urgency of hear-petitions.39 
So, it can be concluded that hear-petitions are requesting a particular or unique kind 
of attention. Aejmelaeus’ reference to a “humble prayer for contact”, points toward this 
conclusion; but the notion of contact is vague and leaves unaddressed the kind and quality 
of intercourse being requested in hear-petitions. What features characterize hear-petitions 
that make them so necessary in the mind of the Psalmist? 
First, Israel’s history testifies to the sure and certain outcome of a petition when 
God has heard it. God decides to “go down” and take action due to the outcry that has come 
to God regarding Sodom (Gen 18:21). God takes immediate action against Cain when 
Abel’s blood cries out to God from the ground (Gen 4:10). As demonstrated above, most 
significant for the history of Israel, God intervenes on behalf of the Israelite slaves when 
“God heard their groaning” (Ex 2:24; see also Ex 3:7, 6:5). This fact explains the necessity 
of God’s hearing for the petitioner. If God hears the petitioner, God’s intervention is sure to 
follow. Therefore, hear-requests imply a particular kind of attention that entails a sure 
response. 
Second, hear-petitions in the Psalms are characterized by an urgency or an 
emergency-status situation that requires God’s immediate intervention. God’s hearing seems 
to take sequential priority over God’s seeing or answering. As in the examples of Sodom or 
Egyptian captivity, God first hears and then proceeds to see or act. Hearing is thus 
                                                          
36 Even if the request to hear takes on a semi-professional or formal feature in the psalms, such 
formality does not invalidate the authenticity of the request. Cf. Moshe Greenberg, Biblical Prose 
Prayer (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008), pp. 6-7. 
37 Aejmelaeus, The Traditional Prayer in the Psalms, p. 29. 
38 Ibid., p. 31 
39 Ibid., p. 42. 
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prioritized as the first step of divine intervention from the perspective of the Psalmist. The 
priority and urgency can be demonstrated when juxtaposed with other prayers. For example, 
God is never asked to hear a thanksgiving. Aejmelaeus infers from this that hear-petitions 
“imply a desperate need for […] contact and for help.”40 Similarly, she remarks that, when 
compared with petitions for God to remember, “These petitions, like the petitions ‘hear’ and 
‘see’ […] appeal for [the LORD’s] attention, but do not imply an immediate emergency as 
particularly ‘hear’ does.”41 God’s hearing is a requisite first step in addressing an urgent 
emergency. Hear-petitions are charged with desperation and need which require God’s 
attention in wilderness circumstances and are not found among the more quotidian requests 
of the Psalter. So, hearing is a particular kind of attention to an urgent need which entails a 
sure response. 
Third, the attention that is being requested is not only urgent, but of a particular 
character. Following Simone Weil, Iris Murdoch has described attention as a form of love.42 
She defines attention as “a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality.”43 
Attention, of the highest quality and kind, is then an act and demonstration of love. As an 
act of love, attention becomes an inherently moral phenomenon, such that the character of 
the attention is a reflection of the moral qualities, commitments, and desires of the attending 
agent. As argued in the above framework, Israel’s history demonstrates God’s loving 
intervention on behalf of the petitioner whenever God has heard. It is not only the desperate 
nature of the situation, but also the belief that God’s attention is the attention of a loving 
Other whose intervention will be characterized by love and covenant commitment. 
Similarly, God’s attention is the attention of a just Other whose intervention will be 
characterized by justice and covenant faithfulness. Listening, it has been argued, is an 
irreducibly moral act.44 As such, the Psalmist can expect that God’s listening attention will 
have a moral character that is consistent with and testified to by God’s historical and 
covenantal relationship with Israel. Exodus 22 explicitly links God’s listening to God’s just 
and covenantal character. For, just as God heard the cries of the Israelites when they were 
sojourners in Egypt, God will hear the cries of the sojourners among Israel if they are 
                                                          
40 Ibid., p. 28. 
41 Ibid., p. 42. 
42 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge Classics, 2001), p. 74. Here Murdoch 
is following Simone Weil, “Attention and Will” in Gravity and Grace (London: Routledge Classics, 
2002), pp. 116-22. 
43 Ibid., p. 34. 
44 See Bernd Wannenwetsch, “‘Take Heed What Ye Hear’: Listening as a Moral, Transcendental and 
Sacramental Act” in Journal of the Royal Musical Association, 135:S1, pp. 93ff.; also, Carol 
Harrison, The Art of Listening in the Early Church, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 219. 
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unjustly treated (Ex 22:23). Similarly, God warns that if a neighbor’s cloak is offered in a 
pledge, it must be returned before sundown. If it is not returned, and the neighbor cries out 
to God, God will hear him (Ex 22:27). Thus, it seems that God’s ear is particularly inclined 
to the cries of those who are unjustly treated—those in the wilderness—and God warns 
Israel that God will be quick to hear on account of divine justice and compassion. When 
God hears, God’s love and justice come to bear on the situation. 
 So, to summarize this reflection on the attention requested by hear-petitions, a 
preliminary definition can be offered. When the Psalmist is making a plea for God to hear 
he is requesting a particular kind of loving and just attention to an urgent need which 
entails a sure response. 
 Before proceeding to positively and constructively fill out this definition of 
hearing’s attention, a brief excurses is necessary in order to negatively define what hearing’s 
attention is not. With respect to God’s character and nature, there is no reason to suppose 
that requests for God to hear imply that God is, metaphysically or in the perception of the 
petitioner, otherwise aloof, ignorant, or unacquainted with the circumstances of the 
petitioner apart from that hearing. The attention requested by hear-petitions is not identical 
with divine omniscience; nor does it imply, in any way, a compromise in the divine 
perfections. Rather, as the Psalmist seems to understand God’s hearing, God can have 
complete and perfect knowledge of some circumstance or petition and yet still not hear it. 
Scripture itself makes this very distinction between God’s hearing and God’s knowing. 
Returning again to Solomon’s dedication of the temple, he prays,  
If there is famine in the land, if there is plague, blight, mildew, locust, or 
caterpillar; if their enemy besieges them in any of their cities; whatever plague, 
whatever sickness there is; whatever prayer, whatever plea there is from any 
individual or from all your people Israel, all knowing the afflictions of their own 
hearts so that they stretch out their hands toward this house; then hear in heaven 
your dwelling place, forgive, act, and render to all whose hearts you know—
according to all their ways, for only you know what is in every human heart—so 
that they may fear you all the days that they live in the land that you gave to our 
ancestors. (1 Ki 8:37-40)  
Solomon’s petition is for God to “hear in heaven… forgive, act, and render to all whose 
hearts you know.” The tacit assumption is that God already knows the hearts of God’s 
people, but is being asked to hear them anyway. When Solomon asks God to hear, he is not 
requesting that God learn or become conscious of something otherwise unknown. This 
distinction strikes at the very mystery of petitionary prayer, wherein one prays to a God who 
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antecedently knows the request and the consequent outcome. Yet the exhortation to pray 
remains, and God’s hearing of that prayer is a necessary element of that mystery. 
So, when the Psalmist is making a plea for God to hear, he is requesting a particular 
kind of loving and just attention to an urgent need which entails a sure response. Yet such 
requests imply, presently for the Psalmist, an experience of the absence of attention to the 
relevant circumstances or needs. The request is for God to direct God’s “just and loving 
gaze” in a particular direction, so to speak. So, what do hear-petitions which request this 
particular kind of attention imply about the Psalmist’s understanding of God’s presence or 
absence? 
Eleanore Stump has argued persuasively that a particular kind of attention is 
necessary for two persons to experience significant personal presence with one another.45 
Stump relies on recent developments in childhood psychology and neurobiology to 
appropriate the phenomenon of so-called, joint- or shared-attention. While Stump’s 
argument cannot be rehearsed in full here, a thumbnail sketch will suffice to demonstrate its 
relevance for hear-petitions. Stump is pursuing questions about God’s presence to creation, 
especially in the context of human suffering. For Stump, significant personal presence for 
two persons is achieved when three phenomena obtain. First, there must be “direct and 
unmediated causal contact with cognitive access to another.”46 This does not mean there is 
no intermediary between the two persons, but that there is no additional causal step required 
by either agent.47 Second, there must be second-person experience. Second-person 
experience is a “matter of one person’s attending to another person and being aware of him 
as a person when that other person is conscious and functioning, however minimally, as a 
person.”48 Third, there must be shared attention.49 Shared attention has proven difficult to 
give precise definition, yet a basic description might be that joint attention is achieved when 
two subjects direct their attention toward some third object and “each subject is aware, in 
some sense, of the object as object that is present to both subjects. There is, in this respect, a 
‘meeting of minds’ between both subjects, such that the fact that both are attending to the 
                                                          
45 Eleanore Stump, Wandering in Darkness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 110-28. 
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and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity, Awareness, and Action,” Faith and Philosophy, 9 (1992), pp. 
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47 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, p. 536 n. 8. Seeing through eyeglasses or speaking over the 
telephone both count as direct, unmediated, causal and cognitive contact. 




same object is open or mutually manifest.”50 For one person to experience another person as 
significantly and personally present, all three of these phenomena must obtain. 
Now, Stump’s argument is relevant by way of its connection between presence and 
attention—a relationship that Stump claims applies, mutatis mutandis, to God.51 She claims, 
“God’s having direct and unmediated cognitive and causal contact with everything in 
creation is still insufficient for God’s being omnipresent. In order for God to be 
omnipresent, that is, in order for God to be always and everywhere present, it also must be 
the case that God is always and everywhere in a position to share attention with any creature 
able and willing to share attention with God.”52 It is this ability that seems to be implied in 
the Psalmist’s requests for God to hear, albeit without all of Stump’s philosophical nuance. 
When the Psalmist requests God to hear his voice, prayer, cry, request, et cetera, the request 
is for God to turn attention to the same object occupying the attention of the Psalmist. There 
is a desire for a meeting of the minds.  
(I should note that Stump’s claim that unmediated cognitive and causal contact is 
insufficient in the absence of shared attention—this claim is analogous to the distinction 
made in the above excurses distinguishing God’s omniscience from God’s hearing. The 
latter requires something in addition to the former. God may have direct and unmediated 
cognitive and causal contact, but this is insufficient for the existential crises that prompt 
hear-petitions from the Psalmist. What is desired is more than knowledge. The petitioner is 
urgently crying out for God’s attention to be directed toward the relevant circumstance. 
When God does so, God becomes significantly personally present to the petitioner.) 
 If hear-petitions are, indeed, requests for God’s significant personal presence by 
way of God’s shared attention, we would expect to find them in situations where God’s 
absence is acutely felt. This is, indeed, what is most often observed. Patrick Miller has noted 
that “this call for a hearing is fundamental especially in those frequent situations when the 
psalmist feels that God is hidden or silent, when God has forgotten or forsaken the one in 
trouble.”53 Psalms 28 and 30 both vividly describe the way that God’s unwillingness to hear 
is associated with human isolation or divine absence. “Going down to the pit” (Ps. 28:1) or 
“Will the dust praise you?” (Ps 30:9) are examples of the experience of the petitioner when 
                                                          
50 Naomi Eilan, “Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind” in Joint Attention: Communication and 
Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 5. Italics 
original. 
51 Stump, Wandering in Darkness, p. 117. 
52 Ibid. Italics original. 
53 Miller, They Cried to the Lord, p. 97. 
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God turns a deaf ear. Again, the connection between God’s hearing and wilderness 
circumstances, developed above, becomes emphatic in the psalms. The Psalmist knows 
God’s hearing means God’s presence; God’s deaf ear, God’s absence. These psalms “speak 
to the heart of those who have carried on an argument with silence.”54 Yet presence and 
absence, hearing and deafness, are usually held together in the Psalms. In the face of God’s 
absence and silence, Psalm 30 can still issue forth in praise, declaring that God has turned 
mourning into dancing, sackcloth into a garb of joy. Psalm 28 can announce, “Blessed be 
the LORD, for he has heard the sound of my pleadings. The LORD is my strength and my 
shield; in him my heart trusts.”  
So how are God’s attention and hearing to be understood when human experience 
and the testimony of the Psalter portrays a divine-human dialogue that is often painfully 
one-sided?55 “The distance or separation occasioned by iniquity does not mean that God has 
moved to another part of the globe; it is a distance within relationship.”56 That the Psalmist 
can and does cry out to God to be heard points beyond the prayer itself to the reality of the 
covenant relationship that is presupposed by the cry, a relationship testified to by the 
historical dealings of the LORD with the covenant people and confirmed by God’s historical 
hearing of the cries of those people. The history of the relationship testifies to the reality that 
if God were to turn attention to the object requested by the petitioner, be it whatever 
complaint or circumstance, God’s love and justice would come to bear on it. God’s hearing 
of such requests is an astonishing gift, and is experienced as such by the Psalmist. When 
there is a meeting of minds and God hears and lovingly and justly acts for the petitioner, 
there is a special comfort, consolation, joy, and delight.  
Yet a careful auscultation of God’s hearing points to a greater gift. Israel’s 
cherished relationship with the LORD is the backdrop of the Psalmist’s request for God to 
hear. The God who hears is, after all, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the 
covenant people of Israel. It is only because of the LORD’s faithful, loving, and just 
dealings with the covenant people that the Psalmist can with confidence, boldly cry out for 
God to hear. These requests to hear are a reminder of Deuteronomy 4:7: “For what other 
great nation has a god so near to it as the LORD our God is whenever we call to him?” Even 
in the absence of a meeting of minds, when the cries of the petitioner remain unheard due to 
sin, rebellion, ignorance, or whatever, God remains present in absence by means of God’s 
                                                          
54 Martin E. Marty, A Cry of Absence (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 147. 
55 Samuel E. Balentine, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-Human Dialogue 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), p. 292. 
56 Terence E. Fretheim, “Prayer in the Old Testament: Creating Space in the World for God” in A 
Primer on Prayer ed. by Paul R. Sponheim (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), pp. 51-52.  
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relationship with the covenant people. The greater gift of covenant relationship with the 
LORD is revealed by bold imperatives for God to hear and act. Whether God hears or not, 
God remains there. More could be said about the experience of God’s deaf ear, God’s 
unwillingness to hear. Here it is sufficient to note that, even in the experience of God’s 
absence, it is an absence in relationship; and that relationship, whether God hears or not, is 
the greater gift. Yet it is exactly in the desperate experience of that absence that the Psalmist 
cries out to be heard. 
Returning to the inductive march toward a definition of God’s hearing, a more 
comprehensive attempt may be offered. The Psalmist’s request for God to hear is a request 
for a particular kind of loving and just attention to an urgent need that is accomplished by 
means of the significant personal presence of the covenant God of Israel, which entails a 
sure response. 
 Finally, just as the above excurses on divine omniscience was necessary, so too I 
must register a distinction about God’s omnipresence. God’s omnipresence does not 
undermine a meaningful understanding of God’s ability to attend to particular circumstances 
or temporal events. Janet Martin Soskice has identified the way Augustine can maintain a 
classical conception of God’s omnipresence while still make sense of God’s particular 
attentiveness: 
For Augustine God's attentiveness does not derogate from God's qualities as 
classically conceived. This is a philosophical leitmotif of the Confessions. It is 
because God is eternal that God is present to all and every time in Augustine's life. 
God need not be a creature of change to be attentive to changing creatures. God 
need not be a particular 'thing' to attend to particulars. And, unlike the God of 
Aristotle whose timeless perfection entails indifference, indeed obliviousness to 
anything other than his own thought, the God of Augustine, the God of Scripture, 
attends to each changing thing—in particular. This is the work of the Spirit, this 
bodying forth of God in history—in our individual histories and in that of our 
world.57 
For Augustine, God remains omnipresent and by virtue of divine omnipresence is able to 
attend to particulars, as when God is petitioned to hear. 
 What value is there in developing a definition of God’s hearing, as understood by 
the experience of the Psalmist? What is the payoff of this concatenation of definitional 
                                                          
57 Janet M. Soskice, The Kindness of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 33. See also, 
Augustine, Confessions V.2; VII.17. 
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qualifiers? First, it jettisons the entire hierarchy of Heiler and others like him who would 
consider hearing language to be merely remnants of a “crude” and “sensuous” 
anthropomorphism. Although, the definition I have offered remains strictly and unavoidably 
anthropomorphic in nature, it is not to be understood in contrast to or continuity with what 
are allegedly primitive alternatives. Rather, by avoiding this troubled hierarchy, hear-
petitions may be better appreciated for their unique revelatory purpose. The cursory 
distinction between hear-, see-, answer-, and remember-petitions evinces their unique 
metaphorical capacity to carry specific meaning for the Psalmist. A definition of hear-
petitions marks out its uniqueness and sets it apart from other attention-seeking petitions. It 
promotes an understanding of God-talk that vindicates it from the naïve assumption that it 
was uncritically borrowed from so-called primitive prayers. 
 Second, if being heard by God means an experience of the covenant God of Israel’s 
loving and just attention that is accomplished by means of God’s significant personal 
presence, which entails a sure response—then that experience must be of considerable 
personal consolation to those who find themselves sharing the urgent and dire circumstances 
of the Psalmist in the face of God’s absence. As the Christian prayer book, the Psalms give 
words to the shared existential experiences. Like the Psalmist, Christians “have carried on 
an argument with silence,”—an experience that has been described by Martin Marty when 
he asks, “Why, O Hidden One…? Why, O Silence…? Why, O Absence, when the cry is 
most intense is the silence most stunning? The passionate heart searches for answers.”58 And 
while no answer is readily available, I have argued that a better gift than God’s hearing is 
revealed by pursuing it. 
 Third, God’s presence in relationship with the covenant people makes possible the 
pleas and petitions that are so desperately offered. That relationship is the unique gift of the 
covenant God with the covenant people. And while being heard by God may be a significant 
source of consolation, being known by and in relationship with God may prove to be the 
greater gift in the midst of suffering. 
 The definition offered remains cursory and unavoidably incomplete. The themes 
pursued above and the elements of the definition all point to the embryonic nature of this 
auscultation of hearing. A fuller hearing may be had only by listening to the voice of the 
New Testament. 
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1.3 New Testament Continuities and Transformations 
With a theological framework and working definition in place, it remains to be asked what 
bearing the New Testament revelation has on the foregoing. Answering this question in a 
fuller manner, in view of the entire canon, will be the burden of the balance of this work. 
Here I am concerned only to evaluate the extent to which the New Testament supports and 
confirms the framework and definition just developed. Then, I aim to anticipate some 
varieties of transformation thereof, in light of the coming of Christ. An auscultation of the 
New Testament corpus is necessary because the above framework and definition, in all their 
tentativeness, receive theological development and verification with the coming of the 
incarnate Christ revealed in the New Testament. Like the Abraham, Sarah, Hagar narratives 
in the Hebrew Bible, listening to the body of New Testament texts requires that careful 
attention be paid to a particular narrative of extraordinarily rich theological value. 
 In John 11, Lazarus of Bethany, the brother of Mary and Martha, falls terminally ill. 
The sisters send for Jesus, confident that he could right the situation. Yet Jesus tarries for 
two additional days before heading to Bethany. Jesus informs the disciples, who are 
understandably hesitant about his return to Judea, that their friend Lazarus had fallen asleep 
but that they are going to Bethany in order to awaken him. Jesus’ description of Lazarus’ 
unconscious state is ambiguous, such that the disciples would prefer Lazarus wake naturally 
and they avoid the risks of Judea. Jesus clarifies that Lazarus is dead, and the disciples, 
whose hopelessness and fear are represented by Thomas, become more recalcitrant, and 
suggest that to return to Judea would mean certain death for them all. Four days post-
mortem, Jesus arrives in Bethany. Martha goes out to meet him while he’s still en route and 
expresses her confidence that an earlier arrival by Jesus would have delivered Lazarus from 
his illness. Jesus re-introduces ambiguity into the narrative by declaring that Lazarus will 
rise again. Martha agrees, conceding an eschatological revivification. Yet Jesus asserts that 
he is, himself, the grounds for such eschatological events: “I am the resurrection and the life. 
Those who believe in me, even though they die, will live, and everyone who lives and 
believes in me will never die.” The statement provokes a confession of faith in Jesus’ 
messianic identity from Martha. 
 Martha then returns to Bethany and summons Mary to join her. Mary, hastens to 
Jesus, followed by her comforters. When Mary approaches Jesus, she prostrates herself 
before him and, like her sister, expresses her confidence that had he been present, Lazarus 
would not have died. Jesus is deeply moved by the tears of Mary and her comforters. He 
asks for the whereabouts of Lazarus’ body and begins to weep, revealing to the bystanders 
his deep love for Lazarus. 
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 Upon arrival at the tomb, Jesus instructs that the stone be rolled away. The certain 
decay of the body prompts hesitation from Martha. Jesus reminds her of his exhortation to 
believe in verses 25 and 26. The stone is rolled away. Jesus then looks to heaven and says, 
“Father, I thank you for having heard me. I knew that you always hear me, but I have said 
this for the sake of the crowd standing here, so that they may believe that you sent me.” 
Jesus loudly calls Lazarus out of the tomb. In response, the revived man proceeds from the 
tomb, still robed in grave clothes. The miracle prompts belief among some, but others report 
the event to the chief priests and Pharisees whose consequent fear and anger prompt new 
resolve to put Jesus to death. 
 The Lazarus narrative is the most explicit—though certainly not the only—account 
of God’s hearing in the New Testament. Given its important and dramatic role as the climax 
of the Johannine “Book of Signs”, its description of Jesus’ deep grief and pain, its first-
person declaration by Jesus of God’s hearing, and its eschatological overtones, the narrative 
is a fitting part of the corpus to auscultate.  
 To what extent does the narrative comport with the above framework? First, the 
God of the covenant people of Israel, the Father of “the Christ, the Son of God”59 is the God 
who hears. Jesus’ definitive statement that the Father hears him is as transparent and 
unequivocal as God’s self-revelation in the naming of Ishmael. The one to whom Jesus 
prays is a God who hears. Yet there are several questions surrounding Jesus’ statement in 
vv. 41-42, the answers to which are critical for the subsequent argument. So they must be 
addressed here. 
Commentators have often struggled with how to understand this “prayer that is not a 
prayer.”60 Since the narrative does not contain what the reader would expect—a prayer for 
Lazarus to be raised to life—Jesus has been accused of merely posturing for the crowd; 
what Loisy called “prière pour la galerie.”61 The search for an explanation spans the 
spectrum from, on the one hand, exegetical clues that are internal to the Lazarus narrative, 
to, on the other hand, more theological explanations that draw on larger Johannine motifs.62 
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Among the latter, Bultmann has argued that Jesus’ statement is “the request of one who 
stands in perfect unity with the Father[…] [who] does not need to make prayer requests like 
others, who have to rouse themselves out of their attitude of prayerlessness and therefore 
godlessness; for he continually stands before God as the asker and therefore the receiver.”63 
Here, Bultmann sees the relationship of the Son to the Father as constitutive of constant 
(“ständig”) prayer.64 This explains the absence of a petition to raise Lazarus by internalizing 
the request to the Father-Son relationship. Yet Wendy Sproston North contends that 
Bultmann wrongly imposes a christological emphasis on the narrative that would not have 
been so prized by the evangelist, and that such an explanation fails to account for Jesus’ 
many recorded prayers elsewhere in the Gospel.65 She is concerned that Bultmann’s more 
christological reading of the text has exerted too much control on subsequent commentators 
and argues that exegetical evidence internal to the narrative makes greater sense of the 
absence of a request to raise Lazarus.66 Specifically, North believes that John 11:22 provides 
the relevant clue, suggesting that it is one of seven occurrences in the Johannine corpus of 
the “ask, and it will be given” logion.67 When situated in this context, Jesus’ “prayer” is 
exemplary for the confidence the Jesus-community can have when they approach God in 
prayer. North concludes, “The logion speaks of the certainty that requests made to God in 
prayer will be granted,” and that “it is John’s christological application of [the logion] in v. 
22 that virtually dictates the terms in which he eventually describes Jesus at prayer before 
raising Lazarus.”68 
This conclusion is interesting and valuable insofar as it further explains Jesus’ 
heavenward speech in connection with 11:22 and the larger Johannine corpus. It should be 
noted, too, that North’s attempt to free interpreters from the “towering influence”69 of 
Bultmann, does not mean she would wholesale discount the latter’s christological reading.70 
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But does her conclusion adequately explain what is happening in vv. 41-42? For while her 
conclusion takes into account the occurrences of the “ask, and it will be given” logion in the 
Johannine corpus, it unfortunately elevates this feature of the narrative above the more 
dominant christological themes in John’s Gospel. From the first sentence of the prologue, 
the fourth evangelist presents his reader with an enduringly high christology that is focused 
on the relationship between the Father and the Son. The “Book of Signs” brings Jesus into 
increasing conflict with the Jewish leaders over questions about his authority. With each 
new σημεῖον, Jesus’ authority to speak and act is called into question.71 With each conflict, 
Jesus further describes his relationship to the Father and the Father’s authority.72 The raising 
of Lazarus as the ultimate sign brings renewed commitment to put Jesus to death. 
Additionally, Jesus’ statement about the Father’s hearing is accompanied by an explicit ἵνα-
clause, specifying the purpose for which he has publicly announced that God always hears 
him: so that the crowd would believe that the Father has sent him. This ἵνα-clause is 
important insofar as it explains the odd nature of Jesus’ heavenward speech. When it is 
taken in conjunction with the enduring emphasis on the Father-Son relationship, a more 
convincing explanation of Jesus’ statement about the Father’s hearing surfaces: he desires 
that the crowd (and the Evangelist’s readers) would believe that he is “the Christ, the Son of 
God, who is coming into the world” (v. 27) on account of his relationship to the Father. So, 
while Sproston North’s argument has merit insofar as the Jesus community may be 
encouraged to greater confidence in prayer, she has driven too deeply a wedge between the 
Father’s hearing of the Son and his hearing of those who belong to the Son. While both are 
important in the Johannine corpus, the dominance of christology in the Gospel requires that 
it take theological and logical priority over the “ask, and it will be given” logion. So, the 
Father hears the Son. We can now return to the framework in order to evaluate the Lazarus 
narrative’s consistency with it. 
Second, this God who hears is the God and Father of Jesus, the Christ of the 
covenant people of Israel. If this God, as was argued above, has chosen to covenant with 
people in such a way that they are given the privilege of God’s listening ear, this privilege 
becomes prototypical in the relationship between the Father and Son. 
Third, the God of the covenant, the Father of “the Christ, the Son of God” hears 
those in the wilderness. Here, the wilderness is acutely felt, and in two ways. On the one 
hand, the grief and tears that accompany the death of Lazarus prompt Jesus to ask, “Where 
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have you laid him?” Jesus, too, weeps in the face of Lazarus’ death. On the other hand, the 
wilderness means not only grief, but also grave. Lazarus has gone into the ultimate 
wilderness, and while he can no longer act for his own deliverance, Jesus is able to act, on 
Lazarus’ behalf. In the face of both grief and grave, Jesus is compelled to turn to the Father 
in prayer on behalf of those next to him—Mary, Martha, and even Lazarus—and is 
confident that he will be heard. While the Father always hears the Son, as Jesus declares, it 
is consistent with the entire Biblical testimony to God’s hearing that the hearing occurs in 
such painful and desperate circumstances. The tension of the circumstances is heightened by 
Martha (v. 21), Mary (v. 32), and the Jews (v. 37) all declaring that had Jesus been present, 
Lazarus would not have died. These expressions of regret only amplify the pain of grief at 
the death of one so loved by Jesus. It is in the midst of both grief and grave that Jesus, in his 
unique relationship to the Father, is heard and Lazarus thereby raised. 
Fourth, the God of the covenant, the Father of Jesus Christ, hears those who are 
faithful to the covenant. The obedience and submission of Jesus to the Father is a recurrent 
theme in John’s Gospel.73 This will be developed further in the final chapter. Here it should 
simply be noted that the Son has kept the Father’s commandments and abides in his love (Jn 
15:10). Unlike the warnings encountered above concerning God’s deaf ear, the Father 
always hears the Son who knew no sin, who was faithful to the covenant. The sinlessness 
and covenant faithfulness of the Son, thus, makes him the Always-Heard Word.74 In these 
four ways, the Lazarus narrative is congruent with and confirms the above framework. Yet it 
does more than that. 
 What does it mean for the Word to be heard? How does this hearing of Jesus in the 
Lazarus narrative comport with the above material definition of God’s hearing? First, Jesus 
is asking the Father to attend to the circumstances occupying the attention of Mary, Martha, 
and their co-mourners. The Father is not unaware of the circumstances surrounding the 
death of Lazarus, nor is he ignorant of the feelings of grief, pain, and loss. Following 
Bultmann, if Jesus, in his unique union with the Father, is continually asking and receiving, 
here he is asking for the eschatological effects of God’s love and justice to be realized in the 
present.75 In the raising of Lazarus, the Father’s love for the Son spills over to those whom 
the Son loves. The justice and love of God that will be climactically displayed in the raising 
of the Son from the dead, the inaugural and proleptic event of the general, eschatological 
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resurrection of the dead, is brought to bear on Lazarus. The Father’s loving and just 
attention is directed to Lazarus by the asking of the Son. This asking is always heard by the 
Father. When the Son calls upon the Father, the loving and just attention of God is always 
directed toward the object of the Son’s asking. The unity of the Father and the Son mean 
that it could not be otherwise. If the Son is continually asker and receiver, the Father is 
continually hearer and giver. Thus, whenever the Son asks, the Father’s loving and just 
attention is surely brought to bear on the Son’s request. 
 What about requests for God’s hearing as a request for the significant personal 
presence of God? The experience of God’s absence is acutely and explicitly felt in the 
Lazarus narrative. The presence of the Father has already been experienced in the presence 
of the Son. The Johannine Book of Signs has demonstrated the way that Jesus’ presence has 
already, in the six preceding signs, been revealed as the very presence of God. This explains 
why the narrative thrice expresses the difference Jesus’ presence would have made (v. 20, 
32, 37) and why the sisters sent for Jesus when Lazarus first fell ill. The significant personal 
presence of the Father is experienced in the personal presence of the Son. Because the Son 
is always heard by the Father, the Father’s personal presence is made manifest in the 
presence of Jesus. As the Always-Heard Word, Jesus bears the presence of God, physically, 
as God incarnate. The sisters send for Jesus (v. 3) because they know that with him, the 
significant personal presence of God is made manifest. His absence leads to death, but his 
presence to the loving and just attention of God. This will be developed substantially in the 
final chapter of this work. 
 The material definition developed suggested that when God hears, the response is 
sure. How much more so for the Son whom the Father always hears. This is where Sproston 
North’s subsidiary theme regarding confidence in prayer becomes more relevant. Indeed, 
Jesus’ heavenward speech in vv. 41-42 is for the crowd—that they may believe the Son is 
sent by the Father. Yet its aim must be greater than that because it is immediately preceded 
by Martha’s expression of concern about the removal of the stone from the tomb. Her 
hesitation is laced with doubt, prompting Jesus to revisit tomb-side the conversation that 
already occurred on the road outside Bethany (vv. 21-27). Martha had already expressed 
confidence that the Father would grant the Son whatever he asks (v. 22). Yet when she 
comes face-to-face with death and decay, Martha’s faith in Jesus finds its limit. The 
confidence of verse 22, that the Father would give the Son whatever he asks, could not 
possibly include the raising of a dead man four days post-mortem! Yet this is precisely the 
confidence commended by Jesus’ heavenward speech. Jesus’ confident declaration that he is 
always heard is simultaneously a confirmation of Martha’s original impulse: that the Father 
gives the Son whatever he asks. When read together, the surety of God’s hearing entails the 
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surety of God’s response. Hearing means response. When the Father hears the Son, the 
Son’s every request is granted. North is correct that this would have been a source of 
confidence for the Jesus community; especially when read in light of 1 John 5:14-15. 
However, it is because of the more dominant Johannine theme regarding the unique 
relationship between the Father and Son that Christians may appropriate Jesus’ confidence. 
Jesus’ followers may now pray in Jesus’ name and appropriate the same confidence because 
the Father will give them whatever they ask (Jn 16:23). 
 The continuity of the Lazarus narrative with the above developed framework and 
definition of God’s hearing, as well as its christological and trinitarian context, make it the 
theological locus of New Testament teaching on God’s hearing.76 As such, it validates the 
framework and definition; yet not in a way that leaves it unaltered. The revelation of the 
Triune God in the incarnation, death, resurrection, and ascension of the Word transforms the 
relationship between God and the covenant people, and this transformation extends to God’s 
hearing of prayer—and that in four ways. 
 First, who hears prayer? The Abraham-sourced framework attributed hearing to the 
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the covenant people of Israel. While this 
remained true in the examination of the Lazarus narrative, the one who is described as 
hearing is the Father of the Christ of Israel. Hearing is something that takes place between 
the Father and the Word. Moreover, in John’s Gospel, the Son (Jn 5:19, 20; 8:28, 47; 12:49, 
50) and the Spirit (Jn 16:13) are also said to hear the Father. Indeed, in the economic 
fellowship between Father, Son, and Spirit, the three hypostases of the Triune God are said 
to always hear each other. In the revelation of the coming of Christ, the framework is 
transformed. It is the Triune God—Father, Son, and Spirit—who hears. 
 Second, who does the Triune God hear? The framework proposed that God’s 
hearing was the special privilege of the covenant people of Israel. Yet because the Lazarus 
narrative reveals that the Father always hears the Son, the Christ of the covenant people of 
Israel, God’s hearing is now unavoidably wrapped up with the Son. The confidence that the 
Father always hears the Son is bequeathed to Jesus’ followers in John 16:23, “On that day 
you will ask nothing of me. Very truly, I tell you, if you ask anything of the Father in my 
name, he will give it to you.” Whatever is asked of the Father in the name of the Son, will 
                                                          
76 Insofar as I am offering a theological exegesis of God’s hearing, and that from within the Christian 
theological tradition, my interpretation assumes a particular ontology of Holy Scripture, viz., that it is 
more than—but no less than—a merely historical or literary object, and that it must be read and 
interpreted in light of its Triune Author who has self-revealed not only in its pages, but also in 
tradition, reason, and experience. This working assumption is, thus, warrant for deploying the 
historically subsequent resources of the creeds of the Christian tradition in the exegetical task. 
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be given. Additionally, the Father will hear and answer prayer on account of the petitioner’s 
love for and faith in the Son (Jn 16:26-27). The status of the relationship between the 
petitioner and God’s Always-Heard Word determines the confidence the petitioner can have 
in being heard. Just as in the original framework, God, in divine freedom, may choose to 
hear and respond to whomever God so pleases. Neither space nor knowledge permit a 
discussion concerning the extent to which the covenant people of Israel retain the special 
privilege of God’s hearing. At minimum, God’s freedom must be emphasized. For, just as 
God assured Israel that God would also hear the cries of those unjustly oppressed among 
them, so, too, God may choose to hear whomever God so pleases. Yet the Lazarus narrative 
points to a definite transformation in the framework. If God’s listening ear was the special 
privilege of the covenant people, it is now a much more certain privilege of those who 
belong to God’s Always-Heard Word, to the One whom the Father always hears. In the Son, 
there is a new and greater confidence that the Father will hear, no matter the circumstances. 
The Triune God hears those who belong to the Son. 
 Additionally, while not observed in the Lazarus narrative, the framework strongly 
suggests an additional group of speakers to whom God will incline the divine ear: those who 
are hurt, oppressed, or unjustly treated by those who belong to the Son. Just as God inclined 
God’s ear to Hagar and the victims of Israel’s covenant failings, in the same way, when 
those who belong to the Son betray the nature and character of that belonging, we should 
expect God to hear those hurt by such betrayal. That God will hear not only for but even 
against those who belong to the Son if they fail to live in concord with their belonging—this 
should serve as a warning to those who claim the gift of belonging to Jesus. Indeed, James 
issues this very warning in James 5:3-4. Quoting Psalm 18:7 (LXX), he warns the wealthy, 
“Your gold and silver have rusted, and their rust will be evidence against you, and it will eat 
your flesh like fire. You have laid up treasure for the last days. Listen! The wages of the 
laborers who mowed your fields, which you kept back by fraud, cry out, and the cries of the 
harvesters have reached the ears of the Lord of hosts.” The greed and unjust treatment of 
laborers serves as one kind of betrayal of Christian belonging. It represents the way God, by 
way of hearing, will demonstrate justice and compassion against those who belong to the 
Son if they fail to live rightly toward others. 
 Third, under what kind of circumstances does the Triune God hear? In light of the 
Father’s always hearing the Son and those who belong to him, the question may seem 
superfluous. Yet the framework suggested God’s ear was especially inclined to those in the 
wilderness. Here the Lazarus narrative offers two surprising transformations of the 
framework, both weakening the sting of the wilderness. The first is with regard to the 
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urgency of prayer. The Psalms revealed the extent to which cries for God to hear are often 
provoked by urgent needs. Yet the Lazarus narrative is noteworthy for its lack of urgency. 
When Jesus was informed of Lazarus’ illness, he lingered two additional days. Rather than 
race to Bethany, Jesus expresses confidence that Lazarus’ illness is for the purpose of 
glorifying God (vv. 11:3-6). The narrative emphasizes the temporal details: Jesus’ two-day 
delay (v. 6); his arrival four days post-mortem (v. 17), the refrain that he arrived too late 
(vv. 21, 32, 37). The Son’s knowledge that he is always heard by the Father has stripped 
away the sense of urgency. Jesus occupies a different sort of time than do the sisters, their 
co-mourners, and even the disciples. What is urgent to the latter groups lacks urgency for 
Jesus. Why? When the Father always hears and answers the Son, temporality loses its 
power. There are no circumstances that cannot be righted by the Son, because the Father 
will always hear and answer him. Not even the past has the final word. The always of the 
Father’s hearing means that the Son can ask for the past to be undone and for the future to 
be made present.77 Time loses its sting in the face of the always of God’s hearing. Second, 
the raising of one who is not only dead, but decayed, puts an exclamation point on the 
always of God’s hearing. Death, and particularly death of one dearly loved as Lazarus was 
by Jesus, is an acute wilderness experience, second only to one’s own death. Thus, death, 
insofar as it is the “last enemy” (1 Cor 15:26) is the wilderness experience par excellence. 
Every other experience of the wilderness is derivative. But the always of God’s hearing 
means not even death has the final word. The always of the Father’s hearing makes all 
things possible and supplies hope, even in the direst of wilderness circumstances. Though, 
this hope does not necessarily assuage the pain of the wilderness. Jesus wept for Lazarus. 
Yet confidence in the Father’s always hearing transforms wilderness circumstances, so that 
death and temporality lose their sting in the face of the power of the Triune God. When does 
the Triune God hear? It is no longer especially in the wilderness, but even in the 
wilderness—always. 
 Lastly, under what kind of circumstances does the Triune God not hear? In the 
development of the framework, numerous passages were cited that insist God will turn a 
deaf ear to petitioners as a result of their covenant failings. How is the always of the 
Father’s hearing affected by the sins and shortcomings of those who belong to the Son? Do 
the same conditions apply? Interestingly, the New Testament introduces a new set of 
conditions that do not contravene the always, but do nuance it. The principle of the old 
                                                          
77 Philip Esler and Ronald Piper have argued that the raising of Lazarus should be read as 
prototypical of the eschatological, general resurrection of the dead, rather than a simple 
foreshadowing of Jesus’ own resurrection, as some have argued. See Lazarus, Mary and Martha 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), pp. 104-30. 
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framework is reiterated by the blind man whom Jesus healed when he uttered, “We know 
that God does not listen to sinners, but he does listen to one who worships him and obeys 
his will” (v. 9:31). On the one hand, this principle validates the reason for which the Father 
always hears the son: he is the sinless Son of God who always does the will of the One who 
sent him. On the other hand, how could those who belong to Jesus ever be heard by God, 
mired in sin as they are? The answer takes us beyond the Lazarus narrative to the effects of 
the cross and resurrection of the Son. If the Triune God hears those who belong to the Son, 
then God’s hearing must be understood as a soteriological benefit of union with the 
crucified, buried, raised, and ascended Christ. For, while sin persists in the lives of those 
who belong to the Son, it would seem that the effects of sin, namely, God’s deaf ear, have 
been mitigated by the cross. This is precisely the way Augustine understands God’s hearing 
of the believer. Commenting on Psalm 130 (LXX: Ps 129), he argues that no matter how 
deep the depths of sin, the forgiveness of sin offered in Christ has made a way for the voice 
of every sinner to reach God.78 Thus, the one who belongs to Christ is heard by God, despite 
personal sin because the effects thereof have been mitigated and a new way made possible 
by the cross for the Father to hear the voice of those who belong to the Son. The gospel has 
made God’s hearing possible, despite sin. So, the first new condition introduced by the New 
Testament is that the petitioner must have experienced the forgiveness of sin that thereby 
makes God’s hearing possible. 
 The only other condition introduced by the New Testament is 1 John 5:14-15, “And 
this is the boldness we have in him, that if we ask anything according to his will, he hears 
us. And if we know that he hears us in whatever we ask, we know that we have obtained the 
requests made of him.”  There, the implication is that confidence in God’s hearing is 
contingent upon a given petition being consistent with the will of God. More existential 
readings of the passage have surely provoked speculation into what the will of God might be 
in any given circumstance, as well as epistemic questions about the possibility of such 
knowledge. These readings assume a static and mysterious will that must be somehow 
wrested from the heavens in order to truly pray and be heard. Yet the context of the passage 
points to a less speculative meaning. The burden of these closing remarks of the epistle is to 
instill confidence in its readers. Verse 13 assures that those who “believe in the name of the 
Son of God” may know that they have eternal life. It is in that same name that Jesus 
commanded his followers to pray, reassuring them that doing so would solicit a sure 
response from his Father (Jn 16:23-24). Thus, it is no surprise that believing in the name and 
asking according to the will of God are proximate in these closing remarks. Being heard by 
                                                          
78 Augustine, Exposition of the Psalms (121-150), vol.vi. trans. by Maria Boulding (New York: New 
City Press, 2000), p. 140. 
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God is promised to those who pray according to the divine will; but this is not so different 
from praying in the name of the Son. Given the similar aim of both passages—specifying 
the qualifications for confidence in prayer—as well as their shared mention of the name of 
the Son of God, it should not be assumed that the meanings of the two passages are so 
different. Further, both passages belong to a cluster of Johannine motifs about confidence 
before the Father. In 1 John 3:21-23, answer to prayer is promised to those who keep God’s 
commandments and do what pleases God. Then, the commandment and what pleases God 
are both specified, respectively: belief in the name of the Son of God and loving one 
another. Similarly, John 14:13-14 promises that prayers in Jesus’ name will be answered. 
Additionally, abiding in Jesus is the criteria in John 15:7. Then, verse 10 clarifies what it 
means to abide: to obey Jesus’ commandments. These passages about confidence in prayer 
cluster around obedience and prayer in the name of Jesus. 1 John 5:14-15 should be read in 
light of these related passages. Doing so makes praying according to God’s will less 
mysterious. It is a matter of praying in Jesus’ name and obeying his commandments. 
 The New Testament thus introduces two criteria for God’s hearing. God hears those 
who have received the gracious forgiveness of sins as they have been united to the Christ, 
the Son of God, whom the Father always hears; and God hears those who pray in the name 
of the Christ, the Son of God. Those who approach the Father in prayer are reassured that 
God will hear and respond to those who belong to God’s Son and offer petitions in his 
name. The effects of sin, which had formerly caused God to turn a deaf ear, have been 
redressed by the One whom the Father always hears, and the relationship of the petitioner to 
the Always-Heard Word has now become the grounds for confidence that the petitioner, like 
the Son, is always heard by the Father. Thus, the Triune God will always hear those who 
belong to the Son and ask in His name. 
 The New Testament in general and the Lazarus narrative in particular have 
demonstrated a consistency with the theological framework and definition of God’s hearing 
offered above. Yet the coming of the Christ, the Son of God—to use the Johannine 
description—has demonstrated a transformation of both the framework and the definition. 
The result is a similar four-part framework. (1) The Triune God—Father, Son, and Spirit—is 
the God who hears. (2) That God hears those who belong to the Son. (3) That God is the 
God whose ear is always inclined, even in the wilderness. (4) God will always hear those 
who belong to the Son and ask in his name. The definition underwent less modification, but 
was buttressed and developed by the Lazarus narrative. The circumstances of Lazarus’ death 
lost their urgency and desperate features in light of the confidence of the always of the 
Father’s hearing. Thus, a request for God to hear is a request for loving and just attention 
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that is accomplished by means of the significant personal presence of the Triune God, which 
entails a sure response. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that insufficient attention has been paid to God’s hearing of the 
pleas and petitions of creatures, and that this neglect has resulted in a failure to recognize 
the extraordinary theological value of this Biblical motif. By listening more closely to the 
body of revealed Scripture, it was shown that descriptions of God listening, hearing, 
inclining God’s ear—that these descriptions are more than crude metaphors borrowed from 
primitive religion. Rather, they are rich descriptions of God’s meaningful, dialogical 
relationship with creatures. The Triune God has chosen to self-reveal as one who not only 
speaks, but hears. It was argued that this hearing is a particular kind of loving and just 
attention that God supplies by means of God’s own significant personal presence. While the 
Hebrew Bible provided grounds for a theological framework for God’s hearing in a 
narrative as early and foundational as the Abraham-Sarah-Hagar narrative, the New 
Testament demonstrated a continuity with but also a transformation of that framework. With 
the incarnation of the Word, it was demonstrated that now, those who belong to the Son of 
God and pray in his name enjoy the always of God’s listening ear. If the Psalmist found 
considerable comfort in God’s hearing, that same comfort and consolation is now made 
available in a new and more significant way by means of the Triune God’s significant 
personal presence in the coming of the Son. The always offered to those who belong to the 
Son ensures a presence in relationship that is manifest in all of life’s varying circumstances, 
even the wilderness. These conclusions offer a way forward for thinking theologically about 
what it means for God to hear creatures, as well as the comfort, consolation, and peace 
available to those who find themselves in the wilderness. Before moving on to propose, 
constructively, how this framework and definition might illumine or transform 
understandings of specific dogmatic loci, we will first consider, descriptively, the work of 




2. KARL BARTH AND THE PROMISE OF GOD’S HEARING  
 
“[E]r nicht nur hören, sondern erhören will”1 
 
Holy Scripture supplies an abundance of testimony to the reality of God’s hearing. Thus, it 
should be no surprise that one of the twentieth century’s most exegetical dogmaticians 
would have written most substantially on God’s hearing and its theological significance. 
Karl Barth’s theology in general, and the Church Dogmatics in particular, is well informed 
by the Scriptures. And it is his great attention to the revealed Word of God in its written 
form that likely accounts for Barth’s attention to and serious engagement with the theme of 
God’s hearing. Barth takes up the Biblical witness to God’s hearing into his theological 
system in two ways. First, Barth is able to give an account of what the Bible means when it 
speaks of God’s hearing. This makes a good start toward an understanding of God’s hearing, 
even if, as it will be noted, Barth’s developed concept of God’s hearing insufficiently 
reflects the diversity of the Bible’s talk of divine hearing. Second, Barth not only attends to 
and develops the theme of God’s hearing, but actually makes important use of it. It is 
noteworthy in its own right, but even more significant for some of Barth’s theological ends.  
In what follows I will attempt to identify the place of God’s hearing in Barth’s 
theology, demonstrating where it fits and how Barth conceives of hearing in light of his 
broader understanding of the relationship between the creator and creature. This will involve 
an all too brief account of Barth’s understanding of the relationship between covenant and 
creation. It will be shown that Barth’s distinctive understanding of creation as the external 
basis for the covenant is the proper place for understanding God’s gracious hearing of 
human creatures.  
 After laying that necessary groundwork, I will go on to offer an exposition of two 
features of Barth’s theology of divine hearing.  The first will address the sequence of God’s 
hearing and human speaking. It will be shown that, like some contemporary feminist 
theologians, Barth understands God’s hearing to precede human speaking. This will 
helpfully display the asymmetrical arrangement of human and divine agency by which Barth 
understands prayer. The second will be with regard to faith and the kind of confidence one 
                                                          
1 Karl Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik (hereafter abbreviated, KD), II/1, p. 575. 
58 
 
may have of God’s hearing. These two features of Barth’s theology of hearing will be noted 
to have implications for practical theology, including Christian prayer and liturgy. 
 Finally, the promise of hearing as a theological concept will be demonstrated by an 
examination of Barth’s own theological appropriation of the topic in relation to the question 
of divine immutability (or “constancy” as Barth prefers). While Barth scholarship is 
frequently focused on Barth’s actualism, here there is to be identified an all too 
underappreciated, if highly qualified, divine receptivity in Barth’s doctrine of God. In this 
context, Barth’s argument reveals the value of hearing as a theological concept that may be 
appropriated to address classical theological questions. Barth’s deployment of divine 
hearing as an illuminating and useful theological construct to serve dogmatic ends supplies 
the courage to follow his lead in the subsequent chapters.  
 There should be noted an inherent danger in this exposition of Barth’s concept of 
divine hearing. Any excising of Barth’s thought from his broader theological program will 
be vulnerable to both imbalance and distortion. Indeed, many of the more recent works on 
Barth decry the disregard for context, including Barth’s theological development,2 the 
arrangement or prioritization of his doctrines of covenant3 and election,4 failure to recognize 
him as an exegete,5 inattention to the ethical nature of his thinking,6 and his conversation 
with tacit dialogue partners,7 to name only a few. Nonetheless, a brief account—as the 
following must be—of Barth’s understanding of hearing, will necessarily leave some things 
unsaid and run the risk of reduction. The most immediate context for Barth’s understanding 
of God’s hearing is, in fact, his understanding of prayer and the creator-creature relation—
context that I will foreground below. I hope that those more familiar with Barth’s thought 
                                                          
2 See Christoph Schwöbel, “Theology” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. by John 
Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 17-21. 
3 See Joseph L. Mangina, Karl Barth: Theologian of Christian Witness (London: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2004), p. 29. 
4 See Bruce McCormack, “Grace and Being” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. by 
John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 92-109. 
5 John Webster, “Introducing Barth” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth ed. by John 
Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 13-14. See also, Francis Watson, “The 
Bible” in op. cit., pp. 57-71. 
6 See John Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), pp. 2-9. See also Daniel L. Migliore, “Commanding Grace: Karl Barth’s Theological Ethics” 
in Commanding Grace: Studies in Karl Barth’s Ethics, ed. by Daniel L. Migliore (Cambridge: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), pp. 1-25. 
7 See Mike Higton and John McDowell, “Introduction: Karl Barth as Conversationalist” in 
Conversing with Barth, ed. by John C. McDowell and Mike Higton (Aldershot, England: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 1-13. 
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will hear overtures—albeit incomplete ones—to his larger theological project without 
expecting everything to be said. 
 
2.1 Creation and Covenant: The Place of God’s Hearing 
Barth’s understanding of God’s relation to creation will be explored in more detail in the 
subsequent chapter. Here, one aspect of that relation must be brought into focus in order to 
make sense of Barth’s understanding of God’s hearing: the relationship between God’s 
creative acts and God’s covenant with humanity. Barth’s construal of the relationship is well 
known and forms the basis for all of Barth’s Doctrine of Creation volume. Thus, it will 
suffice to briefly explicate it and then situate God’s hearing of creatures within that context.  
 For Barth, creation is the external basis of the covenant, and the covenant is the 
internal basis of creation. That creation is the external basis of the covenant means that the 
creation is oriented toward the covenant. The creation is the basis, the “theater”, in which 
the covenant takes place. “Creation sets the stage for the story of the covenant of grace.”8 
Creation cannot be a generic explanation of human origins or human dependence. It is not 
merely or primarily about beginnings. Rather, for Barth, a truly Christian doctrine of 
creation must be shaped by the Triune God and oriented toward God’s covenantal, electing 
work. Creation is, then, “the presupposition of the realization of the divine purpose of love 
in relation to the creature.”9 Barth claims that “Creation provides the space for the story of 
the covenant of grace. This story requires a space corresponding to it: the existence of man 
and his world. Creation provides this.”10 This is so because it is the formal presupposition 
for God to love what is not-God. Yet it is not “the necessary ground of the other works of 
God, a ground which is complete in itself and can be defined without reference to the 
history of redemption.”11 As the external basis of the covenant, creation has in view “the 
institution, preservation and execution of the covenant of grace, for partnership in which 
[God] has predestined and called man.”12 This understanding of creation is consistent with 
Barth’s well-known and vehement antipathy for natural theology and his corollary 
                                                          
8 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (hereafter abbreviated, CD) III/1, p. 44. 
9 CD III/1, p. 96.  
10 CD III/1, p. 44. 
11 Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation, p. 64. 
12 CD III/1, p. 43. 
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prioritizing of revelation. It distinguishes creation from covenant, while maintaining their 
relatedness. 
 Covenant, then, is the internal basis for creation. The primary work is not creation 
but God’s act of grace in Christ which constitutes the covenant. The creation is logically 
secondary and ordered to that saving work. It is covenant that is the material presupposition 
of creation.13 The covenant should not be thought of as some later addendum to creation. 
No, it is the covenant that gives rise and cause to creation. Creation has “its eternal source in 
God’s decision and plan.”14 Consistent with Barth’s prioritization of revelation, “The belief 
of Israel in the covenant God subsequently caused it to confess God the Creator.”15 
Understanding the covenant as the internal basis of creation demonstrates the relatedness 
between the two. They do not exist independently of each other, as if creation were 
somehow “remoto Christo.”16 Rather, the creation is “wholly enclosed within the 
redemptive covenant, in the history of which creation becomes itself.”17 It does not have an 
existence independent of God’s covenant with creation. This means that “The creature does 
not exist casually. It does not merely exist, but exists meaningfully. In its existence it 
realizes a purpose and plan and order. […] The creature owes both the fact that it is, and 
what it is, to the revelation which has this content.”18 
 Thus, creation and covenant belong together and remain distinct from each other. 
For Barth, this relation between the two is a necessary postulate if revelation is to be 
properly prioritized. The creation and the covenant are revealed, not as the arbitrary work of 
just any “god”, but as the work of the Triune God who loves in freedom and who has 
determined to reveal Godself in Christ. It is a work that is uniquely characterized by the love 
and freedom of this God that is manifest and revealed in Jesus Christ. Barth asserts that 
“The decisive anchorage of the recognition that creation and covenant belong to each other 
is the recognition that God the Creator is the triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Where 
this is and remains clear, the idea of creation will itself receive the necessary concretely 
Christian form and meaning.”19 For the doctrine of creation to be truly Christian, it must 
                                                          
13 CD III/1, p. 232. 
14 CD III/1, p. 43.  
15 Eberhard Busch, The Great Passion: An Introduction to Karl Barth’s Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), p. 182. Italics original. 
16 Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation, p. 65. 
17 Ibid., p. 64. 
18 CD III/1, pp. 229-30. 
19 CD III/1, p. 48. 
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find its ground and orientation in Christ. “Knowledge of God as Creator does not take its 
rise in human experience—a sense of contingency or an awareness of ultimacy within 
human history—but in confession of Jesus Christ whose humanity is the guarantee of the 
independent existence of the creation.”20  
 So how are we to understand the relation between covenant and the human 
creature? When Barth turns to his anthropology, his distinctively Christian approach is 
maintained. Humanity cannot be understood apart from Christ. It cannot be pondered or 
approached from any other angle.21 This is fundamental to the relationship between creation 
and covenant, such that creation must be understood as the external basis for God’s grace; 
but more specifically, it is fundamental to Barth’s very nuanced understanding of humanity. 
Humanity can only be considered by reflection on this one man. “The ontological 
determination of humanity,” Barth claims, “is grounded in the fact that one man among all 
others is the man Jesus.”22 Thinking about it otherwise is to merely dabble in abstractions.  
Once the nature of humanity is understood to be revealed exclusively in Jesus 
Christ, then, in this distinctively Christian and trinitarian understanding of creation, are we 
able to find the basis for God’s hearing of human creatures in Barth’s theology. Holding 
together this notion that humanity is thought from the man Jesus Christ with the notion that 
it is the Triune God who is the creator, we come to understand that the Son, who is true 
humanity and the creator of humanity, is one who both speaks and hears. This is because 
humanity, insofar as it is wholly understood from the perspective of this one man, Jesus 
Christ, is related to God as creator in a way that is analogous to the Father’s relation to the 
Son. The critical passage comes from CD III/1: 
It is legitimate and imperative that by the expression ‘Son’ or ‘Word of God’ we 
should here understand the second mode of existence (‘person’) of the inner divine 
reality in itself and as such. There exists between it and creation the following 
connexion. In the same freedom and love in which God is not alone in Himself but 
is the eternal begetter of the Son, who is the eternally begotten of the Father, He 
also turns as Creator ad extra in order that absolutely and outwardly He may not be 
alone but the One who loves in freedom. In other words, as God in Himself is 
neither deaf nor dumb but speaks and hears His Word from all eternity, so outside 
His eternity He does not wish to be without hearing or echo, that is, without the 
ears and voices of the creature. The eternal fellowship between Father and Son, or 
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between God and His Word, thus finds a correspondence in the very different but 
not dissimilar fellowship between God and His creature.23 
God does not desire to be without the voices of creatures, just as, analogously, God the 
Father is not without God’s Word. Of course, the dissimilarity between the ad intra and the 
ad extra infinitely exceeds the similarities. Yet if the one man, Jesus Christ, is the starting 
point for what it means to be human, then the relation between this man and God must be 
instructive, even if so greatly dissimilar, for the understanding of humanity’s more general 
relation to God the creator. This Triune God is the creator of a humanity that is bound to its 
creator by the Word. The creation in general—and this includes the creation of human 
beings—is teleologically oriented for grace and covenant. While for Barth that covenant 
majors on God’s Word, speech, voice, address, summons to creatures, it is also a covenant 
that summons into existence human creatures who are united to that Word and, who, like the 
Word to whom they are united, have voices which God wishes not to be without. 
 If the covenant is the internal basis for creation in this way and, as such, explains 
the relation between creation and covenant, then this particular understanding of the human 
creature, in relation to God, results. For Barth, the nature of creation “is simply its 
equipment for grace.”24 The nature of creation in general, and human creatures in particular, 
is fundamentally oriented toward covenant participation. Human creatures are, thus, built for 
grace. As theirs is a humanity that is revealed in the one man, Jesus Christ, that humanity is 
revealed to be not only the recipient of God’s address, God’s Word, but also those who, like 
the Word to whom they are united, address God and are heard. 25 
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2.2 The Priority of Divine Agency in Human Speaking and Divine Hearing 
So, for Barth, God does not desire to be without the ears and voice of human creatures. But 
how does Barth conceive of the human address to God which is heard? From where does it 
originate and at whose initiative? Given Barth’s insistence on God’s initiative in God’s 
relationship with humanity, it should be no surprise to learn that Barth sees even human 
address to God as divinely initiated. However, this will be shown to have interesting and 
counterintuitive implications for Barth’s understanding of God’s hearing. 
 In §3.1 of the Church Dogmatics Barth labors to distinguish between proclamation, 
in its various forms, and address to God. Not all talk about God is proclamation, and talk to 
God is different than proclamation. This distinction is important for Barth’s purposes 
because he understands there to be a cause and effect relationship between proclamation and 
address to God. He claims, “The Church’s prayers and hymns and confessions of faith 
obviously are what they purport to be only to the extent that so far as possible they cease to 
attempt the impossible task of proclaiming something to God or the unworthy one of 
incidentally proclaiming something to man.”26 None of the various kinds of address to 
God—prayers, hymns, confessions—inform God of something previously unknown. 
Further, they do not serve an incidental purpose of proclamation to others who might 
overhear them. No, he goes on to claim that, addresses to God “are the response to God of 
the praise, confession and thanksgiving of those to whom proclamation concerning Him has 
come. They are the sacrifice the bringing of which can have before God only the meaning of 
a confirmation of what He has done to man, and in respect of which man can obviously have 
no intentions in relation to others who may also be present.”27 For Barth, all address to God 
is, at bottom, a response to proclamation that has already come to the speaker. She who 
addresses God does so as the result of a prior proclamation that has come to her, such that 
all of her prayers, worship, and confessions are the result of God’s gracious initiative in her 
life. Address to God functions as “confirmation,” Barth claims, that God has already 
wrought a work in the one who addresses God. Thus, all human speech directed toward God 
is response, and that response is caused by divine initiative.28 
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26 CD I/1, p. 49. 
27 CD I/1, pp. 49-50. 
28 See Trevor Hart, “Revelation” in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, esp. pp. 38-41. 
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 The radical implications of the divine initiative in human address to God are most 
acutely felt when considering Barth’s understanding of prayer. Ashley Cocksworth has 
recently elucidated Barth’s understanding of prayer, noting the prioritization of petition.29 
Barth is explicit in CD III/3 that petition “controls and includes everything else one might 
say about prayer.”30 Despite how curious petition may appear for Barth’s theological 
program—especially in light of Barth’s understanding of the asymmetry between divine and 
human agency—Cocksworth enumerates several good reasons for the prioritizing of 
petition.31 First, Barth finds it significant that the text of the Lord’s Prayer is “quite clearly 
and simply a string of petitions, pure petitions.”32 Second, Cocksworth observes Barth’s 
commitment to the “profound sense of neediness” which constitutes the human agent.33 
Third and ultimately, Cocksworth believes that Barth’s prioritization of petition is rooted in 
the divine command to pray. For Barth concludes that “The real basis of prayer is man’s 
freedom before God, the God-given permission to pray which, because it is given by God, 
becomes a command and an order and therefore a necessity.”34 So, at this juncture of 
Barth’s thinking, petition takes center-stage. Yet how is petition, among the many different 
types of address to God, to be understood as divinely initiated, and how does this influence 
the way Barth thinks of God’s hearing of those petitions? 
 Answering these crucial questions for Barth’s understanding of prayer requires 
following him on what he describes as a “rather strange and apparently circuitous path.”35 
Barth has argued pointedly for the neediness of humanity in relation to God. In prayer, one 
comes to the holy, rich, and great God in profound wretchedness, poverty, and weakness. 
The fundamental posture humanity takes before God is that of great need. Yet this is not the 
constitutive element in Christian prayer. Barth claims that the “primarily and properly 
surprising” element in distinctively Christian prayer is not the ontological gulf between God 
and humanity, but that despite that gulf, God through the Word has moved toward humanity 
with intimacy analogous to that of Father toward a child. Such intimacy is made possible by 
the incarnation, crucifixion, death, and resurrection of Christ. “It was for the direct nearness 
between God and man as between Father and child, and child and Father, that Jesus Christ 
                                                          
29 Ashley Cocksworth, Karl Barth on Prayer (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), pp. 61ff. 
30 CD III/3, p. 268. Of course, Barth’s later “turn to invocation” in The Christian Life is well known.  
31 Cocksworth, Karl Barth on Prayer, p. 62. 
32 CD III/3, p. 268. 
33 Cocksworth, Karl Barth on Prayer, p. 62; citing examples from CD III/3, pp. 267-69, 273, 281; CD 
III/4, pp. 91, 93, 95.  
34 CD III/4, p. 92.  
35 CD III/3, p. 270.  
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was born a man and crucified. And this nearness is the light of His resurrection.”36 It is this 
intimacy that makes the Christian able to ask freely without fear or anxiety. Important for 
his argument is the truth that “The Christian is able to take because God gives him Himself 
and all that He possess. ‘He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up freely for us 
all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?’ (Rom. 8:32).”37 For Barth, the 
asking of the pray-er is a response to the situation in which she finds herself—a situation of 
intimacy established by the giving of the Word. Thus, her free asking is a response to God’s 
giving of Godself and all that God possesses. Prayer, Barth claims, “derives from what the 
Christian receives.”38 So, God has established the conditions by which prayer to God may 
occur. This is the beginning point for Barth’s argument.  
But God is not only the beginning of prayer, but also its answer. For when Barth 
conceives of the petitions of the pray-er and all her needs that can be met by asking God, he 
believes that there is only one answer and “one great gift”39, namely, Jesus Christ—the 
answer to all petitions. “Of all the things that are needed by man, and needed in such a way 
that he can receive them only from God, that only God can give them to him, there is one 
great gift. And to all the true and legitimate requests that are directed necessarily to God, 
there is one great answer. This one divine gift and answer is Jesus Christ.”40 How is Christ 
the answer to all Christian petition? Barth elaborates by describing Christ’s reign—his 
ability to bestow blessing, his power to create, his covenant relationship with creation, his 
solidarity with humanity in the incarnation, his deliverance offered to humanity, his self-
constitution as Lord, Guardian, Helper, and hope of the world, his supreme control over the 
world which he upholds and rules. Stating it succinctly, “In the fact that Jesus is there, the 
world is already helped, and everything that creation needs, and at the heart of creation man, 
is already provided for.”41 Christ “is the one great gift and answer in which all that we can 
receive and ask is not merely determined but actually given and present and available for 
us.”42 What is the payoff for tracing Barth’s argument here? It is the surprising and profound 
conclusion that in Christian prayer, the answer to prayer precedes the asking. For Barth, the 
meaning of human petition is summarized as a “taking and receiving of the divine gift and 
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answer as it is already present and near to hand in Jesus Christ.”43 Put summarily, Barth 
claims that  
in asking for it, he takes up towards this God a position which he alone may and 
can take up. But in doing this, in entering into a suitable and therefore a right and 
profitable relationship to the gift and answer already given and present, it comes 
about that he can actually take and receive it, so that God attains His end with him 
as the Saviour. The Christian asks, and by this asking the doors are opened wide, 
and the gates are lifted up, that the King of glory may come in.44 
 Petition is, then, the receiving of the gift and answer already given in Christ. This 
means that the answer precedes the asking and that even in petitionary prayer the initiative 
rests with God. Petitionary prayer is made possible through two movements. The first is that 
through Christ God has graciously and freely brought about the conditions wherein the 
prayer-er may approach God without fear or anxiety. The second is that through Christ God 
has graciously and freely supplied the answer to all petitions, prior to their asking. In this 
way, the initiative is entirely God’s. The answer precedes the request, and more profoundly 
for Barth’s understanding of God’s hearing: God’s hearing precedes the asking.45 
 The notion that God’s hearing precedes human asking is a theme that appears 
throughout the Church Dogmatics. Already in the earliest pages of CD I/1 Barth had 
written, “Prayer can be the human answer to the divine hearing already granted.”46 Later in 
CD III/4 he claims that “it is only an apparent paradox to say that human prayer has its 
origin in the divine hearing.”47 Barth is not alone in giving precedent to divine hearing. 
Modern feminist theologians following Nelle Morton have spoken of a “hearing to speech” 
that conceives of human speech as being drawn out as a result of God’s already listening 
presence.48 Morton’s and Barth’s understandings of hearing and its relationship to speaking 
are very different and are developed toward different ends. Yet there is considerable 
similarity. For both Morton and Barth, it is God’s hearing that brings about a formal 
condition that allows speech. Further, both see God’s hearing as the efficient cause that 
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brings about human speaking as a response to the hearing. These similarities are important 
because they make Barth’s argument less surprising and counterintuitive. Barth’s 
prioritizing of divine hearing as the initiation, cause, and temporal antecedent of human 
speaking becomes more plausible in light of similar accounts. 
 One important implication of Barth’s prioritizing of divine hearing is that it 
undercuts many of the inadequate conceptions of the God-human relationship, and that in 
three related ways. First, contrary to popular description, prayer is not a “conversation” with 
God. Barth rarely uses the term, and when he does, it is with considerable qualification. 
Cocksworth notes two reasons for Barth’s aversion to the term: it tends toward idolatry, as 
conversation with God is likened to any other conversation; and it will not carry the political 
and ethical demands that Barth places on prayer.49 The primacy of divine agency and 
initiative in God’s hearing will not allow for the metaphor of conversation to be of any help. 
The asymmetry of divine and human agency will not permit it; and prayer accomplishes, for 
Barth, far more than simple conversing. Second, this understanding of hearing’s priority 
disrupts the temptation to view prayer sequentially, as a sort of hand-off of agency, moving 
first from speaker and then to hearer. John McDowell describes this as a “crudely 
anthropomorphic” understanding of prayer and goes on to identify the difficulty in the 
“sequentiality or successiveness involved in the agencies. ‘God’ begins where the praying 
creature leaves off, and vice versa—prayer moves from creature to the God who is purely 
hearer, and thus something of a passive spectator; God then acts in response to the now 
waiting one who had prayed.”50 This “relay-race” approach to prayer and God’s hearing is 
foreign to Barth’s understanding of God’s activity and initiative. This means, third, that all 
di-polar models of the creator-creature relationship that follow the process theology of 
Charles Hartshorne and Alfred N. Whitehead are ruled out due to the openness and 
reciprocity involved.51 Barth conceives of God’s agency as altogether different in kind and 
quality such that God hears petitions before they are made and has, thus, brought about the 
formal conditions that even permit them and the material response to them. 
God’s hearing is not the receiving and responding to of some temporally offered 
human speech-act. It operates at what might be imprecisely called “a higher plane”. Despite 
humanity’s profound alienation on account of sin, God’s hearing graciously, freely, and 
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intimately bridges the ontological gulf like a Father aware of his child’s unrecognized need. 
That gracious hearing makes it possible for the child to verbalize a need and receive a 
response that was “already” heard by the father.  
 
2.3 Confidence in the God Who Hears 
One might worry that Barth’s arrangement of divine and human agency just described could 
have a potentially damaging effect on Christian life and spirituality; for, if God hears 
prayers before they are uttered, what remains of prayer’s purpose? If God knows humanity 
in all of its alienation and need and has already worked to answer all need in Christ, why is 
there a need for petition at all? Does God’s gracious provision of Christ in response to all 
human need make petition superfluous? Barth will not be party to undermining the practice 
of petitionary prayer. Rather, he labors to emphasize the Biblical command to pray and is 
concerned to supply a theological rationale for the Christian experience of prayer. Christians 
can and must pray; and even if God has already heard and answered prayer, Barth knows 
that the subjective experience of the pray-er may tell a different story. What confidence may 
the pray-er have that her petitions are truly heard by God? Can she have confidence that her 
petitions really matter to God and God’s sovereign rule? What theological reasoning will 
address the existential need for confidence that the pray-er is doing more than merely 
talking to herself or telling God something superfluous to God’s sovereign plan, that she is 
actually being heard. While Barth does not himself explicitly enumerate reasons for such 
confidence, spread across the Church Dogmatics, as well his other writings on prayer, there 
can be identified seven major reasons that the Christian may be assured of God’s hearing. 
 First, prayer offered in faith is heard on account of God’s perfect nature. Barth’s 
understanding of divine perfection will be explored in more detail below. Needless to say, 
he has a very specific understanding of divine perfection such that “God’s being consists in 
the fact that He is the One who loves in freedom,” and that “God’s being is itself perfection 
and the standard of all perfection.”52 This notion of God’s perfections is the grounds for 
Barth’s confidence in God’s hearing. Barth concludes that the Bible is “completely 
unambiguous” that God is one who hears prayer.53 “It is,” Barth insists, “essential for faith 
to be faith in the God who listens to prayer,” and that because it is God’s very nature to do 
so.54 God’s hearing is a function of divine freedom, but also because “He remains and is, the 
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Creator and Lord of all creation,” and “as such He has now made clear… that He wills not 
only to hear but to hearken [er nicht nur hören, sondern erhören will].”55 Of course, this 
does not mean it is necessary, as a function of God’s nature, to answer prayer. This would 
be a distortion of Barth’s argument and compromise the divine freedom Barth labors so 
stridently to defend. Rather, it is due to God’s perfect nature that God always hears the 
prayers of God’s people. 
 Second, prayer offered in faith is heard on account of its consistency with and 
prioritizing of the will of God. Barth has in mind, here, the experience of prayer identified 
with the parable of the importunate widow of Luke 18:1-8, whom Jesus commends for her 
incessant asking. The parable is relevant, for re-petition implies unanswered prayer, and in 
short time, unanswered prayer may feel like unheard prayer. But this need not be. Without 
abrogating Jesus’ commendation of incessant petition, Barth suggests that “In spite of all its 
untiring insistence and its likeness to the passionate prayer of the importunate widow, the 
prayer of faith has also the characteristic of the prayer of Gethsemane, in which the will of 
God is resolutely and finally set above the will of men. It is only prayer of this kind which 
has the promise that it will be heard…”56 Here Barth has in mind the “not my will, but yours 
be done” of Jesus’ prayer. That prioritizing of the divine will in petition gives assurance that 
the pray-er is heard on account of Biblical promise. The promise Barth has in mind is 1 John 
5:14-15, which establishes a cause-effect relationship between petition κατὰ τὸ θέλημα 
αὐτοῦ and God’s hearing of prayer. This promise is good news for the pray-er. For even in 
re-petition, she may be confident that she is heard by God when, like Jesus, she prioritizes 
the divine will over her own and when she aims to bring her petition in line with τὸ θέλημα 
αὐτοῦ. In such cases, the Scriptures supply confidence that the pray-er is heard. 
 Third, prayer offered in faith is heard on account of the special relationship between 
speaker and listener. Barth understands prayer to be the special privilege bestowed by God 
upon the believer, which allows her to share in God’s rule and reign over the cosmos. Barth 
insists, “while God alone exercises the government of the world believers are not simply to 
be servants under Him. They may stand beside Him as His friends.”57 Barth cites as 
examples both Moses experience as one who spoke with God face-to-face as one speaks 
with a friend (Ex. 33:11), and the declaration of Jesus to the disciples: “You are my friends 
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if you do what I command you. I do not call you servants any longer, because the servant 
does not know what the master is doing; but I have called you friends, because I have made 
known to you everything that I have heard from my Father” (Jn. 15:14-15). Here Barth is 
concerned to emphasize that God listens to prayer as a friend listens to the needs and 
requests of another friend. Above I have already detailed the way Barth sees God’s posture 
toward believers as one of intimacy and analogous to that of a father and child. Bearing in 
mind that context, it is evident that it is the special relationship that the believer has with 
God through Christ that allows her to approach God in prayer with confidence that God 
listens, not as a stranger or an enemy, but as friend or father, who is eager “not only to hear 
but to hearken.”58 
 Fourth, prayer offered in faith is heard on account of the believer’s participation in 
Christ. This is an extraordinarily rich theme in Barth’s thinking that has been well-
explicated by Cocksworth.59 Here a summary must suffice. In §53.3.4 Barth states 
unequivocally that “True prayer is prayer which is sure of a hearing.”60 He then offers the 
most explicit definition of God’s hearing found anywhere in the CD: “the reception and 
adoption of the human request into God’s plan and will, and therefore the divine speech and 
action which correspond to the human request.”61 Confidence in this kind of hearing 
constitutes the posture of “true prayer” and is its conditio sine qua non. This sort of prayer is 
characterized by and comes under the determination of hope—an unreserved and 
unquestioning certainty.62 For Barth, the question cannot be whether or not God hears, but 
only if the petition is characterized by this confident hope. In this, Barth has the Heidelberg 
Catechism, Question 129 on his side: “For my prayer is much more certainly heard by God 
than I feel in my heart that I desire such from Him.”63 Barth concludes from the Catechism 
that  
It is not as if our prayer were the certain thing and His hearing the uncertain, but 
precisely the opposite. We can doubt the value, power and sincerity of our own 
asking, but not God’s hearing. Will our request as such ever be anything but weak 
and poverty-stricken? Well, we are not called upon to believe in its power and 
richness. We are called upon to believe that it is heard by God even as it is prayed: 
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ἔχομεν, ἐλάβετε. It is because it is heard that we pray, and not because we are so 
skilled in asking.64 
Yet what is the foundation of such confidence and hope in God’s hearing? The basis for this 
confidence comes by the participation of the believer in the life of the Triune God as she is 
incorporated into Christ by the Spirit. By her incorporation into the “we” of the Church 
whose head is Christ, she is bound up with God from all eternity. As one who belongs to 
God through Christ by the Spirit, her asking is an asking with Christ. The basis for 
confidence in God’s hearing is here stated by Barth in full:  
[W]hen we pray to God we have Him on our side from the very outset, and we for 
our part stand on His side from the very outset, so that from the very outset we 
must be certain that He hears our prayer. In His Son God has become man, and 
therefore He has actually taken our side and become our Brother. And in His Son 
we are actually raised as His brethren to the side of God. Now if the Son asks Him, 
how can the Father possibly fail to hear Him? How can His asking fail to be 
accompanied by hearing? And how, then, can the Father fail to hear and answer 
those whom His Son calls His own, who are together with His Son His children, 
who ask Him in company with His Son, with whom and for whom the Son asks? 
How can there be even the smallest interval between asking and hearing? As Jesus 
Christ asks, and we with Him, God has already made Himself the Guarantor that 
our request will be heard. Indeed, He has already heard them.65 
Such confidence is entirely consistent with the Johannine theme of praying in Christ’s name 
(Jn. 14:13; 15:16; 16:23ff.). This invocation of Christ’s name and identification with him in 
asking is a recollection of the pray-er’s participation in the life of the Triune God who hears. 
“For this God is not only occasionally but essentially, not only possibly and in extraordinary 
cases but always, the God who hears the prayers of His own.”66 
Fifth, and related to the believer’s participation in Christ, prayer offered in faith is 
heard on account of Christ’s prayers for and with the believer. In §49.4 Barth details the 
way that Christ is not only the answer to all prayer, but the petitioner par excellence. Here 
Barth’s indebtedness to Calvin is evident.67 Christ petitions the Father for and with his 
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people as an intercessor. The elected community “is constituted by the fact that it knows and 
acknowledges and affirms His intercession as that of the great High-priest, that it is posited 
on this basis, that it cannot posit itself on any other.”68 In this, Christ as the great High Priest 
continually teaches his people to pray as he prays for them. This community of the elect 
“will not allow its Lord to be alone in prayer, but it will be at His side with its own asking, 
however imperfect and perverted and impotent this may be compared with His.”69 More 
succinctly: “There is no Church which is not an asking Church.”70 For Barth, the Church, 
qua Church, prays with and in Christ, and “Christian prayer is participation in Jesus Christ; 
participation, basically, in the grace which is revealed and active in Him, in the Son of 
God… Christian prayer is life in and with the community of Jesus Christ.”71 So, it is in 
relation to Christ, the High Priest, and in relation to the community of the elect that the 
believer is able to pray. This dual relation is brought about by God in the life of the believer 
and is the grounds for confidence in God’s hearing prayer. Barth connects participation in 
Christ with confidence in God’s hearing: “God must set [the believer] in fellowship with His 
Son, gathering him into the community of His Son and making him a living member of it. In 
this freedom, he prays, and therefore he asks, and he can do it as we have described—in the 
fullness of the divine presence, and therefore with a strong assurance that he will be heard 
even as he asks.”72 So the believer may embrace a posture of confidence in prayer due to her 
petition with Christ and her position in his community.  
 Sixth, prayer offered in faith is heard because it is, fundamentally, a gracious work 
of God in and through the believer. Throughout his work, Barth pushes prayer in two 
directions. On the one hand, Barth insists that the believer must pray as Christ has taught his 
disciples to pray. On the other hand, he insists that the believer is unable to pray as she 
ought.73 By the writing of The Christian Life, Barth declares that prayer is “totally 
inconceivable.”74 Yet Christ’s followers are commanded to pray. Barth’s commitment to the 
avoidance of “religion” or autonomous religious activity is evident here. Barth will allow no 
understanding of prayer that rests on human effort devoid of God’s activity. On the contrary, 
human prayer is a divine activity, brought about by the grace of God. For Barth, it is “He, 
                                                          
68 CD III/3, p. 277. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 278. 
71 Ibid., p. 282. 
72 Ibid., p. 283. 
73 See Cocksworth, Karl Barth on Prayer, p. 132.  
74 Karl Barth, The Christian Life (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), p. 136. 
73 
 
Jesus Christ, [who] is properly and really the One who prays”75 in the believer. Prayer then 
is the activity of God in the believer. This work of grace in the believer accounts for 
confidence that the prayers of God’s people are heard; for they are, at bottom, a work of 
God that, as such, cannot fail to be efficacious.76 
 Finally, in the creaturely experience of prayer, God’s hearing accomplishes 
something in the pray-er and her experience of the relationship with the One to whom she 
prays. This is not a specifically textual argument, but a structural one, extrapolated from 
Barth’s prioritization of petition. Petition is prioritized by Barth, in part, on account of its 
emphasis on the relationship between God and the pray-er. The petitionary posture of the 
pray-er is, for Barth, the truest and deepest form of relationship with God as the pray-er is, 
in union with Christ, praying to the Father. “The only possible status of the creature,” Barth 
insists, “is that of one who asks.”77 As the pray-er approaches God as one who asks, the 
neediness and dependence conform to the divinely willed and commanded structure of the 
relationship.78 In that posture of neediness and dependence, the pray-er becomes, in 
obedience to God and as a gift of the Spirit, more who God has intended her to be. While 
God has already heard the petitions of the pray-er, she receives more than the affirmation of 
God’s hearing in her neediness and dependence. She receives the gift and blessing already 
given in Christ as she conforms to God’s divinely willed and commanded posture of 
dependence such that she becomes more whom God is making her to be. While God has 
already heard and already answered in the giving of Christ, the experience of that answer to 
prayer, in prayer, is a gift and blessing itself. It is a fuller experience of God’s already and, 
from the creaturely experience, becomes a gift given again and again as the pray-er 
approaches God in neediness and dependence. It is, then, in the experience of prayer that the 
pray-er receives renewed confidence of God’s hearing. 
 Barth leaves no question that when the believer approaches God in prayer, God 
hears. God’s hearing is not and should not be called into question on account of the 
subjective experience of the pray-er. To suggest that God might only occasionally hear—
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whether it be on account of the prayer-er’s effort, skill, or emotion in prayer—would be to 
deny the believer’s identity and gracious participation with Christ in the life of the Triune 
God, and would be an implicit denial of God’s perfect power and lordship over creation. 
Additionally, God’s hearing is not to be denied on account of a response from God that is 
incongruent with the petition. Barth clarifies this in the Christian Life when he writes,  
It would be wholly inappropriate and impossible for the children of God to expect 
and demand that the glory of the hearing should consist in the congruence of the 
divine fulfilling with the limited form of the asking, or even to accept as a hearing 
only a divine fulfilment that conforms to their own thought and intention. The rule 
is instead that they must accept already a fulfillment, that is, a transformation, of 
the prayer itself.79 
In this way Barth fends off any complaints about God’s potential failure to hear. While 
already cited, his position could be summarized as follows: “For this God is not only 
occasionally but essentially, not only possibly and in extraordinary cases but always, the 
God who hears the prayers of His own.”80 Therefore, the believer should approach the 
throne of grace with confidence, knowing that the Triune God is a God who hears (Heb. 
4:16). 
 Before moving on, it is worth briefly pausing to note an apparent tension between 
Barth and Holy Scripture. As the last chapter demonstrated, Scripture amply testifies to 
God’s refusal to hear and to hearken on account of covenant unfaithfulness. Yet Barth does 
not anywhere address God’s unwillingness to hear. Rather, when he writes of God always 
hearing prayer, he speaks of a believing, faith-filled prayer. The faith and belief that make 
prayer possible is a gift, divinely given. Such prayer is, for Barth, “so real” that “where it 
occurs God positively wills that man should call upon Him in this way.”81 Because prayer is 
divinely willed by God, it is sure to be heard. Further, because it is divinely willed by the 
God who hears, it is imbued with a faith that has God’s hearing as its content. Barth insists 
that the faith which produces prayer to God includes faith that God hears. “It is,” Barth 
claims, “essential for faith to be faith in the God who listens to prayer.”82 So, Barth does not 
address God’s unwillingness to hear. But this seems to be on account of his understanding 
that prayer, as something divinely willed and offered in the faith that has been divinely 
given, is offered in accordance with God’s will and is offered in the belief that God hears. 
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While this may appear to stand in tension with Scripture’s clear assertion that there are 
prayers which will go unheard, there is a potential resolution. For Barth, the certainty of 
God’s hearing is wrapped up with this particular kind of faith and is the result of the divine 
will. In contrast, the unheard prayers of Scripture are the prayers of those living at odds with 
covenant faithfulness. While Barth would certainly reject the introduction of any human 
contingency in God’s hearing, it might be proposed that, for Barth, these so-called “prayers” 
of the faithless and disobedient are not really prayers at all, because they lack faith and run 
contrary to the divine will. For Barth, it is the divinely willed, faith-filled prayer in the God 
who hears to which God always hears and always hearkens. So it may be that the unheard of 
“prayers” of which Scripture are not what Barth has in mind when he writes of prayer being 
always heard. 
 
2.4 Hearing and God’s Constancy 
With an account of Barth’s understanding of hearing in place, the question must be asked, 
What relevance has any of this for Barth’s dogmatics? In what way does this particular 
understanding of hearing do theological work for Barth? As a theological construct, what 
end might it serve? The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated to demonstrating the 
theological promise of hearing, as put on display by Barth. It will be shown that Barth 
appropriates his particular account of hearing so as to qualify and inform his doctrine of 
immutability. It will be seen that when hearing is brought into theological conjunction with 
immutability, a certain qualified doctrine of immutability results that affirms God’s 
constancy without impinging upon God’s freedom, power, or self-determination all the 
while bestowing dignity on the believer who petitions God by faith. This will require, first, 
an explication of Barth’s understanding of immutability, explaining its place and context in 
Barth’s dogmatics. Then it will be demonstrated what hearing accomplishes for Barth’s 
concept of immutability.  
 “God’s being consists in the fact that He is the One who loves in freedom. In this 
He is the perfect being: the being which is itself perfection and so the standard of all 
perfection; the being, that is, which is self-sufficient and thus adequate to meet every real 
need; the being which suffers no lack in itself and by its very essence fills every real lack. 
Such a being is God.”83 Thus, Barth begins his introduction to God’s nature. Famously, 
Barth prioritizes God’s love and God’s freedom, arranging them dialectically and indexing 
God’s perfections under either God’s free love or God’s loving freedom. It is under the 
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latter heading of God’s loving freedom that Barth, with characteristic dialectic intention, 
situates his doctrine of divine immutability, or “constancy” as he prefers it. And, while 
God’s loving freedom may seem like an unlikely context for a discussion of God’s 
constancy, Barth has here made an intentional decision to face the theological flashpoint 
head on. 
Barth claims that it is God’s constancy that differentiates God from all that is 
distinct from Godself, and this constancy means that there can be no “deviation, diminution 
or addition, nor any degeneration or rejuvenation, any alteration or non-identity or 
discontinuity. The one, omnipresent God remains the One He is. This is his constancy.”84 
Yet Barth is quick to qualify this kind of constancy, declaring that it in no way conflicts 
with God’s freedom or love. Rather, “both His freedom and His love are divine for the very 
reason that they are the freedom and the love of the One who is constant in Himself.”85 This 
entails that, in a broader sense, God’s constancy does not conflict with the life of God. God 
lives in perfect love and freedom. To understand what it means for God to be immutable, the 
predicate must be qualified by the subject. So, if God is the God who loves in freedom, then 
it must be that God who is immutable. Barth sees this approach as perfectly consistent with 
both Old and New Testament claims about God’s unchanging nature. Yet he observes the 
way Protestant orthodoxy, and even Augustine, read these passages in a way that created an 
abstract antithesis between rest and activity, or stasis and movement, which bequeathed to 
theological heirs an unresolvable paradox. In contrast, Barth claims that “God’s constant 
divine nature lies beyond the antithesis between rest and movement.”86 Barth is motivated 
by the impulse to honor the Biblical testimony to immutability, without isolating God from 
any contact with creation or making God immobile.87 The latter would be to make 
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immutability God, which could only result in the deifying of death itself.88 No, it is the God 
who loves in freedom who does not change.89 Immutability, as a result, comes to be 
identified with the fullest sense of a life of love and freedom, rather than stasis and death. 
This account of the God who is constant in loving freedom goes a long way in 
addressing the both-and of God’s immutability and free engagement with creation. Yet 
Barth is aware that the Scriptures present cases that appear inconsistent with his account. So, 
in a seven-page excurses, Barth takes up several special cases generated by salvation history 
that might confound a “general concept of immutability.”90 Barth claims that God “wills to 
be understood in His reality, that in [the Scriptures] He wills that we should learn what the 
really immutable is, and in what sense He, God, is the immutable.”91 While surveying each 
of these special cases falls outside the purview of this chapter, it is the final case that is 
immediately relevant. The issue is “the fact that the prayers of those who can and will 
believe are heard: that God is and wills to be known as the One who will and does listen to 
the prayers of faith.”92 In this way, Barth takes up the issue of God’s hearing and asks what 
it means for a doctrine of immutability. Here I will trace his argument and highlight the way 
Barth’s understanding of hearing shapes immutability.  
Barth’s thesis is that, on the basis of God’s freedom, God wills “not merely to hear 
but to hearken [nicht nur hören, sondern es erhören will] to the prayer of faith and that He 
not only permits to faith the prayer which expects an answer but has positively commanded 
it.”93 
First, Barth musters the Biblical testimony to support his claim:  
The Bible is completely unambiguous about this: ‘He heareth the prayer of the 
righteous’ (Prov. 15:29). ‘The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him, to all 
that call upon him in truth. He will fulfil the desire of them that fear him: he also 
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will hear their cry, and will save them’ (Ps. 145:18-19). ‘Call upon me in the day of 
trouble: I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me” (Ps. 50:15). ‘The effectual 
fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much. Elias was a man subject to like 
passions as we are, and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain; and it rained not 
on the earth by the space of three years and six months, and he prayed again and the 
heaven gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit’ (Jas. 5:16-18). ‘Ask and it 
shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you: 
For everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that 
knocketh, it shall be opened. Or what man is there of you, whom if his son ask 
bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent? If ye 
then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more 
shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?’ (Mt. 
7:7-11). ‘Hear what the unjust judge saith. And shall not God avenge his own elect, 
which cry day and night unto him, though he bear long with them?  I tell you he 
will avenge them speedily’ (Lk. 18:6-8). 
What does Barth make of this impressive (if selective) list of Biblical citations? Why does it 
belong in a discussion of God’s loving freedom and constancy? He claims that, “We need 
not hesitate to say that ‘on the basis of the freedom of God Himself God is conditioned by 
the prayer of faith.’ [‘es gibt auf Grund der Freiheit Gottes selbst eine Bestimmung Gottes 
durch das Gebet des Glaubens.‘] The basis is His freedom.”94 For Barth, God’s hearing 
creates a special case of divine immutability, grounded in God’s perfect freedom. God’s 
perfect hearing is essential to God’s own nature as the immutable Lord and creator. “What 
else is revealed when God hears and answers prayer but that He is the Creator and Lord of 
all things?”95 In Scripture, God has self-revealed as the one who hears prayer and as the one 
whose hearing constitutes God’s lordship and sovereignty over creation. For Barth, this 
means, “The living and genuinely immutable God is not an irresistible fate before which 
man can only keep silence, passively awaiting and accepting the benefits or blows which it 
ordains. There is no such thing as a Christian resignation in which we have either to submit 
to a fate of this kind or to come to terms with it.”96 Faith in and prayer to the God revealed 
in Christian Scripture is faith in and prayer to a God who is willing “not only to hear, but to 
hearken” (“nicht nur hören, sondern es erhören will”) to the prayers of the elect.97 For 
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Barth, God’s perfection means the perfect hearing and hearkening of the immutable and 
living God.  
 Yet how can it be that God hears and hearkens, yet remains immutable? Barth’s 
understanding of immutability transcends the antithesis between rest and movement in a 
way that is analogous with his arrangement of divine and human agency. God’s hearing 
precedes human asking because God’s agency is altogether different than human agency. 
Similarly, God’s constancy is not compromised by God’s free and eternal will as lord and 
creator to be conditioned by the prayers of faith. God’s eternal will is not in competition 
with creaturely petitions. 
[God] does not alter when he reveals Himself as the One who listens to prayer. He 
remains the One He was and is, the Creator and Lord of all creation. But as such He 
has now made clear this other aspect of His being, that He wills not only to hear but 
to hearken, that He does actually hearken, that His own can meet Him in what is 
finally not a passive but a supremely active attitude, that He has, indeed, expressly 
commanded that they should do so—not, of course, in the work of a creaturely 
freedom, in competition with His sole sovereignty and activity, but in the freedom 
of friends, a freedom which He has specially given them.98 
Here it is noteworthy, first, that Barth is committed to avoiding a competitive understanding 
of divine and human agency.99 This is consistent with the aforementioned observation by 
Cocksworth that prayer is not merely and crudely “conversation” for Barth. The 
arrangement of agencies is too different, too asymmetrical, to allow competition. Second, 
Barth understands God’s hearing as a “supremely active attitude”. It is not some passive 
inactivity in the way a “general concept of immutability” might suggest. On the contrary, 
God’s hearing is a function of the free and loving activity of the living God who is eternally 
active and eternally listening. This is why Barth can exclaim, “What else is revealed when 
God hears and answers prayer but that He is the Creator and Lord of all things? And how 
can this fact be more gloriously revealed, or be revealed at all, except by His hearing and 
answering prayer?”100 Indeed hearing reveals something fundamental about God’s nature 
and character for Barth; something so fundamental that we might propose an equally true 
adaptation of Barth’s description of God. God may rightly be described as the God who 
hears in freedom. As the immutable One who hears in freedom, God establishes Godself as 
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the unchanging Lord and creator of all things, and as the Lord and creator who hears the 
petitions of God’s own.  
 The significance of hearing in relation to God’s lordship is proved later in The 
Church Dogmatics. Barth again takes up the question of God’s immutable Lordship over 
creation in relation to God’s hearing. Under the discussion of the life of “The Christian 
under the Universal Lordship of God the Father” (§49.4), Barth is concerned to articulate 
God’s lordship and the place of prayer in God’s plan. It is the most compact weaving of 
immutability, freedom, sovereignty, prayer, and the significant role that God’s hearing plays 
in it all, in all of The Church Dogmatics. It proves the weight and work of God’s hearing for 
Barth. Thus, I will quote it in full, and then offer five brief observations. Commenting on the 
Christian’s share in the universal lordship of God, Barth writes, 
It is a genuine and actual share in the universal lordship of God. The will of God is 
not to preserve and accompany and rule the world and the course of the world as 
world-occurrence in such a way that He is not affected and moved by it, that He 
does not allow Himself to converse with it, that He does not listen to what it says, 
that as He conditions all things He does not allow Himself to be determined by 
them. God is not free and immutable in the sense that He is the prisoner of His own 
resolve and will and action, that He must always be alone as the Lord of all things 
and of all occurrence. He is not alone in His trinitarian being, and He is not alone in 
relation to creatures. He is free and immutable as the living God, as the God who 
wills to converse with the creature, and to allow Himself to be determined by it in 
this relationship. His sovereignty is so great that it embraces both the possibility, 
and, as it is exercised, the actuality, that the creature can actively be present and co-
operate in His overruling. There is no creaturely freedom which can limit or 
compete with the sole sovereignty and efficacy of God. But permitted by God, and 
indeed willed and created by Him, there is the freedom of the friends of God 
concerning whom He has determined that without abandoning the helm for one 
moment He will still allow Himself to be determined by them. There is no 
autonomous and rebellious counter-activity of the creature in opposition to the 
eternal activity of His own will and action; but on the model of His own will and 
action there is an individual activity of the creature which is planned and willed and 
demanded and made possible and actual by His own eternal activity, since it is 
included within it. There is no divine surrender to the creature, but in the very fact 
that God maintains and asserts himself as King and Lord there is a divine hearing--
in the basis of the incomprehensible grace of God an incomprehensible hearing--
even of the creature which is sinful. The grace of God to sinful man is that He 
encounters him as the hearing God; that He calls him not merely to the humility of 
a servant and thankfulness of a child but to the intimacy and boldness of a friend in 
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the immediate presence of the throne, His own presence; that He not merely 
permits but commands him to call upon Him in the definite expectation that He will 
both hear and answer, that his asking will have an objective as well as a subjective 
significance, i.e., a significance for his own will and action. The will of God is done 
even as the creature calls and presses and prevails upon it to be done. It is done as 
the converse with the creature established by this will is entered into by the creature 
in the form of this calling and pressing and prevailing. It is done as God participates 
in the creature, and enables it to participate in Himself, and in the purpose and 
direction of His works. It is done on this condition. And in this way it triumphs as 
the sovereign will of God which is living even in its divine sovereignty.101 
 How are we to unravel this complex of themes? First, in God’s universal 
governance, God hears as the trinitarian God and, as such, allows creation to speak into 
God’s plans. For Barth, the Triune God actively “converses” with creation as both speaker 
and hearer, inviting humanity to participate in God’s free and loving rule over creation. God 
remains immutable, but not as one who is deaf to the petitions and cries of creation. On the 
contrary, God’s free and sovereign rule is as the one who hears and hearkens to those 
petitions and cries. 
Second, while Barth does not use the language of community, he does claim that 
God is “not alone” in God’s lordship and that God hears the petitions and pleas of humanity 
in a way that allows a chorus of voices to participate in the divine rule. The friends of God 
are permitted and willed to influence God as God listens to them. God does not abandon the 
helm, continuing to rule as the Sovereign One, but that rule is a community affair. And as it 
is “the friends of God” who are permitted and willed to have such influence, this community 
affair is specifically an ecclesial affair. It is not out of ignorance that God inclines God’s ear 
to the community, but out of love for the friends of God, God is concerned to hear and 
hearken to their desires and pleas.  
 Third, for Barth, all of this is entirely consistent with God’s immutability. It has 
already been observed that Barth understands God’s constancy or immutability as a free and 
living immutability that is neither static nor immobile. Yet here it is underscored that God’s 
will is conditioned not by some vague and undefined relationship with creation, but by 
God’s willingness to hear the prayers of God’s own. God remains immutable, but it is the 
covenant relationship with those whom God hears that accounts for the latter’s co-
governance in the divine plans. In this way, Barth entertains a kind of receptivity in God that 
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is often underappreciated in his thought. Yet it is a receptivity that is highly qualified by 
God’s constancy, covenant, and the asymmetry of the creator-creature relation.  
 Fourth, implicit in this paragraph are some characteristic features of God’s hearing. 
God hears in order to be conditioned by God’s friends, but is not controlled or compelled by 
them. God remains resolutely the king and lord. There remains an asymmetry in the divine-
human relationship, even as God hears. Barth maintains that God’s hearing does not 
introduce conflict or competition. Rather, God’s hearing is as the king and lord, and the 
pleas of God’s friends will not compete with, control, or rebel against the eternal will. Thus, 
God’s hearing is not a vulnerable one. While God’s ear inclines to creatures, no amount of 
shouting will overtake or coerce God to depart from God’s good and eternal will. 
 Lastly, and most astonishingly, Barth grounds God’s immutable hearing in the 
gospel of grace. Despite human sin and rebellion, it is on account of grace that God can still 
be encountered as One who hears. Human rebellion, by all counts, deserves an inattentive 
ear. What right has the sinful creature to be heard by God? Yet that God would not only 
hear but even hearken is, indeed, a gracious concession by the holy and Triune God to lost 
and rebellious creatures, and that in three ways. First, there is nothing about the relationship 
of creator to creature, simpliciter, which establishes obligations to listen one to another. It is 
a gracious and loving concession that God has established a communicative relationship 
with human creatures. Second, human rebellion and sin, as Barth points out, would be 
sufficient for God to turn a deaf ear. While Barth neglects to cite the relevant passages, the 
Scriptures are consistent with this perspective.102 Yet, as an act of love in the face of human 
rebellion, God has chosen to hear and hearken to the petitions of those who are in Christ. 
Numbered among God’s acts of redemption is the establishment of a restored 
communicative relationship that human sin and rebellion had destroyed. Third, God’s 
hearing establishes God's presence as an intimate friend who is willing to listen to and be 
conditioned by the pleas and petitions of the redeemed. This experience of God’s hearing 
presence is a most profound experience of the grace of the gospel. 
Thus, it is God’s gracious and intimate hearing of God’s own by which they 
cooperate, albeit asymmetrically, in the divine rule. God’s hearing does not create 
competition, but cooperation in the freedom of friendship. It is not merely tolerated by God, 
but is constitutive of the divinely given command to pray. It results not only from the 
believer’s participation in God, but God’s participation in the life of the believer. By it, the 
immutable God maintains freedom in the covenantal relationship with creatures. God’s 
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hearing is the knot that ties together a constellation of theological questions about the 
relationship between the immutable, sovereign creator and sinful, finite creatures. Were 
God’s hearing of human speech removed from Barth’s thought here, what would be left of 
the creature’s relationship to God and God’s plan? A kind of deism would result—a 
relationship devoid of the substance of the covenant relationship—with a gaping chasm 
between God and creation that would reduce God to an immutable stasis and leave creation 
abandoned as an orphan. But because God nicht nur hören, sondern es erhören will, 
believers have the dignity of participating in the universal lordship of God. “It is in their 
official capacity in this respect that [God] allows Christians a voice and a part in the 
formulation and execution of His will.”103  
 I have sought to show how Barth deploys the concept of God’s hearing to do 
theological work. By considering God’s immutability in the light of hearing, Barth is able to 
avoid the “miserable anthropomorphism” of immutability, which “rules out the possibility 
that God can let Himself be conditioned in this or that way by His creature.”104 It allows 




To briefly survey the ground covered: Barth’s understanding of the covenant as creation’s 
internal basis means that the creation is oriented toward the covenant, such that God creates 
creation in general, and human creatures in particular, to be in covenantal relationship with 
God. Revealed in this covenant relationship and the creation that conforms to it is that God 
willed not to be alone and not without the voices and ears of human creatures. Creation is 
the external basis of God’s covenant and, as such, is the theater for divine-human dialogue. 
Further, while sin has damaged the relation between humanity and God, God’s gracious 
work in the life of the believer restores the dialogical covenant relationship and is the cause 
of human speaking to God. Barth conceives of human speech to God as a response to God’s 
gracious work in Christ that has already been accomplished and provided as the answer to 
all human asking. This means that God has already heard the petitions and needs of the 
believer before the asking ever occurs. The hearing precedes the asking and is the ground 
and cause of that asking. Yet the already of God’s hearing does not invalidate the 
experience or value of human prayer; nor does it nullify God’s command to pray as Jesus 
                                                          
103 CD III/3, p. 288. 
104 CD III/4, pp. 108-9. 
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taught his disciples to pray. On the contrary, it is the cause of great confidence that, despite 
subjective experiences, the believer may be confident that she is heard by God. From the 
Barthian corpus I have isolated seven reasons Barth believes the pray-er may have 
extraordinary confidence that her prayer is heard by God. Finally, I have shown that Barth 
puts the concept of God’s hearing to work, using it to qualify and clarify the doctrine of 
divine immutability. For Barth, God is always and unchangingly the living God who freely 
and graciously hears those who are God’s own. God hears them and allows them to 
cooperate, through their petitions, in the divine governance of the universe. 
 The implications of Barth’s understanding of God’s hearing can only be suggested 
here; though they are many. Christian prayer is shaped and influenced by the already of 
God’s hearing and by an acknowledgement of Christ as the supreme and final answer to all 
asking. The pray-er is armed with additional confidence and boldness in approaching the 
throne of God. This is accompanied by a deep neediness and humility in prayer, mindful 
that it is only by God’s gracious initiative that human speaking and divine hearing are made 
possible. What might this mean for Christian liturgies that are frequent in their plea, “Lord, 
hear our prayer.”105 What of the additional value of hearing for the traditional systematic 
loci? Barth has brought hearing into the realm of theology proper and deployed it to clarify a 
number of dogmatic disputes about immutability; but what might be its implications for the 
doctrines of creation, anthropology, or christology? Barth has not said it all, and the project 
of exploring hearing’s theological import for these other systematic loci will occupy the 
remainder of this work. 
                                                          
105 Nicholas Wolterstoff, in his Kantzer Lectures in Revealed Theology, has examined the liturgies of 
a number of confessional traditions with an eye toward God’s hearing and drawn conclusions about 
the analogical nature of God’s hearing of human prayer in the liturgy. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, The 
God We Worship: An Exploration of Liturgical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2015), pp. 71-86. 
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3. CREATION: A THEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR 
 
“agere sequitur ad esse”1 
 
In the first chapter, it was argued that the Triune God has chosen to self-reveal in Holy 
Scripture as one who not only speaks, but hears. It was argued that this hearing is a 
particular kind of loving and just attention that God supplies by means of God’s significant 
personal presence. This theological framework for understanding the semantic content of the 
Biblical testimony to God’s hearing was developed through a careful listening to Scripture 
and by way of philosophical engagement with the notion of attention. The result was a more 
robust understanding of the Biblical testimony. The second chapter examined how Barth 
sought to make theological sense of God’s hearing, with special attention to its implications 
for his doctrine of God. What follows is neither entirely dependent on Barth’s conclusions 
and approach, nor does it neglect his contributions to the topic. My argument hereafter is 
inspired by Barth’s approach but departs from it in ways that will become evident in order 
that I might consider more broadly the effects of God’s hearing on other dogmatic loci. 
There is a need to ask what theological import this framework has for dogmatics more 
generally. For, if God hears—and that in the way I have developed from an auscultation of 
Scripture—it must be asked of what consequence this is for theological reflection on God, 
God’s being, and God’s activity in and on creation. Further, it must be asked how the 
developed framework squares with the Christian theological tradition and its understanding 
of its material object: the Triune God. While there are any number of ways in which God’s 
hearing or listening might be spoken of, this speech, in order to be true to its subject, must 
be formally conditioned by God, God’s being, and God’s relation to creation. Such 
conditioning of language finds its rightful home in the doctrine of creation.  
 The intention of this chapter then is the construction of a dogmatic grammar that 
will make intelligible God’s hearing in light of God’s relation to and distinction from God’s 
creation. If God be infinite, eternal, immutable, and ontologically other, what sense does it 
make to say that the creator brings into being finite, temporal, and transient creatures whom 
God hears? How can we speak properly of God, as one who hears not-God? The question is 
an ambitious and dangerous one because concealed behind it are metaphysical questions 
about the relationship between God’s being and activity, ontology and economy, that cannot 
                                                          
1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, lib.3. cap. 69 n. 20. 
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be exhaustively addressed here. And, while some discussion of those questions is 
unavoidable, they are presented here only in the service of developing the grammar. For, if 
the dogmatic grammar is to be successful—that is, successfully establishing the boundaries 
of appropriate speech about God’s hearing—it must avoid two errors. First, it must avoid 
making God, qua hearer, dependent on creation. Put another way, if God is a hearer, God 
must be so, eternally, sans creation, the act of creation in no way changing God’s being. 
Second, it must avoid making God unable to act upon creation, compromising God’s loving, 
outward activity. This would be to deny the realism of the Biblical testimony to God’s 
hearing and undermine the theological framework already developed. Rather, what must be 
developed is a grammar for speaking about God’s hearing that circumscribes it in such a 
way that God’s ontological alterity is uncompromised, and yet the realism of God’s hearing 
is made intelligible. 
 
3.1 God’s Radical Ontological Alterity and Infinite Proximity 
John Webster has repeatedly declared that the doctrine of creation “treats four principle 
topics: the identity of the creator, the divine act of creating, the several natures and ends of 
created things, and the relation of creator and creatures.”2 He goes on to state that these 
principle topics are materially ordered in such a way that what is known about the first 
governs what may be said about the subsequent three. Here it is necessary to follow 
Webster’s lead by first clarifying the nature and identity of the creator, then proceeding to 
understand God’s relation to creation.  
For our purposes, clarifying our understanding of God’s nature begins by way of 
declaring, with Nicholas of Cusa, that God is non aliud, or not another thing.3 To begin by 
making such a declaration is to consciously part ways with dipolar, open, or process models 
which seek to prioritize divine receptivity and potentiality.4 What unites this diverse family 
of theological understanding is the placing of God in continuity with the ontological plane 
of the created order. In doing so, the becoming of creation imposes constraints on divine 
                                                          
2 John Webster, “‘Love is Also a Lover of Life’: Creatio Ex Nihilo and Creaturely Goodness” in God 
Without Measure: Working Papers in Christian Theology Volume 1: God and the Works of God, 
(New York: T&T Clark, 2016), p. 100. See also “Trinity and Creation” and “Non Ex Aequo: God’s 
Relation to Creatures”, op. cit., for similar statements. 
3 Nicholas of Cusa, On God as Not-Other: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud, 3rd 
edn, trans. by Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1987).  
4 See, e.g., Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Amherst, New 
York: Humanity Books, 2000), passim. For a historical survey, beginning with Plato, see John W. 
Cooper, Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006). 
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being. While there is considerable merit in these models insofar as they seek to give due 
weight to Scriptural language concerning God’s responsiveness and openness toward 
creation, I remain unpersuaded that these understandings offer a better explanation of God 
and God’s relation to creation than the tradition I follow here. I am, rather, convinced that 
God’s being, when conceived of as radically ontologically distinct from creation, actually 
provides a theologically satisfying and Biblically faithful account of God’s relation to 
creation. So, while this family of models is too diverse to engage directly and substantively 
here, I trust that the merits and justification for following Cusa will be evident in what 
follows, offering a preferable account of God’s being as well as God’s hearing of creation. 
For, to declare that God is non aliud is to insist that God’s being is in no wise comparable to 
creaturely reality. Divine existence does not share, or even mirror, the ontological reality of 
creatures, but is altogether ontologically other. God does not exist sui generis, but, to cite 
Aquinas, “Deus non est in generis.”5 This ontological alterity, which has been called “the 
distinction” by Robert Sokolowski,6 is the first principle of all speech about God’s nature; 
all subsequent claims about God, creation, and the kind of relations which exists between 
the two are materially governed by this principle. Historically, the distinction between God 
and the world has been developed by way of two distinct but related doctrines: creatio ex 
nihilo and divine simplicity. 
As early as Theophilus of Antioch, God’s creative act has been understood properly 
as ex nihilo. The second-century bishop was one of the earliest to recognize that God’s 
being was the lesser if creation was formed out of some pre-existent material alongside God. 
“But how is it great,” Theophilus queried, “if God made the universe out of pre-existing 
material? For a human craftsman, too, when he obtains material from someone, makes from 
it whatever he wishes. But the power of God is made manifest in this: that he makes 
whatever he wishes out of what does not exist.”7 And, while Theophilus’ insight was not 
shared unanimously among the early church fathers, his position came to acceptance as the 
most Biblically satisfying way to understand the creative act.8 Contrary to the common 
accusation that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is an intrusive Hellenizing influence on 
                                                          
5 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter abbreviated, ST) 1.3.5. 
6 Robert Sokolowski, God of Faith and Reason (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 
pp. 31-40. 
7 Theophilus of Antioch, “To Autolycus” 1.4 in Patrologia Graeca, 6:1029B. English translation 
from The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, 10 vols. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996). 
8 Justin Martyr, in his First Apology 59, embraced the Platonic preference for creation out of pre-
existent material. See Ian McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation, (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2014), p. 2.  
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Hebrew Scripture, whatever may be meant by that, Theophilus actually breaks with the 
well-known cosmogony of Plato’s Timaeus and with Parmenides axiom, “ex nihilo, nihil 
fit,”—and he does so on Biblical-exegetical grounds.9 This break sets the doctrine on a 
trajectory toward catholicity, as both an exegetical conclusion and as a sometimes-useful 
polemic against heresies like the “gnosticisms” which denigrated the material world.10 Janet 
Soskice is correct when she comments that creation ex nihilo is a “biblically compelled 
piece of metaphysical theology.”11 While serving exegetical and polemical purposes for 
some of the fathers, the driving motive behind the broad acceptance of creatio ex nihilo was, 
according to Gerhard May, “the attempt to do justice to the absolute sovereignty and 
unlimited freedom of the biblical God.”12 For God to be sovereign over creation and entirely 
free to act upon it, God’s being had to be entirely apart from the arena of becoming. Only in 
this way would God’s freedom and sovereignty be absolute. Any claim that the material 
world existed autonomously alongside God “marked a fundamental limit on God’s 
sovereignty” and was, as such, “inconsistent with Christian confidence in God’s power to 
save.”13 Thus, creatio ex nihilo became one way of recognizing God’s ontological alterity 
from creation—a way of establishing the divinely imbued worth of creation without 
compromising divine freedom, sovereignty, or aseity. If the creator is to be adequately 
distinguished from creation, creation must be ex nihilo. 
 A second way in which God’s ontological distinction from the created universe has 
been articulated is by way of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Rather than suggesting that 
God is simplistic or lacks sophistication, the doctrine is an attempt to make an ontological 
distinction about God’s nature that sets it apart from created reality. In Aristotelean 
language, simplicity asserts that, unlike created reality, there is no distinction between 
divine substance and accident. Rather, the divine nature is without matter, form, or accident. 
It is not simply that there are no accidents or properties that are non-essential to God; it is 
                                                          
9 Theophilus of Antioch, “To Autolycus” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol.2, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 1996), 2.10. See Paul Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), pp. 21-46 for a response to alleged Hellenizing. Of course, there were Jewish 
interpreters who saw pre-existent material in their exegesis of the Genesis account; cf. McFarland, 
From Nothing, pp. 2-5. However, the point remains that Theophilus’ priorities are exegetical in 
nature. 
10 For ex nihilo as a response to gnostic heresies, see McFarland, From Nothing, pp. 5-10. 
11 Janet M. Soskice, “Creatio ex nihilo: its Jewish and Christian foundations’, in Creation and the 
God of Abraham, ed. by David Burrell, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 25. 
Emphasis original. 
12 Gerhard May, Creatio ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation out of Nothing” in Early Christian 
Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. 8. Note, however, that May does not believe the doctrine 
was Biblically motivated.  
13 McFarland, From Nothing, p. 19. 
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that God’s nature just is without form, matter, or accident—without composition 
whatsoever. God’s essence just is, without distinction. God’s existence is identical with 
God’s essence, and in that sense, God is simple. Of course, this does not preclude or 
invalidate creaturely predication of the divine nature. For Aquinas, speaking of God in such 
a way is a function of human intellect. We may, Aquinas claims, “speak of simple things 
only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge.”14 
So, it remains a true proposition that “God is good.” However, to predicate goodness of God 
is not the same as predicating goodness of, say, Odysseus. The predicate “is good” is being 
employed (whether knowingly or unknowingly) analogically so as to say something similar 
about God and about Odysseus. Yet the difference between the two statements exceeds their 
similarity because God is simple and Odysseus composite. God’s relationship to God’s 
goodness is distinct from the case of Odysseus, insofar as God’s goodness is identical with 
God’s nature. God’s nature is God’s goodness. In contrast, Odysseus’ nature is not identical 
with goodness. Again, God’s essence just is God’s existence, without distinction. Thus, 
importantly, the function of the doctrine of divine simplicity is not to state something about 
how the theologian is to treat divine properties or accidents. Rather, it is to deny the 
existence of divine properties or accidents altogether, in order to deny any kind of 
composition to God. This means that “from first to last the doctrine of divine simplicity is a 
piece of negative or apophatic theology and not a purported description of God.”15 As an 
apophatic qualification of God’s nature, then, simplicity is a means of distinguishing God 
from the created world.16 
 The doctrines of creatio ex nihilo and divine simplicity serve to secure one principle 
identifying truth of the God of the Christian Scriptures: God is radically ontologically 
distinct from creation. Yet positing such a stark distinction between God and the world 
immediately generates questions about the nature of the relation between the two. How can 
God intelligibly be said to act in and on creation? In what way is the created world related to 
its creator? Due to the distinction between creator and creature, the relation between the two 
must be understood as an asymmetrical or mixed relation. This characterization finds its 
warrant as early as Augustine in De trinitate17 but finds its most developed articulation in 
                                                          
14 Aquinas, ST, Ia. 3.3, reply obj. 1. 
15 Brian Davies, “Classical Theism and the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity” in Language, Meaning 
and God: Essays in Honor of Herbert McCabe OP, ed. by Brian Davies (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 
2000), p. 59. 
16 Ivor J. Davidson has noted that the Christian tradition has developed many ways of glossing this 
distinction, including divine aseity, simplicity, perfection, and sufficiency. See “Divine Sufficiency” 
in Theological Theology: Essays in Honour of John Webster (London: T&T Clark, 2015), pp. 66-67. 
17 Augustine, De Trinitate, V.16.  
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mediaeval scholasticism. Aquinas argues that the relation is a mixed one insofar as it is 
“real” (relationes reales) in creation, but only “logical” or a “relation of reason” (relationes 
rationis) in God.18 This kind of mixed relation is found in the created order among items 
that are not of the same order. Aquinas illustrates that the relation “on the right” is 
meaningless when applied to a column, until it is made in reference to, say, an animal which 
occupies that relation to the column.19 While the relation could change and become “to the 
left”, no change has taken place in the column but only in the animal. This illustrates the 
way a relation can be mixed between two items of different orders and may be, mutatis 
mutandis, applied analogously to God’s relation to creation. Insofar as God is not sui 
genres, but non est in generis, God’s relation to anything not-God must then be a mixed 
one. But this understanding of God’s relation to creation is more than merely an apophatic 
qualifier. Webster is clear that characterizing the relation this way is not an attempt 
to deny God’s relation to creatures but to invest that relation with a specific 
character […] by indicating that God’s simple perfection is such that he is not one 
term in a dyad, relatively or contrastively defined, and, by consequence, that God’s 
creative will and action are unrestrictedly benevolent and beneficent, giving life 
simply for the creature’s good.20 
It is because of God’s independence and freedom from any external influence that the opera 
Dei ad extra are demonstrably gratuitous. Were God under the influence of any external 
compulsion, the pure gratuity of the act would be called into question. Yet, because God is 
unaffected by the act of creation, the existence of creation itself may be characterized as the 
result of the sheer goodness of God.  
 Aquinas has an additional purpose for characterizing God’s relation to creation as 
logical or non-real. Doing so is one way of making evident “that the relation between 
creatures is not like the relation between creatures and God.”21 Even though mixed relations 
are found in the created order, Aquinas “destabilizes our sense of familiarity with this 
relation,”22 in order to demonstrate its peculiarity. Calling God’s relation to creation rationis 
undermines the validity of the category relationes to describe God vis-à-vis creation. The 
category simply fails to account adequately for the mysteriousness of the ontological 
                                                          
18 Aquinas, De Potentia III.3 resp.; ST, Ia.13.7; 45.3 ad 1. 
19 Aquinas, ST, Ia.13.7. 
20 Webster, “Non ex Aequo: God’s Relation to Creatures” in God Without Measure (Vol 1), p. 116. 
21 Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2017), p. 50.  
22 Tyler R. Wittman, God and Creation in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 119. 
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coordination of God and not-God. Even though creaturely understanding inevitably defaults 
to thinking of the relation as a reciprocal one, that epistemically convenient construct falls 
short of acknowledging God’s ontological reality. By describing God’s relation to creation 
as logical or rational rather than real, Aquinas is attempting, by way of negation, to 
safeguard the divine reality as more mysterious than the category of relation can suitably 
describe. 
 As a result of this characterization of asymmetrical relations, one of Aquinas’ most 
significant conclusions is elucidated. Because the relation is asymmetrical, God’s 
unmediated intimacy with creation is made intelligible. To think of God’s relation to 
creation in a reciprocal manner envisages God standing outside or alongside creation in an 
externally coordinated relation. In this way God might be thought to stand at a distance from 
creation in a way that makes divine agency seem removed from creation. This would be to 
deny the realism of Biblical language about God’s agency in and with creation. But once the 
relation is understood as rational and non-real in the way described, it becomes possible to 
imagine a more immediate coordination between the creator and all of creation. Clarity 
about God’s agency among creation is achievable only by this careful understanding of 
asymmetry. “This is because of the sheer difference between God and creation. God can be 
infinitely close to creation because there is no mediating principle or act between the terms 
besides the very act of creation itself.”23 God acts on creation not as another agent in relation 
to it, but in a categorically distinct manner, uniquely befitting God as the source, foundation, 
and telos of the relation. God’s non-real relation to creation does not lead to distance, 
absence, or a mediated agency, but to infinite proximity, presence, and immediacy. 
 How does all of this contribute to a grammar that allows intelligible speech about 
God’s hearing? It does so by furnishing two conclusions about the divine nature. First, like 
the act of creation itself, God’s hearing does not add something new to God. Like all divine 
works ad extra, hearing does not bring about some change in God. The relation of God, as 
hearer, to creature, as speaker, must be understood as real in the speaker but rational or 
logical in God as the hearer. This is not to deny the reality of God’s hearing. Claiming it to 
be non-real or logical is to give it a particular character that emphasizes its analogous, yet 
ultimately dissimilar, character to creaturely hearing. This does not evacuate hearing-
language of meaning any more than it would speech of other opera ad extra. Rather, it 
qualifies the speech in a way that says something about the character of God’s hearing: it is 
                                                          
23 Oliver, Creation, p. 51. 
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not like creaturely hearing. It is perfect, “unrestrictedly benevolent and beneficent,”24 and 
uncompelled by the creature. 
 Second, God’s radical ontological distinction from creation is the grounds for God’s 
immediate, infinite proximity to creation. Thus, the distinction between God and the world 
does not prohibit or frustrate God’s hearing, as though creatures needed to shout or God 
needed to lean in close. This would be to arrange God and creatures in a mutually exclusive 
and ultimately incoherent relationship.25 On the contrary, the distinction means that God’s 
hearing is infinitely proximate and immediate to creaturely speech. In this way, God, as 
hearer, is “closer” to creaturely speech than the creature to her own words. Rather than 
undermine the notion that God’s hearing is a particular kind of loving and just attention that 
God supplies by means of God’s significant personal presence, a proper understanding of 
the distinction buttresses it. The kind of significant personal presence between God and the 
speaker is not a presence like that between two intimate friends. It is a presence that is 
infinitely “closer” (to use spatial language) and immediate. This is, again, why 
“conversation” is an anemic and misleading metaphor for prayer.26 God’s relation to 
creaturely speech is not as that of a conversation partner, but as one who is present in a way 
that is wholly unique and ontologically distinct from creaturely presence. 
 
3.2 God as Hearer in Being and Act 
The above conclusions about God’s nature must be supplemented by an inquiry into the 
relationship between the nature of God and the actions of God. This is because, in making 
metaphysical claims about God’s nature and its relation to creation, a methodological 
problem presents itself. Does claiming that God is a hearer mean that God is a hearer in 
Godself, or does it mean only that God is a hearer as God relates to creation? I have 
claimed that God, ad extra, hears God’s creation; but is God also a hearer, ad intra? Could 
the former be true if the latter is not? The question is important if God is to be known as 
God truly is. The question is plagued by the complex and varied treatments it has received 
across the Christian tradition, thus ruling out any attempt here to present a comprehensive 
treatment of the question and its related issues. Rather than attempting a sweeping answer to 
this question, it is my intention to suggest that there is methodological route by which we 
                                                          
24 Webster, “Non ex Aequo”, p. 116. 
25 See Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005) 
for a treatment of the coherence of divine and human agency in the creator-creature relationship.  
26 See prior chapter on Barth’s aversion to “conversation”. 
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might conclude that God is not only a hearer, ad extra, but also one ad intra, in God’s 
eternally blessed and perfect Triune life.  
 Contrary to some theologians, I am unpersuaded that everything that is claimed of 
God, ad extra, must be claimed of God, in se. While some would claim otherwise, I am 
unpersuaded that the crucifixion of Christ—to take one principle but particularly 
complicated example—could be understood as internal to the eternal, blessed life of God. 
Failure to acknowledge the distinction between God in Godself and God’s action, ad extra, 
is crucial for maintaining the distinction outlined above. Certain applications of “Rahner’s 
Rule” wherein the “Economic Trinity is the Immanent Trinity and the Immanent Trinity is 
the Economic Trinity”27 have produced different understandings of the relationship between 
God’s being and outward activity, some of which compromise God’s freedom and aseity.28 
My intention, as should be clear from the above, is not to assert that God’s hearing of 
creatures is identical to a “hearing” that happens in the eternal and blessed life of God, 
thereby collapsing the very distinction just articulated. Nor is it my intention to appropriate 
a version of the analogia entis, by which God happens to be the supreme hearer who is the 
more perfect and felicitous version of creaturely hearing. Rather, I want to propose that God 
has chosen to reveal Godself in Holy Scripture as one who does not merely hear creation, 
but does so as an overflow of God’s own blessed, eternal, Triune life which is marked by a 
kind of “hearing”.  
 The conclusion will be argued by way of engagement with two recent theological 
works. The first is Tyler Wittman’s God and Creation in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas 
and Karl Barth.29 Wittman brings Aquinas and Barth into dialogue with one another in order 
to adjudicate between their conceptually divergent understandings of the relation between 
God’s nature and outward activity. Wittman carefully demonstrates the way that Aquinas, 
through both negations (i.e., simplicity in Ia 3) and affirmations (i.e., divine perfection and 
goodness in Ia 4-6), establishes the distinction between God and creation. He then goes on 
to show how Aquinas understands creation’s correspondence to God’s own nature as 
blessed Trinity. God’s creative act is analyzed in light of its principle and telos as a self-
                                                          
27 Karl Rahner, The Trinity (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997). For ways that 
Rahner has been allegedly misread, see Catherine Mowry LaCugna’s introduction, pp. vii-xxi. 
28 For a helpful summary of contemporary theology’s attempts to coordinate the immanent and 
economic Trinity, see Chung-Hyun Baik, The Holy Trinity—God for God and God for Us: Seven 
Positions on the Immanent-Economic Trinity Relation in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011). For a critique, see Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and 
the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity (London: T&T Clark, 2005), pp. 83-124.  
29 Tyler R. Wittman, God and Creation in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).  
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corresponding act, with an eye toward demonstrating a correspondence between God’s 
being and God’s activity. The analysis of the principle of creation highlights the 
correspondence between it and God’s blessed being through “a perfectly circular divine 
movement of the divine operations and processions.”30 Aquinas carefully demonstrates 
creation’s correspondence to God’s perfect being, while avoiding making creation a 
necessary divine act that would compromise divine freedom and aseity. For Aquinas, any 
account of creation’s correspondence to its creator must demonstrate a correspondence to 
God’s Triune nature. Thus, Aquinas’ doctrine of the Trinity and its model of internal 
processions of the Word and the Spirit, allows him to argue that creation corresponds, as an 
external procession, to the internal processions in the Godhead in a way that stamps creation 
with a likeness to God and as loved by God. Additionally, Aquinas proposes that God’s 
creative act has God’s own goodness as its ultimate telos. This consideration of creation’s 
telos reveals that it is ordered according to God’s goodness, such that God’s self-
correspondence is seen in the way creation participates in God’s own structured life, being 
purposed for God’s own goodness. Thus, God’s self-correspondence in creation allows for 
Aquinas’ conclusion that “act follows being” (“agere sequitur esse”).31 
 In contrast to Aquinas, Barth’s coordination of theology and economy is driven by 
very different concerns. Despite disagreements about the extent to which Anselm has 
shaped Barth’s thinking,32 Wittman suggests that Barth approaches the question as an 
“Anselmian procedure” due to his noetic prioritization of the actual over the possible. This 
explains Barth’s conviction that theology cannot think past or behind God’s actual, concrete 
self-revelation in Christ. Thus, God’s being is only able to be understood in light of God’s 
external acts and vice versa. This does not make creation necessary for Barth, but makes 
theological inquiry about God’s nature impossible apart from God’s creative act. For Barth, 
what can be known about God’s being is restricted to and identified with what can be known 
about God’s act. Being is identified with the concrete act of God’s self-revelation in Christ, 
such that the material object of theological inquiry is, in Barth’s well-known formula, “the 
God who loves in freedom.”33 For Barth, the dialectic of being and activity is so intertwined 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 78. 
31 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, lib.3. cap. 69 n. 20. 
32 See Bruce L. McCormack’s challenge of the so-called “von Balthasar thesis” in Karl Barth’s 
Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development (1909-1936) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), pp. 1-28. 
33 Barth, CD II/1, §28. 
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“that it is difficult to discern which comes first: the inquiry’s material object or formal 
orientation.”34 
 So, how are being and act to be coordinated? In the end, Wittman finds Barth’s 
ambiguous coordinating of the order of knowing and order of being to be dissatisfactory 
because it makes difficult, if not impossible, any theological speech about God apart from 
the act of creation. Wittman is convinced that in order to sustain the conviction that God 
would be God in eternal, blessed perfection, sans creation, theological inquiry must move 
beyond Barth’s noetic restriction.35 Aquinas, thus, offers the more satisfactory coordination 
of being and act by disrupting the orders of knowing and being, thereby permitting speech 
about God’s being, sans creation. For Wittman, theological speech about God’s perfect 
being, independent of God’s creative activity, is licensed by the Biblical testimony, and that 
in two ways. First, following Aquinas’ reading of Exodus 33:19, wherein God tells Moses, 
“I will make all my goodness pass before you, and will proclaim before you the name, ‘The 
LORD’,” Wittman sees in the “all” of “all my goodness” the plentitude of the divine nature; 
however, the iteration of the covenantal forms of God’s nature in Exodus 34:6-7 is not 
exhaustive.36 Here, Wittman agrees with Aquinas’ finding of a Biblical distinction between 
God’s absolute, plentiful, incomprehensible nature on which Moses could not look, 
denominated by “all my goodness,” and the specific, covenantal acts of that goodness 
iterated in 34:6-7.37 Second, Wittman argues that God’s own self-naming demonstrates an 
ability to speak about God’s nature in a way that is not simply reducible to God’s activity. 
Again, following Aquinas, Wittman takes one divine name in Exodus 3:14 as an example: “I 
AM WHO I AM.” The name signifies God’s absolute self-subsistence, independent of any 
causal activity.38 So, it is Scripture itself that warrants a distinction between being and act 
which does not limit theological inquiry’s object to God’s revealed activity. Wittman 
concludes that  
                                                          
34 Wittman, God and Creation in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth., p. 173. 
35 Ibid., p. 273. 
36 Ibid., p. 274. See Aquinas, Commentary on St. Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, 2.2.57. 
37 Ibid. pp. 273-75. Barth, of course, rejected this reading on account of his allergy to semi-
nominalism. Yet Wittman points out that Barth’s refusal to speak of God’s being apart from God’s 
activity in creation is typical of other modern approaches that are implicitly indebted to Hegel, ibid., 
p. 277. See, also, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. I, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), p. 360. 
38 Ibid., p 277. See Aquinas, ST Ia.13.11.ad 2. Wittman further argues that an understanding of God’s 
external acts, esp. the reconciling work of Christ and the Spirit, is inseparable from divine names if 
they are to be rightly understood. 
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While an emphasis on God’s action is crucial for the chastening of concepts and 
names in accordance with the gospel, a retrieval of more traditional accounts of the 
divine names could help theologians resist the correlationist impulse of some 
contemporary theology. Theology needs to subvert its noetic restriction in the order 
of knowing, not to master God but to acknowledge an ontic Object that is infinitely 
more and greater than the dialectics with which He is confessed.39 
While only a sketch of Wittman’s argument, the above is sufficient to warrant, on Biblical 
grounds, a method for deploying theological speech about God’s nature without reducing it 
to the opera ad extra. Further, Wittman gestures toward a reconsideration of the function of 
God’s self-naming and its fruitfulness for theological inquiry.  
 Taking direction from Wittman’s conclusions, I want to propose that too little 
theological attention has been paid to divine naming, and that of a unique order. Of course, 
there is a long and rich history of theological reflection on the divine names.40 Traditionally, 
theological attention has been directed toward divine names. While the Tetragrammaton of 
Exodus 3:15 stands in a class of its own, as a kind of proper name, other names like the “I 
AM WHO I AM” of Exodus 3:14, or the especially descriptive name, “The LORD, the 
LORD…” of Exodus 34:6-7 belong in a class of names that have captured theological 
attention. The reasons for such attention appear to be due to the way these names are 
uniquely constituted by three criteria. First, in each case, God is the speaker doing the 
naming. As a divine pronouncement, this imbues the name with superlative authority. 
Second, in each case, the name carries an ontological “weight”. Each offers a description of 
God that, if Wittman is correct, may speak not merely to God’s relation to creation, but 
reliably to God’s being, in se. Third, God is the referent of the name. These are examples of 
God naming Godself. For these reasons, these names have proven generative for theological 
reflection. However, there exists another class of names that may speak to God’s eternal, 
Triune, blessed nature; namely, those names given by God to human beings that are self-
revelatory. These are names that are given by God and reveal something about God, but are 
not self-referential insofar as the names are given of human beings and not of God. In other 
words, this class of names is like the first group in the first two ways, but not in the third. 
Concretely, these are names that God gives that are compounded with “Jah” or “El”. 
Writing of names compounded with the name of God, in an older but still relevant work, 
                                                          
39 Ibid., p. 279. 
40 See esp. R. Kendall Soulen, The Divine Name(s) and the Holy Trinity, vol. I, Distinguishing the 
Voices (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011); Scott R. Swain, “On Divine Naming,” in 
Aquinas Among the Protestants, ed. by Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen (Hoboken: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2018), pp. 207-27.  
97 
 
William Francis Wilkinson suggests that many of these are etymologically ascertainable 
only when external circumstances provide sufficient context. “But,” he goes on to state,  
in most cases in which the etymology of the name is ascertainable, we may 
discover the sentiment embodied in the word or words composing it—some notion 
capable of being stated as a proposition which was in the thoughts of him or them 
who gave the name. In the case of names compounded with the name of God, this 
sentiment is necessarily of a religious character. Some reference is made in them to 
the attributes and character, or the acts and dealings of God, or to the relations 
between Him and man.41 
These names, then, can be said to reflect some proposition in the mind (or “mind”) of the 
namer. The overwhelming majority of these names are given by human parents at birth and 
likely “bear reference to circumstances attendant upon the nativity of those who possesses 
them.”42 Yet among those birth names are those divinely commanded by God. These names 
satisfy the first two of the three criteria mentioned above. They are names given by God, 
thus carrying divine authority, and are self-descriptions of God, thus bearing some 
revelatory content. 
 The most relevant member of this class of names is, of course, Ishmael. Ishmael is 
the first example of a divinely given birth name (excluding Adam, for whom there was no 
proper birth and no alternative namer available) in the canon. The narrative context was 
recounted in Chapter 1 and need not be rehearsed here. The relevant question is, How are 
we to understand the revelatory significance of this divinely given name for God’s being? Is 
the relevance of the name restricted to God’s dealings with creation? Is it a description only 
of the opera ad extra Dei? Or might this divine self-description carry ontological 
significance for God, in se?  
 Ishmael—as a member of the class of names satisfying the first and second criteria 
above—varies from the “I AM WHO I AM” by its creaturely referent. Does this make it 
less likely to describe the divine nature? Would God have to be called Ishmael in order for 
the semantic content of the name to describe God’s being? While adding Ishmael to the 
catalogue of divine names might settle the question more tidily, it is hard to see what makes 
the referent of the name decisive for this question. If the name is given by God and is a self-
description of God, the question of its ontological significance ought to be left open. Indeed, 
                                                          
41 William Francis Wilkinson, Personal Names in the Bible: Interpreted and Illustrated (London: 
Alexander Strahan, 1865), p. 127. With apologies, I have preserved the original, gendered language 
of the quotation. 
42 Ibid., p. 256. 
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what God declares about God ought not be too quickly dismissed as irrelevant for God’s 
being. So how might the question be settled for Ishmael or any other name which belongs to 
this class?  
 First, we might ask, Is the etymological significance of the divinely given name 
something that could be properly predicated of the divine nature; or is it excluded on 
account of some other theological constraint? The divinely-given name, Israel, for example, 
could not be properly attributed of the divine nature. For, if the name means “striving with 
God” or even “God strives,” it cannot be a description of the divine nature in any 
straightforward sense without violating divine omnipotence or simplicity. So, is God’s 
hearing something excluded on similar grounds? Not obviously. Given the working 
definition developed in Chapter 1, it is evident that the Biblical descriptions of God’s 
hearing do not imply corporeality; nor do they violate divine omniscience or omnipresence. 
Perhaps it could be argued that hearing is a passive phenomenon that is contingent or even 
dependent upon another. However, hearing need not necessarily be considered a passive act; 
for active listening is what is often extolled as the more virtuous creaturely activity, over 
against passive listening, which might be considered lazy or inattentive. The Biblical 
concept of divine hearing already developed is quite active. Further, hearing need not 
necessarily be thought of as dependent on another speaker. A listener can hear silence in a 
way that would be a qualitatively distinct activity from that of a deaf person standing in a 
silent room. Hearing, even as a creaturely phenomenon, does not require another, a speaker. 
Moreover, even if hearing necessitated a contingency or even dependency on another, that 
would hardly exclude it as something properly predicated of the divine nature, given a 
thoroughgoing doctrine of the Trinity.43 Indeed, it is not at all obvious that divine hearing, as 
developed in Chapter 1, must be excluded from God’s nature on the basis of prior 
theological constraints. 
 Second, we might ask if there are other historical or theological precedents for 
predicating something like hearing of the divine nature. Here the verbum internum and other 
dialogical analogies of understanding God’s Triune life may be of help. Considering the 
Logos as God’s own internal Word, whereby God’s own speech is directed toward and 
known by Godself—this internal Word suggests the possibility of an internal “hearing”, an 
audio internum, which corresponds to the verbum internum. This internal hearing might be 
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understood as the mysterious and perfect means by which God perfectly attends to God’s 
own Word. As a dialogical analogy, there is historical precedent for considering this as an 
“explanation” of the Trinity that is not merely speculative.44 Such analogies have been used 
among both Protestant45 and Roman Catholic46 theologians. Notably, Walter Kasper, in an 
attempt to make sense of modern, personalizing concepts of hypostasis, while 
acknowledging the analogical nature of attributing dialogue to the Godhead, claims, “[T]he 
divine persons are not less dialogical but infinitely more dialogical than human persons are. 
The divine persons are not only in dialogue, they are dialogue.”47 Such strong claims for the 
analogy of dialogue establishes a theological and historical precedent for claiming that there 
is a “hearing” in God. 
 So, while divine names like the Tetragrammaton and the “I AM WHO I AM” might 
carry more straightforwardly ontological significance, there are not prima facie reasons for 
excluding a divinely given, self-describing name like Ishmael from carrying a similar 
significance for the divine nature. Ishmael might describe an activity of El, but act and being 
are not easily separated, as Wittman’s analysis of Aquinas demonstrates. In Aquinas’ 
arrangement, if act follows from being, there must be some ontological self-correspondence 
to God’s hearing activity. This would, no doubt, be wrapped up with God’s perfect and 
blessed Triune life and have God’s goodness as its principle and telos. This self-
correspondence leaves open the possibility of speaking of God as a “hearer,” in se, apart 
from any creative act.  
 More than merely leaving the possibility open, how might one construct a positive 
argument for including “hearing” as natural to God’s eternal, blessed and Triune life? 
Rachael Muers has raised this very question in Keeping God’s Silence.48 In reliance on 
Bonhoeffer’s christology, Muers takes up the theme of God’s hearing in view of the 
resurrection. She is interested in the “trinitarian implications of the identification of God as 
a listener.”49 Reflecting on the Johannine theme of Jesus’ vindication by the Father in the 
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46 See Joseph Ratzinger, “Zum Personverständnis in der Theologie” in Dogma und Verkündigung 
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resurrection event, Muers proposes that therein God’s “capacity for listening” is shown to be 
“definitive of who God is.”50 She goes on to state, somewhat opaquely, that “God’s 
‘hearing’ of creation is grounded in God’s hearing of God’s self. To understand God as in se 
the ‘one who hears’ is to say that the completeness of God’s self-possession is a 
completeness that includes openness to what is not God.”51 What is to be made of this? On 
the one hand, to claim that “God’s ‘hearing’ of creation is grounded in God’s hearing of 
God’s self” could be read in a minimalist way that claims no more than Aquinas’ dictum: 
agere sequitur esse. This would be to suggest, unproblematically, that there is something in 
the nature of God that corresponds to God’s good and loving actions toward creation. On the 
other hand, Muers seems to want more than that. Her concern is to demonstrate what God’s 
hearing means for the innertrinitarian relations. Yet, because the argument is dependent on 
the resurrection event, which Muers suggests shows the character of God’s “capacity for 
listening”, it is unclear how she understands an event in the divine economy to correspond to 
the divine nature. In other words, how does an economic event like the resurrection, 
occurring in the economy as it does, correspond to something ontological in the blessed, 
eternal, Triune life of God? The danger of collapsing the opera ad extra into the opera ad 
intra is acutely felt at this point of Muers’ argument. Her awareness of it is registered in a 
footnote wherein she simply suggests that it “need not be the case” that “the concrete 
distinction between God and humanity” be eliminated.52 The argument is further 
complicated by the declaration that understanding “God as in se the ‘one who hears’ is to 
say that the completeness of God’s self-possession is a completeness that includes openness 
to what is not God,”53 because such a claim is liable to the implication that God is 
necessarily open to something other than Godself. To anchor this kind of openness in the 
nature of God, rather than the grace of God, eliminates the need for grace, making God 
constitutionally related to creation. Of course, given the cautions registered in the footnotes, 
these are unlikely to be Muers’ desired conclusions. So, how might the argument be 
strengthened? 
 Beginning with a characterization of God’s hearing activity in terms of the 
judgment and vindication that culminates in the resurrection of Christ—an event in the 
economy—restricts what can be said of God’s “hearing,” in se, to the order of knowing. 
That restriction makes it difficult, if not impossible, to speak of God as a “hearer,” in se 
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apart from creation because what is claimed about God’s “hearing” in eternity is approached 
“from below” in God’s economic dealings with creation. Put another way, in the order of 
knowing, being follows act.54 But when it comes to the order of being, there cannot be a 
straight line drawn from economy to ontology because of divine ontological alterity. As 
Wittman has argued in his exposition of Aquinas, “the order of knowing is distinct from the 
order of being […] so it does not follow ontically that being is strictly correlated with 
activity, understood as either external works or outgoing internal acts.”55 By disrupting the 
order of knowing and order of being, it becomes possible to acknowledge an ontological 
reality distinct from creation, thereby maintaining aseity, freedom, and the distinction 
between God and creation already articulated, while acknowledging the reality of God’s acts 
in creation. So how might theological inquiry proceed in making true (if still analogical) 
ontological claims about God as a “hearer”? As already observed, Wittman suggests that 
Aquinas does this by distinguishing between the all of God’s goodness in Exodus 33:19 and 
the specific covenantal acts in Exodus 34:6-7.56 God’s goodness is the expansive and 
inexhaustible being from which God’s covenantal acts flow.57 “Every perfection of 
goodness includes all the relative perfections of grace, mercy, patience, and so forth.”58 
God’s goodness is the principle and fount from which God’s hearing flows. Further, and in 
contrast to Muers, our working definition of hearing is broader than judgement and 
vindication. Understanding God’s hearing as a particular kind of loving and just attention 
that God supplies by means of God’s significant personal presence—this is more 
straightforwardly understood as constituent of God’s good, eternal, blessed, Triune life. 
God’s good Triune life, in all its sufficiency and plentitude is not without perfect, loving, 
attention between Father, Son, and Spirit. Indeed, there is an interpersonal presence that 
goes beyond being merely “significant”. In the trinitarian life of God there is a perfect 
presence that is constituent of God’s good, blessed being. This perfect presence, manifest by 
an eternal, loving interpersonal attention is in no way contingent upon creation; nor is it, like 
its creaturely analog, subject to the contingencies of time or space, sin or error. It is 
constituent of the eternal, blessed, perfect life of the Triune God, and in that sense, we can, 
without qualification, claim that there is “hearing” in God—a perfect “hearing” in the 
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immanent life of Father, Son, and Spirit that is inexhaustibly wrapped up with the “all” of 
God’s goodness. Here we find the being from which act follows and the warrant for taking 
God’s self-revelation in the naming of Ishmael as ontologically significant. That self-
revelatory act points behind the economic circumstances of the Sarah-Hagar narrative, or 
any other hearing of creation, to an ontological Other who is already one who “hears” in 
eternity.  
Hearing is, thus, not a new divine capacity that obtains upon the act of creation. It is 
in no way contingent upon creation. What is true of God remains unchanged by the creative 
act. The order of being is not identical to the order of knowing. Were God never to have 
heard creation, never to have self-revealed as Ishmael, never to have created at all, God 
would still be a “hearer”. Yet the eternal, good, blessed, Triune God has chosen not only to 
self-reveal as a “hearer,” but has chosen to hear God’s creation. How is that hearing of 
creation, that act that follows from God’s good being, to be understood and characterized? 
 
3.3 God’s Hearing—An Utterly Gratuitous and Perfect Gift of Love 
It remains to give an account of the shape and character of God’s hearing of creation. For a 
dogmatic grammar of God’s hearing to serve its purpose, it must not only negatively 
circumscribe the formal limits of theological speech concerning God’s hearing—what may 
not be said—but also positively give account of how God’s hearing may be characterized. 
Having established God’s ontological alterity—the qualitative and categorical lacuna that 
exist between divine and creaturely hearing—and having established that God is a “hearer” 
in se such that God’s act of hearing in the economy corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to God’s 
being as a “hearer,” we must now ask, What kind of act is God’s economic hearing? If 
God’s hearing of creatures corresponds to God’s “hearing” of God, then that 
correspondence will give God’s hearing a particular order and telos. 
 What is offered here is not intended to modify or supplant the working definition of 
Chapter 1. Rather, it is offered to demonstrate the way that definition functions in the light 
of the above dogmatic constraints. Given God’s alterity and self-correspondence, God’s 
hearing of creatures must take on not only specific constraints, but must now be viewed in a 
particular hue that illumines the act of hearing as the hearing of that hearer. Seeing it in this 
light will clarify the ends toward which the working definition aims. 
 First, God’s hearing of creatures is an utterly gratuitous and uncompelled gift. 
God’s ontological alterity, established and preserved by the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, 
entails a freedom that is uncompromised by creation’s existence. The creative act does not 
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compel God to hear creation. As God’s relation to creation is non-real or logical in God, 
there is no change that takes place in God as a result of the creative act. It is not as though 
creation now stands within “earshot” of God, making God’s hearing inevitable or 
unavoidable. On the contrary, the act of creation—itself a gift—becomes all the more 
beneficent and generous when understood to include God’s willingness to hear creatures. 
God’s hearing is “an operation of generosity on the part of one who in his inner-trinitarian 
life is wholly realized, satisfied and at rest.”59 Thus in the act of creation, God, in freedom 
and generosity, creates the possibility of God’s own hearing of creation. The gift of that 
possibility is magnified by God’s ongoing, gracious, sustaining of that possibility. Like 
creation itself, the possibility of God’s hearing is not only established, but preserved, such 
that the possibility of God’s gracious hearing of creatures is maintained in a way that 
characterizes God’s ongoing relation to creation.  
 The uncompelled and utterly gratuitous nature of God’s hearing means that it is best 
characterized as an undeserved gift to creatures. God gives the gift of hearing not-God, and 
does so in a way that cannot evoke reciprocity.60 The asymmetrical nature of the God-
creation relation means that what God does in hearing creation is so utterly unique that it 
can only be a unilateral action. The creaturely possibility of speaking and being heard by 
God is a possibility that finds its locus in God’s grace and mercy toward creatures, not in 
creaturely effort, skill, or ability. This self-donation of God’s hearing is, in the words of 
John Milbank, “a gift of a gift to a gift.” 61 As an uncompelled and utterly gratuitous act, it is 
a mysterious and benevolent kindness shown by God to creation. 
 Second, it is analogous but ultimately dissimilar to creaturely hearing in its 
perfection and radical proximity. The ex nihilo doctrine and the asymmetrical relation 
between God and creation emphasize the distinction between God’s hearing of God and 
God’s hearing of creation. And that distinction is a crucial one because its implication for 
God’s hearing of creatures is all the better for it. As was already suggested, the 
asymmetrical relation between God and creation means that God is maximally and 
immediately proximate to creation. God’s hearing is dissimilar, if analogous, to creaturely 
hearing insofar as God’s hearing does not require any medium of creaturely speech. This 
immediacy means that there is no third term or principle in the speaker-hearer dyad. “In the 
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relation between God and creation, there is nothing held in common between the terms, and 
neither is there a mediating act besides the very act of creation ex nihilo.”62 In the creative 
act God is already and always infinitely proximate to creatures, thereby establishing the 
possibility of God’s hearing not-God, in a way that is necessarily without the possibility of 
error, misunderstanding, or failure of any kind. The perfection and proximity of God’s 
hearing is not despite, but because of God’s ontological alterity. It is because “God’s 
relation to creatures is not ‘real’ that his love is of infinite scope and benevolence.”63  
 The perfect, infinite, and immediate nature of God’s hearing creatures was well 
understood by Augustine. In his comments on “the depths” from which the Psalmist cries 
out to God in Psalm 130, Augustine, in order to make the theological point, calls to mind the 
earthy narrative of Jonah who,  
was not only beneath the waves, but also in the entrails of the beast; nevertheless, 
those waves and that body prevented not his prayer from reaching God, and the 
beast’s belly could not contain the voice of his prayer. It penetrated all things, it 
burst through all things, it reached the ears of God: if indeed we ought to say that, 
bursting through all things it reached the ears of God, since the ears of God were in 
the heart of him who prayed.64  
The passage is remarkable for the way it brings into relief the analogous but dissimilar 
nature of divine and creaturely hearing. No sooner does Augustine speaks of God’s 
metaphorical ears than he immediately questions the appropriateness of that speech and 
pivots to acknowledge the infinitely proximate nature in which God hears the cries of 
creatures. God’s hearing is not inhibited by the depth of the sea or the body of the beast 
because God’s hearing is not a mediated act. Its immediacy is characterized by the presence 
of God’s ears in the heart of him who prayed. This validates and illuminates our working 
definition, characterized as it is by a significant kind of personal presence. It is because of 
the ontological distinction between creator and creature that God may be significantly and 
personally present. That presence is what makes possible God’s loving and just attention to 
creatures; but it is on account of God’s ontological difference. 
 Finally, God’s love is the principle and telos of God’s hearing creatures. The Triune 
God who is love (1 Jn 4:8) creates on account of, by means of, and for the purpose of God’s 
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63 John Webster, “Non ex aequo: God’s relation to Creatures” in God Without Measure vol. I 
(London: T&T Clark, 2016), p. 125. 
64 Augustine, “Exposition on the Book of Psalms” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers vol. 8, edited 
by Philip Schaff, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), p. 613.  
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own love. It is the whence and wither of God’s hearing. This Triune God whose eternal life 
is characterized by innertrinitarian “hearing”—a perfect and loving attention paid to God by 
God—creates creatures loved by God, on account of an overflow of God’s own love, in 
order that they might be loved by God. In Aristotelian terms, the love of God is the efficient, 
formal, and final cause of God’s hearing creatures. The loving and just act of hearing 
creatures is an act of self-correspondence by which God lives and acts toward creation 
according to God’s eternal and perfect life, in se. The love that characterizes God’s 
“hearing” of Godself is the same love that characterizes God’s hearing of creatures. In this 
way, God’s ontological alterity does not generate a deistic picture of a God who is “far off” 
and cannot or will not hear. Rather, the creator-creature distinction becomes the principle 
for God’s significant personal presence with creatures, which makes loving and just 
attention toward creatures possible. This loving gift is at the heart of the gospel insofar as 
God’s love orients God’s activity toward love of finite and fallen creatures in order that they 
may participate in God’s love. As was shown in Chapter 1, Augustine makes the gift of 
God’s hearing central to the gospel:  
But our Lord Jesus Christ did not despise us in our depths. He graciously willed to 
come down into this life of ours, promising us the forgiveness of all our sins, and 
he aroused human beings to cry out to him even from those deep places where their 
sins weighed them down, so that the voice of every sinner might reach God.65 
God’s listening ear is a gracious and merciful act of love on which the good news of 
redemption in Christ turns. As God hears creatures, those creatures participate in the 
eternally-hearing and loving life of the Triune God. God’s hearing is, thus, a loving act of a 
loving God to a beloved creature for the purpose of participation in God’s loving life. This 
participation in the love of God is the ultimate telos for which God hears creatures.66 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The task of a dogmatic grammar is to circumscribe speech in a way appropriate to its object. 
It involves the establishment of a set of protocols for speaking in a way that affirms what is 
proper and denies what is not. With respect to God’s hearing, the burden of this chapter has 
been to do just that, negatively fencing off improper language or implications of God’s 
                                                          
65 Augustine, Psalm 129 (LXX), Expositions of the Psalms 121-150 (III/20) (Works of Saint 
Augustine) (New York: New City Press, 2000), p. 140. 
66 Cf. Daniel Shields, “On Ultimate Ends: Aquinas’s Thesis that Loving God is Better than Knowing 
Him” in The Thomist, vol. 78.4, (October 2014), pp. 581-607. 
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hearing and positively orienting theological inquiry toward a way of speaking of God’s 
hearing that appropriately accords with God’s self-revelation in Holy Scripture. This set of 
protocols finds its dogmatic home in the doctrine of creation, which establishes the identity 
of the creator and the relation between creator and creature. It was shown, first, that the 
creator is ontologically distinct from creation and that, as creator, God’s hearing does not 
add something new to God; nor does it bring about some change in God. Rather, God’s 
radical ontological alterity was shown to be the grounds for God’s immediate, infinite 
proximity to creation. Then, following Aquinas and his reading of the “all” of God’s 
goodness in Exodus 33:19, it was shown that God has revealed to creation truths about the 
divine nature which are not, in contrast to Barth, concealed by the order of knowing. God’s 
acts of self-revelation in Scripture make some ontological claims possible. God’s self-
revelation in the naming of Ishmael, combined with theological precedent for dialogical 
analogies of God’s Triune life paved the way for the argument that there is “hearing” in God 
that corresponds to God’s ad extra hearing of creatures. Finally, the character of God’s 
hearing creatures was informed by God’s relation to creation more generally. Without 
modifying the theological framework and working definition of Chapter 1, this 
characterization of God’s hearing shed new light on God’s hearing as an act that is utterly 
gratuitous and perfect and which finds its principle and telos in the abundant and 
overflowing love of the Triune God. Speech about God’s hearing is located within this 




4. ANTHROPOLOGY: BEING HEARD INTO HEARING 
BEINGS 
 
“Who am I? They mock me, these lonely questions of mine.”1 
 
In the previous chapter we established protocols for proper speech about God’s relation to 
creation in general and to the divine act of hearing, in particular. With those in place, 
theological speech about divine hearing now becomes possible, and it is this possibility that 
opens up new questions for theology and hearing’s bearing on it. If we can now speak 
intelligibly and with appropriate theological precision about God’s hearing, it must be asked 
what bearing this has on the human creature. If God is a hearer, what then is the relationship 
between the doctrine of humanity and God’s hearing? How does being heard by God form a 
person and what shape does that formation take? If humanity is related to a God who hears, 
how might humanity be different were God not a hearer? The assumption that underlies 
these questions and this chapter more generally is that human becoming is positively formed 
by God’s hearing, and that this hearing is anthropologically significant.  
Yet as soon as that positive formation and becoming are considered, myriad 
methodological challenges present themselves that must be anticipated and addressed. First, 
God’s hearing of human creatures is not a phenomenon easily identified for measurable 
impact.2 Human experiences are formative in subtle and even imperceptible ways that often 
elude description or narration. How much more so must this be the case for experiences with 
God that may be known only personally, by the subject of the experience? It might seem 
that evaluating the formative impact of such experiences may be limited to ethnography or 
otherwise amount to nothing more than sheer speculation on the part of the theologian. Yet 
persons do self-report and self-narrate ways in which experiences with others have formed 
them—even if comprehensive understanding is beyond reach and interpretation under 
constant revision—and no less so experiences with God.3 The methodological import of 
such self-reporting raises questions that exceed the scope of this chapter and the knowledge 
                                                          
1 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 348. 
2 See the helpful discussion on prayer’s efficacy by Vincent Brümmer, “Introduction: Putting Prayer 
to the Test” in What are We Doing When We Pray?: On Prayer and the Nature of Faith (Revised and 
Expanded ed.) (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), pp. 3-17.  
3 See T.M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship 
with God (New York: Vintage Books, 2012). 
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of its author. But such self-reporting gives prima facie reason to work with the assumptions 
that humans are formed by and in relationship with God.  
So how are such experiences to be evaluated for their formative effects? Here lurks 
the second methodological challenge: How are we to speak about God’s hearing forming 
human becoming without merely projecting human hearing onto God? The dual worries of 
Feuerbach and the analogia entis have appeared throughout this study, and here they must 
be acknowledged again. To speak of the formative features of God’s hearing is not merely 
to project a creaturely intersubjectivity and its formative effects onto God. Indeed, avoiding 
this was, in one sense, the burden of the entire preceding chapter. God’s hearing is revealed 
in Scripture as real and formative, and theological speech about it must be characterized and 
conditioned by God’s self-revelation, rather than by models of inter-human hearing. 
Similarly, we cannot think of God’s hearing as merely better than human hearing, as though 
a few rungs up the ontological ladder God hears like we do, a fortiori. Rather, God’s 
ontological alterity means that God’s hearing is also ontologically other; thus, speech about 
God’s hearing can be, at best, analogical. Scripture gives warrant for and invites speech 
about God’s hearing that is realistic and demonstrates its formative role in human becoming. 
“Because he inclined his ear to me, therefore I will call on him as long as I live,” declares 
the Psalmist (Ps 116:2). It is Scripture, therefore, that must guide, control, and condition 
conclusions about God’s hearing and human becoming. At the same time, if Scripture 
invites us to speak of God’s hearing in analogical ways, there may be ways of speaking 
rightly about God’s hearing that are informed by creaturely intersubjectivity. Indeed, 
theological anthropology has long relied on the social sciences to inform its task. To do so is 
not an attempt to smuggle Feuerbach back into theological inquiry; rather it is to follow 
Scripture’s lead in speaking of God as God speaks of God: in terms that are often 
anthropomorphic and analogous to creaturely intersubjectivity. There is, thus, a dual warrant 
for the procedure that follows. Individuals self-report God hearing their prayers and the 
effect it has on them and their circumstances; and Scripture invites us to understand God’s 
hearing as akin to human hearing. 
In what follows I begin by sketching the model of intersubjectivity with which I will 
be working in order to further understand human being and becoming. Borrowing from the 
social sciences, I proceed to offer an account of the ways in which God’s hearing might 
prove formative for human becoming, and that in two ways. First, positively, I will bring 
hearing into dialogue with the concepts of empathy and the related concept of joint 
attention, the latter having already been treated in Chapter 1. Additionally, I reflect on 
hearing as a kind of attunement and what that might mean for the one heard. I then extend 
the discussion begun in the previous chapter, of what it might mean for hearing to be a gift, 
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and the way in which being the recipient of a gift produces a necessarily positive change in 
the recipient. Second, negatively, I will examine the formative effects of being unheard or 
silenced and the way these are destructive for self-understanding. It will be demonstrated 
that such silencing impairs one’s theory of self and is corrosive to personal identity-
formation. These positive and negative, constructive and destructive, reflections from the 
social sciences suggest ways in which the formative effects produced by being heard may 
also be understood, mutatis mutandis, to result from God’s hearing of human creatures. 
Together, these two means of approach bring us very near to the existential burden of this 
study: questions of human pain, suffering and evil that cry out, like the blood of Abel, to be 
heard by God. Indeed, if the overwhelming majority of Biblical references to God hearing 
are human requests—even cries—to be heard by God, as was seen in Chapter 1, there is 
then warrant for asking how God’s hearing might relate to the particularity of human 
suffering. I conclude with an extended theological reflection on Psalm 22, observing how 
God’s hearing is, indeed, efficacious for human becoming and identity-formation, especially 
in the concreteness of human suffering—and that in contrast to alternative theological 
strategies on offer. 
It is important to maintain that proceeding along these lines is not simply an attempt 
to wishfully project the features of creaturely relations onto divine-human relations. Rather, 
it is to follow God’s invitation in Holy Scripture to speak about God in ways that are 
anthropomorphic and yet real.  
 
4.1 Human Social Formation 
In order to make claims about the formative effects of God’s hearing, we must first identify 
the model and understanding of human formation with which we are working. Generally, 
and in agreement with contemporary anthropology, it is to be assumed that human persons 
are formed interpersonally and that this interpersonal formation is constitutive of human 
identity and identity-formation itself. Despite a variety of competing anthropological 
theories, by the arrival of the twentieth century, there was already an established consensus 
that “the age of individualism [was] over.”4 Personal identity-formation is not an 
autonomous task, accomplished by the agency of a subject, as though the “I” had absolute 
governance over the self and self-formation. That modernist and Cartesian understanding of 
the self was displaced by social or intersubjective models argued most notably by Ebner, 
                                                          
4 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1985), pp. 179f. 
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Rosenzweig, and Buber.5 These were followed by many, including the works of Gabriel 
Marcel in France and of Alistair McFadyen in Britain.6 While divergent in their approach to 
the question of the human subject or person—differences that extend to method, vocabulary, 
definitions and more—there is broad agreement that the “I” is formed in and through 
encounter with others, intersubjectively and not autonomously. Identity-formation and 
human becoming result from the intercourse of two or more subjects and cannot be 
accomplished in a vacuum.  
 It is important to register here that, while some theological anthropologies have 
attempted to develop an intersubjective or dialogical account of the human person by way of 
the imago dei, claiming that God’s tri-personal nature is reflected in it, such an account is 
neither necessary nor theologically appropriate.7 It is inappropriate, first, because these 
arguments share in common an understanding of the human person that is correlated to 
divine hypostaseis—a correlation that requires reading the mystery of the trinitarian 
hypostaseis onto human nature. I take this move to be the substitution of one mystery for 
another, and as such, runs a greater risk of anthropological projection onto the Godhead. 
Second, hypostasis- and prosopon-language in the doctrine of the Trinity, each with their 
related intents but distinct histories, were deployed in order to bear unique and specific 
metaphysical burdens that would not be appropriate to load onto the imago dei.8 “Person”, 
when deployed as a descriptor of the tri-unity of the Godhead, is categorically sui generis. 
Put another way, I take this theological maneuver to be guilty of what Kevin Vanhoozer, 
adapting James Barr’s famous phrase, calls, “Illegitimate Trinitarian Transfer.” 9 What is 
                                                          
5 See Franz Rosenzweig, Stern der Erlösung (1922), Ferdinand Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen 
Realitäten (1921), and Martin Buber, Ich und Du (1923).  
6 See esp. Gabriel Marcel, Le Mystère de l'être (1951) and Alistair McFadyen, The Call to 
Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
7 See, e.g., Persons: Divine and Human ed. by. Chris Schwöbel and Colin Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1991). Schwöbel remarks in his introduction, “One of the central questions for the discussion 
in these essays is whether the Trinitarian mode of reflection can contribute to a perspective for the 
consideration of what it means to be a person which is both distinctively theological and authentically 
Christian...”, p. 13. 
8 Contra John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: 
Darton Longman and Todd, 1985). Lewis Ayres cautions with reference to ousia and hypostasis 
language that “it is important to attempt to understand what meaning was attributed to these terms at 
the time of Nicaea. By way of a general warning, it is important to note that any attempt to define 
fourth-century theological terminologies by reference solely to their philological origins or to a 
history of non-Christian philosophical development runs the constant danger of resulting in an 
artificial clarity that is not reflected in actual theological usage.” Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach 
to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 93. Note, too, 
that it was for related reasons that Barth famously preferred “Seinsweise” over prosopon language. 
See CD 1/1, §9. 
9 Kevin Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 
150. Similar restrictions ought to be observed for incarnation, kenosis, perichoresis, procession, and 
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proper to the mystery of the Trinity ought not to be transferred to the created order. Third, 
the modern concept of the human person, despite the post-Cartesian history just narrated, 
even in its intersubjective or dialogical formulations, continues to refer to a center of 
consciousness. Thus, the correlating of human persons to divine hypostaseis runs the risk of, 
on the one hand, positing multiple divine consciousnesses—an explicit threat to orthodox 
trinitarianism, or evacuating the concept of the human person of any meaningful content, on 
the other. Stated most strongly, when it comes to understandings of the person, the human 
person and the divine person share only a six-letter word in common. Further, this sort of 
theological maneuver is unnecessary. Theological anthropology, rather than finding its 
anchor in the doctrine of the Trinity, would do better to look to christology and the person 
Jesus of Nazareth for an understanding of what it means to be fully human.10 If Jesus Christ 
is the perfect instantiation of human nature, albeit hypostatically united to the divine nature, 
his person ought to inform our understanding of the human person, more generally. 
 The brief criticism of this species of theological anthropology is important because 
the method is characteristic of McFadyen’s account of personhood, which I intend to follow; 
but only in part.11 McFadyen’s understanding of person “is both dialogical (formed through 
social interaction, through address and response) and dialectical (never coming to rest in a 
final unity, if only because one is never removed from relation).”12 A “dialogical 
understanding of personhood [means] that we are what we are in ourselves only through 
relation to others. Persons are unique centres or subjects of communication, but they are so 
only through their intrinsic relation to other persons.”13 By working with this understanding 
of the person, McFadyen is intentionally and admirably bringing the social sciences—
especially the thought of Habermas, Luhmann, and Harré—into dialogue with theology. All 
of this is fair enough. However, his choice of theological dialogue partners makes him 
unnecessarily vulnerable to the worries of projection and equivocation just raised. Following 
Moltmann’s claim that “Being a person [as Father, Son and Spirit are only insofar as they 
are related to each other] means existing-in-relationship,”14 McFadyen expounds, claiming 
                                                          
other properly trinitarian concepts that have proven too tantalizing for theologians to leave in eternity. 
For a more thorough rebuke, see Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social 
Doctrines of the Trinity” in New Blackfriars 81 (2000), pp. 432-45. 
10 For one noteworthy example, see Kathryn Tanner, “Human Nature” in Christ the Key (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-57. 
11 McFadyen, The Call to Personhood, pp. 17-44. 
12 Ibid., p. 9 
13 Ibid. 
14 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, pp. 171f. Cited in Ibid., p. 28. “Personsein 
bedeutet in dieser Hinsicht In-Beziehungen-Existieren.” in Trinität und Reich Gottes (München: 
Kaiser, 1980), p. 188. While Beziehungen might be translated more generally as “connection” or 
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with respect to the trinitarian Persons, that “[t]hey are Persons only in so far as they are 
related in these particular ways, and they may be related only in so far as they are discrete, 
as Persons, both from one another and from any one of the totality of their relations. Person 
and relation are inseparable but not the same thing.”15 Going on, McFadyen concludes, “If 
[…] the God whom human being images is not a simple, single individual with certain 
internal attributes, but is more like a community of Persons, then it would seem more 
adequate to conceive of the [imago dei] in relational terms.”16  
While all of this is consistent with certain so-called “social” models of the Trinity, it 
must be asked how helpful the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is for informing theological 
anthropology. Note, first, McFadyen appears unwilling to follow Moltmann wholesale. 
When speaking of the Persons of the immanent Trinity, McFadyen does not adopt 
Moltmann’s “relationship” (“Beziehungen”), opting for the more historically established 
“relation”. Relationship language is only employed by McFadyen when one or both parties 
are creatures. He appears sensitive to the distinction between the words, carefully adopting 
the more reserved and theologically established notion of relatedness to describe divine 
Persons. Thus, tacitly, McFadyen signals that relationship is a creaturely reality. Second, 
has McFadyen adequately demonstrated that person and relation are irreducible in the 
Godhead? By claiming that person and relation are not identical, it must be asked what 
remains of say, the person of the Son, if the Son is not identical to his relation to the Father. 
Recalling that McFadyen’s inquiry pertains to the immanent Trinity and to that eternal and 
uncreated notion of Person, how does this distinction between eternal, uncreated person and 
eternal, uncreated relation not imply an additional ousia or substantia? If the Son is more 
than God’s own eternal relatedness to Godself as eternally begotten, then the Son must be a 
distinct ousia that exists in relation to the ousia of the Father. The same could be said, 
mutatis mutandis, of the Spirit. Here the threat to orthodox trinitarianism resurfaces. Third, 
when the character of the relations historically posited of the hypostaseis of the Godhead is 
considered, those relations reveal both their unique function in trinitarian theology and their 
incommunicability for theological anthropology. The relations of eternal begottenness, 
eternal begetting, eternal spiration or procession—these are (like the word hypostasis) 
relations that are befitting only of the Godhead. How could they be translated to creation? In 
what sense could those kinds of relations inform creaturely relationships or the 
understanding of created persons? In fairness, McFadyen does not explicitly attempt to draw 
                                                          
“relation”, Kohl has rightly followed Moltmann’s more general thought by rendering it 
“relationship”.  
15 McFadyen, The Call to Personhood, p. 28.  
16 Ibid., p. 31. 
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on those categories to inform his understanding of human persons. However, by claiming 
that it is that kind of relatedness that informs the content of the imago dei, McFadyen 
implicitly suggests that his understanding of created persons is constituted by relations 
derived from the uncreated, innertrinitarian relations that constitute divine persons. I take 
this to be no different than many methodologically circular approaches to the imago dei, 
which find among human creatures some ostensibly unique feature and then proceed to map 
that feature back onto the Godhead in order to claim its divine origins.  All of this is, I 
realize, as much a critique of social doctrines of the Trinity as it is of McFadyen. Yet, 
whatever the merit of social doctrines, McFadyen’s account demonstrates their particularly 
tenuous ability to inform the imago dei and the dangers of projection. Especially in 
theological anthropology lurks the danger to make theology anthropology. 
 So, to return to McFadyen’s claim that “Person and relation are inseparable but not 
the same thing,”17 we can agree: in anthropology, yes; in theology, maybe not.18 Indeed, 
McFadyen’s dialogical understanding of human persons—that they are constituted only 
through dialogical relation to others—is broadly consistent with the trajectory of the social 
sciences’ understanding of the human person and proves especially valuable insofar as it is a 
development in that vein. 
 McFadyen argues convincingly that one’s sense of self and personal identity are 
formed socially through relations of communication with others. “The ‘self’,” he claims, “is 
not some internal organ of identity, but is understood in communication terms as a way of 
organising one’s life and communication in a centered way.”19 Thus, persons are formed 
only in intersubjective, communicative relations. Within particular social contexts persons 
engage in exchanges within a communication code appropriate for that social context. The 
social context dictates, regulates, and codifies interpersonal communication according to its 
system of values. Within this codified system, persons enter into relation with others in a 
way that is conditioned by how they are recognized and addressed by others. Individual 
identity is then formed by this recognition and address. It is “both expressed in and derived 
from the moments in which one responds to others within the framework of given moral 
order.”20 Personal identity, then, is constituted by a “sedimentation” of these moments, 
                                                          
17 Ibid., p. 28. 
18 Aquinas is clear that a trinitarian hypostasis is a “subsistent relation”. Robert Jenson claims that, 
for Aquinas, subsistent relation “is not merely essential to its term, but that just is its own sole term.” 
See “Some Riffs on Thomas Aquinas’s De Ente et Essentia” in Theological Theology, ed. by R. 
David Nelson, Darren Sarisky, Justin Stratis (London: T&T Clark, 2015) p. 130. Italics original. 
19 Ibid., p. 70. 
20 Ibid., p. 73.  
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which should not be understood as discrete or isolated but continuous in their identity-
forming ability. Persons are then, in this way, called into being by others. Individuals are 
linked, McFadyen emphasizes, not by “an abstract metaphysical principle but through 
concrete relations in which one’s individuality is addressed and called into being as a 
communicative, and therefore moral, subject of a certain form.”21 This emphasis on the 
communicative nature of personhood leads McFadyen to draw specific conclusions about 
the human body and the embodied nature of persons. The body of a person is understood as 
a communicative element of personhood, not only being a means of communication, but 
itself communicating to others and to oneself. In other words, we communicate by use of 
our bodies, verbally and non-verbally; but the body itself also communicates, insofar as it 
communicates our identities that persist over time. Yet this does not mean that personhood 
is circumscribed or isolated to that body. Rather, “As a subject of public communication, a 
person is more like a ‘place’ (a location of communication) than a ‘thing’ or an object.”22 
This means that the physical and social elements of life are inseparable. The self is a 
communicative agent that is addressed and recognized while addressing and recognizing 
others. It is this sedimentation of moments of call and response that constitute human 
personality. What is at the core of this concept of personality is the social achievement of 
internally organizing and structuring these moments in a socially acceptable account of self-
understanding. This internal self-organizing is what constitutes a person and enables 
engagement in social communication with other subjects. As such, “‘Self’ is not a thing 
people have within them, but a theory which they have about themselves which facilitates 
personal existence.”23 Selfhood is, thus, “an organizational process.”24 
 Yet not every relation is significant for identity formation. McFadyen is clear that 
there must be a distinction between “a person’s history of relations and the ossification of 
this history into a sedimented structure of personal identity.”25 My communicative 
relationship with my postal deliverer is far less relevant for the formation of my identity 
than my relationship with my parents. How then might we understand one’s identity-
formation in dialogical relation with God? Communicative relations are formed by both 
address and response. That response “must involve attending and returning to the other as 
                                                          
21 Ibid., p. 74. 
22 Ibid., p. 78. 
23 Ibid., p. 100. 
24 Ibid. To claim that personal identity formation is a social achievement should not be understood to 
exclude a natural, genetic antecedent that is subject to the social process; and that antecedent has 
considerable bearing on the experience of the achievement and its resultant formation; i.e., it is not 
“nurture” all the way down. 
25 Ibid., p. 115. 
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she or he is present in communication. This is a readiness to allow the calls of others to 
transform us in response.”26 In the response, both openness and closure are together present. 
The address of the other may be to a greater or lesser extent received and incorporated into 
one’s organization of self. Such is the case with God’s redemptive address to the human 
creature, who may choose thereafter to understand self as one addressed by God, or to reject 
such an address as irrelevant for self. McFadyen summarizes: 
In recognising the form of God’s presence and intention of and for us in the divine 
call we come to a better understanding of ourselves and of our true nature. For the 
form of God’s Word communicates a particular intention and understanding of 
what it is to be a person in relation to God, and calls us to make this understanding 
our own in a responsible existence before God and others. In our acceptance of 
God’s call and claim by responding to it aright, God’s understanding and intention 
of and for us inform a new self-understanding.27 
But if this relation is to be truly dialogical, as McFadyen proposes, it must also involve 
creaturely address to God and divine response; and McFadyen is relatively silent on how 
God’s listening response might be formative for human becoming. In his discussion of 
asymmetrical relations, McFadyen does acknowledge the identity-forming contribution of a 
listening other, but in a way that is isolated to intercreaturely relations. Yet because 
Scripture invites us to consider human creatures’ relation to God in anthropomorphic and 
analogous ways, this discussion can inform the way God’s hearing might prove identity-
forming for human creatures. 
 In an example of asymmetry, McFadyen suggests that a listening ear is sometimes 
an appropriate response in dialogue. What is needed, sometimes, is “an open presence with 
another rather than communication on his or her behalf.”28 Importantly, he goes on to 
qualify this by stating that this listening is, in fact, a kind of communication. “Presence, 
however passive,” he claims,  
is still the communication of a particular personal identity. It therefore bears the 
form and content of a unique communicational spirit. An implicit self-presentation 
is unavoidable, and this has some determining effect upon the relation and the 
                                                          
26 Ibid., p. 121. 
27 Ibid., p. 124. 
28 Ibid., p. 146. 
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communication of the other, and the way in which one is and is perceived to be 
present.”29 
 Several important comments must be made about this. First, I take McFadyen’s use 
of “passive” in this context to mean non-verbal. If communication still occurs in the act of 
listening, there is a sense in which the listening cannot be strictly passive. If the listening is 
to be construed as part of true dialogue, it must be active, engaged, a communicative 
presence. That presence is charged with intention. McFadyen acknowledges that, were that 
active listening to change posture, say to uninterested yawning, the dialogical form comes 
undone. Listening then cannot be passive. Here again the difference between a recording 
device and a personal listener becomes instructive. The former might be better characterized 
as passive. The engineer who designed it certainly did so with intentionality; and it may 
even, in some cases of artificial intelligence, respond accordingly. Yet it lacks the kind of 
significant personal presence (as developed in Chapter 1) to be an active listener. Personal 
agency is thus a necessary but insufficient condition for listening. Dialogue is constituted by 
the active listening of a personal agent who attends to the speaker in ways appropriate to the 
form and content of the speaking. It is dialogue with another person that has the potential to 
be significantly formative. 
Second, the self-presentation of the listener is formative for the communication of 
the other. Significant for the form and content of the dialogue is the individual character of 
the listener. Listeners are not interchangeable in their presence. The ear, McFadyen notes, 
“is always attached to a whole person.”30 This is no less true when speaking of God’s, albeit 
incorporeal, hearing. That one addresses God has significant bearing on the form and 
content of that address. That it is God who hears also has significant bearing. God’s hearing 
is uniquely God’s and is unsubstitutable and unrivaled by any human hearer. It is the 
hearing of one who is characterized by all the perfections of divinity. The form and content 
of the address cannot but be shaped by the speaker’s understanding of the character of the 
listener. Thus, personal identity is uniquely formed through the address to a particular 
listener, not just any listener. 
Third, McFadyen’s reflection on listening brings together, not coincidentally, I 
think, the idea of hearing, presence, and spirit. This both corroborates the exegetical labor of 
Chapter 1, but with a theological addition. But here it must be pointed out that, just as with 
our working definition, listening is understood as a kind of significant personal presence that 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 147. 
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actively communicates the personal identity of the listener (e.g., loving and just), as that 
listener attends to the address of the speaker. Here it would seem that McFadyen’s minimal 
reflections on human dialogue support our working definition. More than that, however, he 
remarks that hearing “bears the form and content of a unique communicational spirit.” The 
language is an attempt to positively characterize the activity of the listener, and “spirit” 
seems to be one way of understanding the presence of the listener. Of course, the collocation 
of “spirit” and “presence” invites further theological reflection upon the role of the Spirit in 
God’s hearing presence in and with creation. Might not God’s hearing be understood as 
God’s significant personal presence in and by God’s communicational Spirit? Space does 
not permit an extended reflection on pneumatology, but insofar as the Triune God is present 
to speakers, that presence is a pneumatological one. 
To summarize the relevant findings from McFadyen’s anthropology, the self is 
formed socially and in relations of communication with others. The self is a way of 
organizing the sedimented history of interpersonal communication in a centered way. 
Individual identity is formed by the ways in which one is recognized and addressed by 
others as well as the ways in which one recognizes and addresses others. For interpersonal 
communication to be genuine, it must be constituted not only by recognition and address, 
but by response. Being heard by another is a requisite response for genuine interpersonal 
communication, and that hearing is formative for one’s theory of self. Whether or not one is 
heard by another contributes to one’s self-understanding and is constitutive of the 
sedimented history of interpersonal communication that structures personal identity. Put 
concisely, whether or not I am heard by another determines who I am and who I understand 
myself to be. Because the Scriptures invite us to speak of God’s hearing in ways analogous 
to this, possibilities of exploration are opened up to consider the formative effects of God’s 
hearing on human becoming. So, what are the concrete ways in which being heard might be 
formative?  
 
4.2 Formed by the Hearing of Others 
A consideration of the ways being heard forms one must necessarily be incomplete. The 
vast range of available interpersonal experiences resists taxonomy.  As one speaks to and is 
heard by another, the particularity of that dialogue becomes unrepeatable; the totality of its 
concrete formative effects on human becoming cannot be translated to another person, time, 
or place. Yet this particularity does not prohibit explication of more generalizable formative 
effects of being heard by another. And if Scripture invites its reader to use dialogical 
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language to characterize the God-human relationship, then an explication of hearing’s 
formative effects becomes a matter of theological interest.  
Toward that end, I will proceed down two broad methodological approaches. First, 
positively, I attempt to characterize the effects of hearing on human experience and self-
understanding. This will involve a protracted, if nevertheless partial, analysis of relevant 
anthropological concepts, borrowed from the social sciences. The analysis is partial because 
these are deep waters; and I desire to avoid being battered by the waves of phenomenology, 
psychology, philosophy, neurobiology and other disciplines about which I cannot claim 
expertise. Yet the analysis is protracted because I take it to improve upon some of the 
theological developments of the twentieth and twenty-first century theology.  This will 
require explanation and defense. These varied anthropological concepts, culled from 
different disciplines, will serve as different lenses through which to observe the possible 
formative effects of the unified experience of being heard. 
Second, negatively, I will consider what formative effects result when one is not 
heard. How does identity-formation and self-understanding result from having no hearer, or 
worse, being silenced? In what ways does this impair human becoming or result in a 
malformed sense of the self? 
One last preliminary note: because Scripture’s speech about God’s hearing is most 
often related to human speech from the wilderness, as examined in Chapter 1, I will proceed 
with an eye toward God’s hearing of humans in their pain and suffering. This is consistent 
with McFadyen’s argument that not all dialogical relations are equally relevant for the 
ossification of a sedimented structure of personal identity. It follows that another’s hearing 
of one’s passing greeting is less formative for self-understanding than another’s hearing of, 
say, the recounting of a personal tragedy. The latter experience is likely to be more clearly 
relevant for the way one organizes one’s sense of self. Of course, these are not the only 
formative experiences. Yet existential experiences of pain, loss, and heartache, being more 
relevant for identity-formation, are what call out more desperately to be heard by God and 




4.2.1 Deep Hearing: Empathy, Joint Attention, and Human Becoming 
In a large portion of human dialogue, being heard by another is no more than a functional 
need for getting along in the world. There are four requirements for such dialogue31: (1) a 
shared language; (2) properly functioning faculties of speech, hearing, and cognition; (3) an 
appropriate environment that does not obstruct or distort that dialogue; and (4) sufficient 
proximity. When these criteria are met, individuals are able to get along with one another in 
ways that make everyday life possible. That these criteria are so often met means that much 
of human dialogue proceeds without need for critical reflection or evaluation. Meals are 
ordered at restaurants, supervisors direct employees, teachers instruct pupils, new 
acquaintances exchange contact details, and in each case, as long as responses to speech 
proceed along predictable patterns, hearing is assumed and the dialogue remains without 
need for critical reflection. Yet there are conditions under which speakers expect more than 
these criteria from hearers. All four criteria may be met: sound waves travel from mouth to 
ears unobstructed and with sufficient proximity that cognition occurs and the spoken words 
are comprehended and responded to in a way that indicates hearing has occurred. But 
certain existential circumstances ask for more. Here, the need to be heard by another rises 
above these criteria and expects a different kind of cognition from the hearer that is more 
comprehensive of the attendant existential circumstances, thoughts, and emotions of the 
speaker. This act of more comprehensively hearing and understanding the thoughts, 
feelings, and circumstances of the speaker approaches what is often labeled empathy. 
 A more narrative description of the existential need of the speaker is provided by 
Carl Rogers, one of the early advocates for empathy as a skill in psychotherapy. Rogers 
well-describes the formative effects of this more comprehensive hearing:  
One thing I have come to look upon as almost universal is that when a person 
realizes he has been deeply heard, there is a moistness in his eyes. I think in some 
real sense he is weeping for joy. It is as though he were saying, ‘Thank God, 
somebody heard me. Someone knows what it’s like to be me.’ In such moments I 
have had the fantasy of a prisoner in a dungeon, tapping out day after day a Morse 
code message, ‘Does anybody hear me?’ And finally one day he hears some faint 
                                                          
31 Of course, dialogue need not require the use of mouth or ears. “Hearing” of the kind under 
discussion is just as well accomplished by those differently abled, by use of, e.g., BSL or ASL. 
Dialogue may happen not only through the use of sign language, but through subtle gestures and 
body-language. However, for the sake of simplicity, I will proceed with examples from forms of 
dialogue that involve spoken, audible language, with the analysis intended to include all forms of 
“speaking” and “hearing”.  
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tappings which spell out ‘Yes.’ By that one simple response he is released from his 
loneliness, he has become a human being again.32 
To be heard in this way is to become more fully human. This kind of “deep hearing” 
describes the additional existential criteria I want to work with in what follows. But how is 
this deep hearing, which proves so formative, to be conceptualized? Rogers understands it 
as empathy. Yet empathy, conceptually, is fraught with difficulties that make it ill-suited to 
describe the additional existential criteria for which we are looking. And because something 
like empathy has played a role in some of the theological developments in the twentieth 
century, it is worth a brief excurses to identify why I prefer to avoid it and, thus, depart from 
Rogers’ label for the phenomenon he here describes.  
First, whether or not empathy, properly defined, requires more than a broader 
understanding of the speaker’s circumstances is a matter of dispute among the social 
sciences.33 At issue is whether empathy requires the hearer to actually experience or share 
similar mental or emotional states of the other, thereby, somehow, inhabiting the experience 
of the speaker.34 Second, if a sharing of mental or emotional experience is necessary for 
empathy, numerous questions immediately arise about the quality and extent to which the 
experience must be shared. Must emotions, for example, be felt to the same degree of 
intensity? How much attendant detail of the speaker’s experience must be imagined and 
shared? Given the particularity of the speaker’s experience, could the hearer ever truly share 
the feelings, thoughts, or experiences of the speaker?35 Third, clinical counseling has 
emphasized not only the importance of empathy, but also its dangers. Insufficient or 
excessive empathy has been studied in clinical settings and shown to have adverse 
impacts.36 Finally, empathy is an ill-suited category for this description of hearing because 
our ultimate concern is with God’s hearing and its formative effects for human becoming; 
and describing God as empathetic would run contrary to the historical doctrine of divine 
                                                          
32 Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus, OH: Charles Merrill, 1969), p. 224. Italics original. 
33 For a brief history, see Robert Elliott, Arthur C. Bohart, Jeanne C. Watson, Leslie S. Greenberg, 
“Empathy” in Psychotherapy (2011) 48(1), pp. 43-49. 
34 These concerns have led to the more recent, tripartite division of empathy into cognitive, affective, 
and compassionate empathy. See Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces to Improve 
Communication and Emotional Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003), p. 180. 
35 The question of whether empathy, defined as “imaginative insight into the lives and experiences of 
others”, is even possible has been thoughtfully raised in the medical community by Jane 
Macnaughton. See “The Dangerous Practice of Empathy” in The Lancet (June, 2009) vol. 373; issue 
9679, pp. 1940-41. 
36 A. Shimoda and E. N. Williams, “Problematic empathy in counseling and psychotherapy”, Society 
for Psychotherapy (2018), <http://www.societyforpsychotherapy.org/problematic-empathy-in-
counseling-and-psychotherapy/> [Accessed Jan 8, 2020]. See also, Elliott, et. al. “Emotion” op. cit. 
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apatheia.37 For these reasons, the term “empathy” need not be what characterizes the kind of 
hearing described in Rogers’ vignette. It is preferable, for those reasons, to simply speak of 
“deep hearing” as a kind of pointer to the concept I am attempting to fill out. 
 Additionally, the problem with requiring empathy, as a concept, to do the heavy 
lifting is that it is too dependent on conceptualizing the internal processes and phenomena of 
the hearer. In contrast, our investigation of the formative effects of being heard in this way 
is concerned, primarily, with the internal phenomena of the speaker, the heard one.38 The 
hearer does, undeniably, have an experience of the speaker, and that experience, too, is 
formative; but that experience, no matter how it is conceptualized, is not relevant for my 
argument. The locus of our investigation of human becoming resides with the one who is 
heard, the speaker. So, rather than attempting an explication of Rogers’ “deep hearing” for 
human becoming, it is our task to investigate the experience of being deeply heard.39 To use 
different language, what is under investigation is the speaker’s experience of “feeling felt”40 
and the formative effects thereof. Further, studies into the interpersonal effects of a 
speaker’s experience of being deeply heard may offer conclusions that are analogously 
applicable to being heard by God without having to query the “how” of another’s hearing. 
So, even though Rogers and others will utilize “empathy” as the label to describe this 
phenomenon, I will avoid the characterization of deep hearing as empathy and, instead, 
focus on the formative effects of the kind of phenomenon experienced by the speaker in 
Rogers’ vignette.  
 That experience of feeling felt by another does, indeed, affect human becoming. 
The experience is formative in profound ways that are categorically non-discrete in the 
                                                          
37 See the oft-neglected but important history of the doctrine by J.K. Mozley, The Impassibility of 
God: A Survey of Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926). See also, 
Daniel Castelo, The Apathetic God (Eugene, OR: Paternoster, 2009). 
38 Though it should be noted that this process of hearing another is, as Rowan Williams put it, “not 
just an optional extra in our human identity and our human repertoire, it’s something without which 
we cannot know ourselves. Without identification with the other, I don’t know myself.” Being 
Human: Bodies, Minds, Persons (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2018), p. 58. Similarly, see Edith Stein, On The Problem of Empathy, vol. 3 in The Collected Words 
of Edith Stein (Washington, D.C.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 116. 
39 Of course, the experience of the speaker cannot be entirely divorced from the nuanced activity of 
the hearer; but the experience of being deeply heard may be had as a result of any variety of cognitive 
processes on the part of the hearer. Whether the hearer shares the feelings (which could only ever be 
approximate and non-identical) of the speaker, or attempts an imaginative process of inhabiting the 
circumstances of the speaker, or more minimally tries to identify and label the emotions being 
experienced by the speaker—whatever the cognitive processes of the hearer, it is the speaker who has 
an additional existential need to be deeply heard in her circumstances; and it is that experience of 
being heard that is under investigation. 
40 Here I am borrowing the phrase of Dan Siegel, The Mindful Brain (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2007), p. xiv. 
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unified consciousness of the speaker. By no means exhaustive, three ways in which feeling 
felt might have effect on human becoming are as follows. 
First, this sort of hearing liberates from loneliness and isolation. As Rogers’ above-
quoted description of hearing makes explicit, when a speaker feels heard by another, there is 
an experience that something known to the speaker is now known or understood by the 
hearer such that a kind of sharing has taken place. What was previously known by one is 
now known by two. Through such sharing, loneliness and isolation become distributed in a 
way that reduces, if not absolutely, their intensity. While speaker and hearer may yet 
experience loneliness or isolation in what they together know, that they know it together 
produces a psychological transformation of the experience of the speaker. The speaker is no 
longer alone in her experience or knowledge, but has experienced something interpersonally 
fundamental in her being heard. The speaker is no longer alone but is with another in this 
knowledge. The speaker’s sense of self, then, is formed through such genuine interpersonal 
communication insofar as she now understands herself to have been truly heard by another, 
and this experience contributes to the organizational process of constructing the self. What 
was known only to her is now shared by another person.  
Second, this sort of hearing creates an experience of interpersonal intimacy. 
Interpersonal dialogue about wilderness experiences of pain, heart-ache, loss, and suffering 
are of a particularly intimate nature because these experiences are so formative for one’s 
self-understanding. They are so formative, inter alia, because already and before the 
experience is ever brought to speech, the hearing of an other is already having a constructive 
role on the self-understanding of the speaker. The possibility of being heard exerts a kind of 
pressure on the speaker, wherein she must give careful thought to how to encode an 
experience with words. Just because that encoding process occurs internally, within the 
speaker, does not mean that it occurs in a vacuum or autonomously. It is always aimed at an 
imagined hearer and is, thus, irreducibly intersubjective. Rowan Williams finds the poet’s 
notebooks to be illustrative. There, one is able to observe the struggle of a thinker to bring 
something into intelligible speech before the ears of an other. Williams claims, “There is 
always a struggle to make what we say both recognizable and defensible: speech that aims 
at truthfulness is speech that invites responsive testing, to establish if it is really 
recognizable.”41 The encoding of that experience into words, with an aim toward a listener, 
becomes one means of self-understanding for the speaker. It becomes one way of narrating 
an intimate and significant experience. Constructing that narrative, to the extent that it is 
                                                          
41 Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), p. 42. 
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identity-forming, is risky. Williams claims that doing so “is to acknowledge that the self 
now speaking is a ‘project’: I set out in my words and acts an identity formed out of my 
history […] and implicitly ask if I am intelligible, recognizable.”42 How will the hearer 
respond? Superficially? Dismissively? With ill-fitting advice? Or with deep hearing that 
communicates that the speaker is known, understood, and accepted broadly in the fullness of 
her experience, as encoded? If that encoding is accepted by a hearer, the speaker will have 
had the experience of disclosing some personally significant and formative matter of her life 
with another, and will have felt felt. The experience of an other’s hearing such intimate and 
personal matters that are central to one’s self-understanding is itself affirming and 
formative. The risk of disclosing personal pain that is constitutive of one’s self-
understanding is that its deep or shallow hearing by another is accompanied by a 
proportionally deep or shallow understanding of the self. To be rejected, dismissed, or 
misunderstood in matters so constitutive of the self, is to be rejected, dismissed, or 
misunderstood in one’s identity. Conversely, to be deeply heard, accepted, and understood is 
to have one’s identity and sense of self embraced by another. And to be heard, accepted, and 
understood in one’s identity is a profoundly intimate experience. To be heard in this way 
may then also contribute to the speaker’s organization of self, such that she has not only 
experienced, for example, profound pain and loss, but has been known and understood in 
that loss. 
Closely related, third, is the way being deeply heard by another is an implicit 
affirmation of the speaker’s self-understanding that bestows a particularly human dignity on 
the speaker. When the speaker discloses something identity-constituting, and that disclosure 
is heard in a way that the speaker feels felt, that experience affirms the reality of the 
speaker’s experience. If, following McFadyen, being a human person is wrapped up with 
intersubjective, dialogical call and response, as argued above, then being deeply heard may 
be understood to be profoundly humanizing. A speaker is given a special and deserved 
dignity when she is heard and affirmed in this way. That dignity is due to human beings as 
human beings. Importantly, this kind of hearing and dignifying listening need not entail a 
wholesale endorsement of the speaker’s understanding of her experience; nor need it 
confirm its self-constituting role in the experience of the speaker. It might still be subjected 
to questions and corrections. Yet, at minimum, it affirms the reality of the experience, qua 
experience.43 If the hearer fails to fully endorse and affirm the encoded understanding of the 
                                                          
42 Ibid., p. 82. 
43 Edmund Husserl has similarly argued that empathy makes objective the subjective experience of 
another. “The things posited by others are also mine: in empathy I participate in the other’s positing. 
E.g., I identify the thing I have over and against me in the mode of appearance α with the thing 
posited by the other in the mode of appearance β. To this belongs the possibility of substitution by 
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speaker, the latter may fail to experience the full range of benefits of being heard with 
absolute agreement and affirmation. But my point here is more modest: to be deeply heard 
has a dignifying and humanizing effect on the speaker. When a speaker feels felt by a 
hearer, that experience is a dignifying one insofar as the speaker understands herself to have 
been worth hearing. Such hearing may, in fact, not just be a necessary dignity due the 
speaker, but may be a necessary prerequisite for credibly questioning or correcting the 
speaker’s narrative. Regardless, to be heard in this way, in one’s wilderness experiences, is 
to be humanized and dignified as a real subject whose experiences are formative and 
meaningful. Put another way, one’s project of self-organization is thereby affirmed and 
dignified when another deeply hears the disclosure of experiences that are understood to be 
self-constituting.  
It is to be remembered that our primary aim in this chapter is to ask what effect 
God’s hearing may have. Thus, it should be noted that, while these effects of feeling felt by 
another might colloquially trade under the label of empathy, we need not eliminate them 
from the possible effects of God’s hearing on account of that label. For God’s hearing may 
produce just these effects without the need to introduce pathos into God’s hearing. The 
experiences of liberation from loneliness, intimacy, and dignifying affirmation of experience 
resound throughout the Psalms. “I love the LORD, because he has heard my voice and my 
supplications,” begins Psalm 116, before going on to describe the liberating and delivering 
experience of God’s hearing, which is surely a deliverance from the threat of death, but is no 
less psychological and affective in its effect. “For you have delivered my soul from death, 
my eyes from tears, my feet from stumbling,” declares verse eight. There is, thus, an 
affective effect of God’s hearing, which need not entail any sort of affect in God. God need 
not “take on” or “feel with” or empathize with the experience of creatures for God’s hearing 
to produce the same effects. Empathy is, thus, not a divine but a creaturely phenomenon; but 
its effects may be brought about by divine hearing and experienced by those who cry out to 
God just the same. Edith Stein made a similar point in her classic work On the Problem of 
Empathy: “As the possessor of complete knowledge, God is not mistaken about people’s 
experiences, as people are mistaken about each other’s experiences. But people’s 
                                                          
means of trading places. Each person has, at the same place in space, ‘the same’ appearances of the 
same things—if, as we might suppose, all have the same sensibility. And on this account, even the 
‘view’ of a thing is Objectified.” Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy, vol. II (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 177.  
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experiences do not become God’s own, either; nor do they have the same kind of givenness 
for Him.”44 
So, a reflection on empathy’s effects informs human formation which may result 
from God’s hearing. Closely related to empathy, however, is the notion of joint attention 
already introduced in Chapter 1.45 Triadic joint attention, again, resists precise definition as 
a phenomenon, but is generally achieved when two subjects direct their attention toward 
some third object and “each subject is aware, in some sense, of the object as object that is 
present to both subjects. There is, in this respect, a ‘meeting of minds’ between both 
subjects, such that the fact that both are attending to the same object is open or mutually 
manifest.”46 As a constituent of our working definition of God’s hearing, it should be asked 
how this meeting of the minds might shape human becoming.  
Stuart Jesson has argued that the experience of receiving compassion from another 
is very often in the form of shared, or joint, attention.47 Through a series of fictitious 
examples, Jesson reflects on the interpersonal and subjective effects of failed and successful 
bids for shared attention. When shared attention does not obtain, compassion is absent. In 
these cases, even when the hearer has paid attention to the speaker and the content of 
communication, she may not have adequately been with the speaker in attending to the 
situation. Conversely, a similar failure of shared attention may obtain if the speaker is 
unwilling to adequately share attention with the hearer. In such cases, fear, frustration, 
disappointment, or any number of undesirable emotions might result from the sharing of 
attention with another, thereby motivating avoidance. Jesson notes that to share attention 
might, uncomfortably, “make it more real”48 for the speaker. When either speaker or hearer 
fail to share attention, there is an absence of with-ness in the experience that falls short of 
compassion. Yet, when shared attention obtains between speaker and hearer, especially in 
                                                          
44 Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 
11. 
45 Empathy and joint attention’s close relationship is evident in the history of autism studies, which 
has proposed that autism alters the experience of empathy (see esp. research by Simon Baron-Cohen) 
as well as joint attention; see Naomi Elian, Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues 
in Philosophy and Psychology, ed. by Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and 
Johannes Roessler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).  
46 Naomi Eilan, “Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind,” in Joint Attention: Communication and 
Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 5. Italics 
original. 
47 Stuart Jesson, “Compassion, Consolation, and the Sharing of Attention” in Simon Weil and 
Continental Philosophy, ed. by A. Rebecca Rozelle-Stone (London: Rowman & Littlefield 
International, 2017), pp. 121-141. 
48 Ibid., p. 131. 
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situations of pain and suffering, Jesson argues that something arises between speaker and 
hearer that is different than a giving and receiving. That shared experience, Jesson notes, is 
wrapped up with the character, attitude, capacity, or preparedness of the hearer to consider 
the speaker’s situation.49 Here again, in McFadyen’s language, the ear is always attached to 
the whole person. Not just anyone is adequate to share attention with the speaker about any 
situation. It must be a particular kind of person standing in a particular kind of relationship 
to the speaker. What is significant is what happens when that particular kind of person 
attends with the speaker in a particular kind of way. Jesson notes that when this occurs, the 
situation under shared attention undergoes a transformation. Its significance is changed. He 
explains, “There is something paradoxical here, I think: my friend’s attention to and with me 
changes my experience only because she does not try to change it, but enters into it as it 
is.”50 This meeting of minds need not result in greater optimism or less pessimism about the 
painful situation. Yet the experience of it has allowed the speaker to react differently to it. In 
Jesson’s example he describes “feeling lighter and calmer, although still frustrated.”51 The 
speaker has experienced compassion as a product of a hearer’s sharing attention. While 
subtler, these effects of shared attention—feeling lighter, calmer, being enabled to react 
differently to a situation—demonstrate the kind of change in experience that is 
accomplished when one is heard by another in a way that shares attention. It may even 
produce the same, or similar, kinds of effects as noted above with respect to empathy. Yet 
the notion of sharing attention, as constituent of our definition of God’s hearing, 
demonstrates the way the effects of compassion may be produced when one is heard by 
God. Indeed, these effects need not require the passio of compassion. God might produce 
similar effects, by whatever divine means, without need of passions; but joint attention 
offers a means of conceptualizing how God’s hearing might produce such effects. The 
experience of divine attention being jointly directed toward the object of a sufferer’s pain, 
and known to be directed as such, could reasonably be thought to produce the effects 
consistent with compassion. If these effects are produced by God’s hearing, the sufferer who 
is heard by God will then have available to her a new way of constructing her theory of self. 
Such a formative and advantageous effect may become sedimented into her self-narrative in 
a way that transforms her perspective of herself and herself in relation to her suffering.  
Jesson’s examples of failed bids for joint attention raise other interesting questions 
about joint attention’s formative effects. It may be that an attentive and well-intended hearer 
                                                          
49 Ibid., p. 132. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
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issues a bid for sharing attention with the speaker, and that bid is refused by the speaker. In 
such a case joint attention fails to obtain. But why? There are myriad possibilities for a 
speaker’s rejection of such a bid: embarrassment, feeling exposed, the discomfort of having 
to face the situation, timing of the conversation, interpersonal distance, pre-existing conflict, 
prior exploitation of a similar experience, distrust, etc. Some motivations for rejecting the 
bid might be external, wrapped up with the hearer or the speaker’s relationship therewith. 
Yet some reasons might be internal to the speaker and thus restrain willingness. Because 
attention is frequently (though not always) a volitional activity among adult persons,52 it 
might be asked what kind of effects joint attention has on the will of the speaker, and 
whether those experiences of sharing attention form the speaker into the kind of person 
more or less inclined to share attention in the future. Keeping in mind that the focus of our 
interest in joint attention is with respect to pain, grief, suffering, or other existentially 
significant circumstances, it follows that rewarding or regrettable experiences of shared 
attention are likely to form a speaker in proportionally significant ways. In other words, the 
advantageously formative experience of having shared attention with a hearer about one’s 
suffering forms a speaker’s volition insofar as she is more likely to share attention in the 
future. The person who is deeply heard is formed into one who is willing to share attention. 
Conversely, the person who goes unheard (more on this below) may become one who is 
unwilling to respond to bids for shared attention in the future. In either case, formative 
effects on the volition of the speaker result, and these results have a bearing on a speaker’s 
willingness to share attention with God.  
It is to be remembered from Chapter 1 that Stump’s doctrine of omnipresence 
requires God’s willingness to share attention with creatures. Stump claims, “In order for 
God to be omnipresent, that is, in order for God to be always and everywhere present, it also 
needs to be the case that God is always and everywhere in a position to share attention with 
any creature able and willing to share attention with God.”53 Thus, given this notion of 
omnipresence, a speaker’s willingness to share attention with God is, in some sense, 
determinative of whether or not she shares attention with God regarding some painful 
circumstance. This does not introduce a contingency into God’s hearing. In fact, I take this 
notion of omnipresence to be a strong assertion of divine actuality: God is always, already, 
everywhere attending to all real circumstances in a maximal way (characterized by God’s 
                                                          
52 There remains disagreement about the extent to which joint attention is a volitional mechanism in 
infants. See Johannes Roessler, “Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds” in Joint Attention: 
Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology ed. by Naomi Eilan, et. al. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 239ff. 




immediate, infinite proximity to creation, as it is) and in a way that, thus, always exceeds the 
attention of the speaker. Yet whether or not a human speaker joins her attention to God’s is 
a matter of creaturely volition. This does not introduce potentiality into God’s hearing, for it 
is always, everywhere, already a reality. Rather, it emphasizes the potentiality of the 
speaker’s willingness to engage in the project of sharing attention with God.54  
 Phenomenology and psychology have made much of the related phenomena of 
empathy and joint attention because they are significantly formative in the lives of suffering 
people. Being deeply heard, as Rogers has described it, changes a person. It liberates from 
loneliness, produces interpersonal intimacy, validates, and dignifies the reality of one’s 
cognitive and affective experience. In deep hearing there is a meeting of minds that allows 
the sufferer to respond differently to her circumstances, and if positively experienced, may 
even incline her willingness to be deeply heard by others. The effects of being deeply heard, 
or of feeling felt, might be more extensively described or differently categorized. Yet these 
particular effects will be shown below to have unique relevance for theological 
anthropology. Here I am only claiming that God’s hearing—a loving and just attention that 
is accomplished by means of the significant personal presence of the Triune God, which 
entails a sure response—may produce analogous effects in the lives of those who suffer and 
cry out to be heard. This claim is authorized by Scripture’s language as it speaks to God’s 
hearing and the experiences of those Biblical persons heard by God. How else might the 
formative effects of being heard be described? 
 
4.2.2 Deep Hearing: Attunement and Interpersonal Neurobiology 
Descriptions of human formation may operate at a variety of non-competitive and 
complementary levels. Attempts to describe the human mind have come from philosophy, 
phenomenology, psychology, linguistics, neurology, biology, and anthropology among 
others. Academic specialization has generated silos that have inhibited interdisciplinary 
analysis. But one ambitious attempt to produce a more integrative approach to studying 
human development comes from the emerging field of interpersonal neurobiology (IPNB). 
Dan Siegel, the founding editor of the Norton Series on Interpersonal Neurobiology, which 
numbers nearly seventy volumes, has pioneered a multidisciplinary approach to 
understanding the neurobiological implications of interpersonal engagement. Fundamental 
                                                          
54 And yet this notion of divine actuality does not abrogate what was argued in Chapter 1: that God 
will refuse to hear those who live in rejection of God’s covenant. There is, admittedly, a tension here, 
but it is one that runs parallel to the tension in God’s love for and rejection of sinners—a tension that 
can only be resolved by God. I take up the resolution of this tension in Chapter 5. 
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to the field is the idea that human neurobiology is interpersonal and that the human mind 
and brain are formed interpersonally. Interpersonal interactions—be they physical, like a 
friendly embrace, or linguistic, like a meaningful conversation—physically alter the brains 
of those interacting. 
 Research in IPNB has produced insights into the effects of “attunement”. 
Attunement denotes the focused, resonant attention of one person on the internal world of 
another.55 The occurrence of attunement between two persons has the ability to “harness 
neural circuitry that enables two people to ‘feel felt’ by each other.”56 What does this look 
like? Taking up the relationship between parent and child for an example, Siegel suggests 
that a parent’s attuning to a child’s internal world in a way that is known by the child means 
that “the child feels good, connected, and loved. The child’s internal world is seen with 
clarity by the parent, and the parent comes to resonate with the child’s state.”57 He goes on 
to argue that attunement promotes nine brain functions: regulation of body systems, 
balancing emotions, attuning to others, modulating fear, responding flexibly, exhibiting 
insight, empathy, intuition, and morality.  These are produced because the experience of 
attunement triggers a firing of neurons in the prefrontal cortex of the brain, which holds 
primary responsibility for those functions. As those prefrontal neurons more frequently fire 
concurrently, there develops a circuitry, a wiring together of neurons, that over time 
produces a growth and density within the prefrontal cortex.58 This increased neural density 
corresponds to the enhancement of those nine functions. Like a muscle that is frequently 
used, the prefrontal cortex becomes enhanced. Thus, interpersonal engagements are always 
more, but never less than biological. 
If we are to understand attunement as constitutive of Rogers’ deep hearing, we now 
have a way of understanding the formative effects of being heard in neurobiological terms. 
It should be remembered that deeply hearing another—just like God’s hearing—is not 
confined to auditory receptivity. Ears are not required. It entails a more comprehensive 
understanding of the internal thoughts and feelings of the “speaker”, who need not 
necessarily use words to communicate. This broader, more holistic sense of interpersonal 
communication can be described neurobiologically as attunement. The “hearer” has 
sufficiently attended to the internal world of the “speaker” such that the speaker both feels 
                                                          
55 Daniel Siegel, The Mindful Brain (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), p. xiii. 
56 Ibid., p. xiv. 
57 Ibid., p. 27. 
58 Ibid., p. 25. Siegel’s research was prompted by observed overlap between the outcomes of research 
into secure parent-child attachment and that of mindful awareness. Ibid., p. 26. 
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felt and experiences a substantial neural firing in the prefrontal cortex.59 In this way, IPNB 
offers another way of supporting the claim made in Chapter 1, following Iris Murdoch and 
Simone Weil, that attention is a form of love;60 attention that produces attunement no less 
so. This kind of loving attention changes the brain of the one who is heard. Being deeply 
heard by another produces a change in the brain that produces a corresponding change in the 
lived experience of the speaker. Put concisely, being heard by another changes the speaker’s 
physical body, neurologically. The experience of being heard is inscribed on the brain of the 
speaker in a way that is empirically observable and measurable.61 If McFadyen is right when 
he claims that bodies are places or locations of communication, then it is important to note 
that the location is one that undergoes a change. Being heard means ongoing development 
and reinforces, in a very empirical and bodily way, the idea that communication is 
fundamental to human development. Indeed, one is not only “knit together” in the womb of 
one’s mother (Ps 139:13), but that knitting continues, ex utero, as one is spoken to and heard 
by others, changing and, in the case of attunement, constructively enhancing persons 
physiologically, neurobiologically, and interpersonally. 
 One significant example of a change in lived experience that results from a 
neurological change is as follows. Steven Porges has argued that the vagal system of the 
brain evaluates interpersonal engagements to determine relative safety or threat. 62 If threat 
is detected, the nervous system activates one of two possible responses: either the flight-
fight response or the freeze response. The former response is activated with a sympathetic 
accelerator; the latter with a parasympathetic paralyzation or collapse. When safety is 
detected, there is an increased neurological receptivity, labeled “neuroception”. There 
results a “softening of facial muscles, relaxation in vocal tone, and opening of the perceptual 
system to receive input from outside itself.”63 Porges has labeled this neurobiological 
mechanism the “social engagement system,” claiming that it “provides a system for 
voluntary engagement with the environment with special features associated with the 
prosocial behaviors of communication.”64 That social engagement system is activated 
                                                          
59 The direction of causality in the experience of feeling felt and of this neural firing may be an 
important question, but that answer is not relevant to my argument. 
60 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge Classics, 2001), p. 74. 
61 These findings have been confirmed and now popularized in trauma research. See Bessel van der 
Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (New York: 
Penguin, 2014). 
62 Steven Porges, “Love: An Emergent Property of the Mammalian Autonomic Nervous System” in 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 23(8), pp. 837-861. Cited in Siegel, op. cit. pp. 129-30. 
63 Siegel, The Mindful Brain, p. 130. 
64 Porges, “Love: An Emergent Property of the Mammalian Autonomic Nervous System” p. 850. 
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interpersonally. Siegel has argued that attunement produces this same neuroception of 
safety. Borrowing a phrase from Porges, Siegel describes the state more generally as “love 
without fear.”65 Thus, the experience of attunement not only activates the prefrontal cortex, 
but activates a general experience of safety and trust that makes one’s neurological system 
more receptive, opening one to receiving external input.  
There is, thus, warrant for Siegel’s claim that “Attunement is at the heart of caring 
relationships.”66 When one is deeply heard and attunement is experienced, the speaker is 
formed in a particular kind of way. The prefrontal cortex is physically changed and its 
functioning is enhanced, thereby contributing to executive functioning and all variety of 
self-regulation and self-control. More than that, the speaker’s own capacities for empathy 
and attuning to others—both prefrontal functions—are increased. This means that those who 
are deeply heard are neurologically improved for the task of deeply hearing others. Feeling 
felt forms one into the kind of person who can make others feel felt. Those who have the 
neurobiological experience of love without fear are thereby able to engage in social 
behavior that produces love without fear. The experience of safety that produces 
neuroceptivity becomes a social skill, better exercised for others by those who have 
previously experienced it.  
More than the ability to care for others, Siegel’s argument is that attunement is 
critical for not only interpersonal but intrapersonal care. Because attunement produces 
enhanced prefrontal functioning, the experience of attunement from another makes the 
speaker better able to attune to herself. Put differently, when I sense that another is attuned 
to my internal states, I am then better able to attune to my own internal states and achieve a 
greater level of neural integration. This is a critical ability for developing an integrated and 
coherent theory of the self. One’s understanding of internal states and emotions is a 
necessary task for developing a coherent self-narrative. Without introspective skills, one’s 
internal world may remain at variance with a self-narrative that is dominated by external 
factors. This lack of internal attunement produces incoherent or non-integrated theories of 
the self. Siegel labels this a state of “impaired neural integration.”67 Thus, intrapersonal 
attunement—a skill that is enhanced when interpersonal attunement is experienced—has the 
                                                          
65 Siegel, The Mindful Brain, p. 130. Porges, however, uses this phrase with specific reference to the 
state of immobilization generally required for mammalian mating. Porges suggests that 
immobilization accompanied by trust and safety is optimized in human mating. See Porges, “Love”, 
pp. 847-48. Regardless, “love without fear” is accurately descriptive of the safety and trust that 
produces neuroceptivity. 
66 Ibid., p. 16. 
67 Ibid., p. 204. 
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ability to produce a more coherent, integrative theory of self and make one better able to 
attune to others.68 
  
4.2.3 Hearing as Gift 
In the previous chapter it was concluded that God’s hearing was a particular kind of act. The 
character of that act was determined by God’s ontological alterity from creation that 
grounds God’s infinite proximity to creation. The act of God’s hearing was thus seen to be 
an utterly gratuitous and uncompelled gift. Categorizing God’s hearing as a gift is necessary 
if God and God’s nature are to remain the principle of theological inquiry. Yet to call God’s 
hearing a gift is to claim more than gratuity. Gifts are, by their nature, formative in 
particular kinds of ways, and therefore warrant a brief consideration of what it might mean 
for hearing to be a gift. 
The kind of deep hearing described above is a kind of gift from one to another. This 
is not to label it merely a kind sentiment or as a particularly warm thing to offer another. It 
is a gift in an anthropological sense that goes beyond sentiment. For a gift to be a gift, it 
must be the sort of thing that is given gratuitously, received as a gift, and must be for the 
real betterment of its recipient.69 Following Dalferth,70 first, the gift must be given 
gratuitously, not under compulsion or under expectation or as deserved. While the 
distinction between gifts and commercial exchange can be too sharply drawn,71 the gift 
cannot be a gift if not given freely. Second, the gift must be received qua gift; i.e., it must be 
understood to have been given gratuitously and must be understood to be given to the 
recipient, in order for it to be received. This accounts for a distinction between accepting or 
                                                          
68 See Daniel Siegel and Mary Hartzell, Parenting from the Inside Out: How a Deeper Self-
Understanding Can Help you Raise Children Who Thrive (New York: Penguin Putnam, 2003), 
passim. 
69 It is not here necessary to rehearse the history of the anthropological understanding of gifts. See 
Marcel Mauss, “Essai sur le Don: Forme et Raison de l’Échange dans les sociétés Archaïques,” in 
Sociologie et Anthropologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 145-279; Jacques 
Derrida, Donner le temps: 1. La fausse monnaie (Paris: Galilée, 1991); Jean-Luc Marion, Étant 
donné: Essai d’une phénoménologie de la donation, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1997); See also, Ingolf U. Dalferth, Becoming Present: An Inquiry into the Christian Sense of the 
Presence of God (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), pp. 169-209; More recently, John Milbank, Being 
Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003); John Barclay, Paul and the Gift 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015). My argument here is a 
general summary of Dalferth’s understanding of gift, who is following R. Horner, Rethinking God as 
Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2001). 
70 Dalferth, Becoming Present, pp. 195ff. 
71 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, pp. 51-63. 
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taking possession thereof (e.g., finding or even stealing another’s property), and the 
conscious act of receiving as one’s own. Finally, the gift must be for the good of the 
recipient. The gratuitous giving of something harmful, even if intended as a gift, would not 
be received as a gift. Indeed, what might be gratuitously given to one person and received as 
a beneficial gift, might prove detrimental to another person. There is, thus, a particularity to 
gift-giving and gift-receiving. Dalferth summarizes:  
The decisive aspect of a gift is not the object given, nor the intentions of the donor 
or of the recipient but the mode and situation in which it is received. Gifts are 
nothing apart from the practice in which they function, and they function as gifts 
only by being made present in such a way that they become received as wholesome 
and beneficial presents made for a particular person in a particular situation. It is 
not my decision nor intention as the recipient that makes something presented to 
me a present for me but, before I can relate to it in any way, it has to be presented 
to me in a particular way, namely as a present for me that makes me the recipient of 
the gift. In short, it is not the recipient who makes the gift but the gift that makes 
the recipient by making him or her receive it in a particular way—the way of the 
gift.72 
This “basic passivity” whereby one becomes the recipient of the gift carries with it 
two important implications. First, it means that the recipient is acted upon in a way that 
produces a change. When the criteria for gift-giving are met, the recipient becomes a donee, 
one who has received something from another and is thereby made different, and that in a 
way which could not have been achieved apart from the particularity of the gift-giving and 
gift-receiving. The recipient is made different in both her being and doing. She is now 
different in her being insofar as her identity has undergone a change: she has become 
“gifted”, a recipient of something outsider herself. Her doing has changed insofar as she is 
now, as the recipient of something new, enabled to do what she could not before without the 
gift. “It plays possibilities into my way that enlarge what I can do and how I can live and 
does not reduce or curb it.”73 In this way, the reception of a gift is anthropologically 
formative. 
 Second, this basic passivity that is fundamental to gift-receiving is, according to 
Dalferth, particularly unique. He claims, “Receiving something is my activity, receiving a 
gift is not. Whatever I do I cannot make my receiving become a receiving of a gift. If I 
                                                          
72 Dalferth, Becoming Present, p. 197. Italics original. 
73 Ibid., p. 200. 
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receive a gift, it is the gift that turns me into a recipient, not my receiving.”74 In this way, the 
giving of the gift is what makes the recipient a recipient of a gift; not the activity of the 
recipient. In other words, for one to receive a gift, qua gift—and thus meet the criteria 
outlined for gift-giving—the gift must be given qua gift. Insofar as it is given in that way, it 
turns the recipient into the recipient of a gift. While potentially confusing or 
counterintuitive, Dalferth points out that this is a common experience. “Falling in love, 
receiving honorary doctorates, being knighted or becoming a Christian, for example, have 
all in common that they change me, that is, my personal or religious identity […] They are 
not the result of my own doings but qualify and change me with all my doings.”75 The 
receiving of the gift is, then, something done to and not by the recipient. 
 In addition to Dalferth’s account, it should be added that, because gift-giving and 
gift-receiving are social practices that are unavoidably interpersonal, the recipient is 
changed in another important respect: in relation to the donor. Just as the ear is attached to 
the whole body of the listener, so gifts are not just given by anyone. The recipient receives a 
gift from a particular giver and the identity of the giver is not insignificant. Barclay 
summarizes a conclusion from Mauss’ famous essay by claiming, “[T]he gifts not only 
belong to people, they are invested with the personality of the donor.”76 The recipient is thus 
bound in a new way to the donor, insofar as she has become the recipient of a gift from that 
donor and not another. Whatever she was before, she is now in a new relationship with the 
donor. The extent to which this new relationship is formative, however, may be contingent, 
inter alia, upon the nature of the gift given. The extent to which the donor and gift 
contribute to one’s theory of self may vary. While it is true that the perfunctory “gratuity” 
given to a server at an American restaurant may fit all of the criteria of gift-giving, and it 
may indeed change the server’s life for the better—who now enjoys increased capital and 
buying-power—it is unlikely that the particular donor, the gift, or its reception greatly 
inform the server’s theory of self. Here the server’s doing and being are changed, but 
perhaps not strongly. In contrast, one can imagine more magnanimous gifts that might 
forever change one’s self-understanding and capabilities.  
 If hearing is understood to be a gift, then it must meet the criteria: first, being given 
gratuitously and not out of obligation. Second, it must be given as gift, something that is for 
the advantage of the recipient, in this case, the speaker. Third, it must be received as gift and 
                                                          
74 Ibid., p. 198. Italics original. 
75 Ibid., p. 199. 
76 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, p. 15. This understanding, Barclay explains, runs counter to the modern 
Western distinction between persons and property.  
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be to the real advantage of the speaker who is the recipient of the gift. Given these three 
criteria, it seems that not all hearing is a gift. Hearing is not always offered gratuitously. 
Clinical counseling situations involve one person listening to another for an agreed upon 
sum of compensation. Further, some hearing is not for the good of the speaker, for example, 
if it involves the intent to exploit. Given these criteria, in what sense can God’s hearing be 
considered a gift and what advantage is to be found in understanding it as such? 
My proposal is that God’s hearing is, in contrast to creaturely hearing, always a gift; 
and that because it always meets Dalferth’s three criteria. First, God’s hearing can only be 
given gratuitously and not under compulsion. Second, it can only be the product of God’s 
superabundant goodness and love which imbues the gift with an advantageous character, the 
character of the giver. Third, given as a gift, it turns the recipient into a recipient of a gift. It 
turns the speaker into one who has been gifted with the hearing of God.77 In this sense, it is 
most properly received as a gift; for the speaker has no claim or right to be heard by God 
and, assuming a knowledge of God’s love and goodness, knows it to be to the speaker’s 
advantage. The result is that the gift of God’s hearing forms the speaker’s doing, being, and 
relationship to the Hearer. The speaker is now one who has been heard by God, enabling a 
new way of relating to her world and circumstances. Her ability to engage with and respond 
to pain, sorrow, heart-ache and the like is now conditioned by having been gifted with this 
hearing. The speaker’s being is changed insofar as she now understands herself to have been 
heard. As one heard by God, her identity cannot remain the same. Whatever she was before, 
she is now that and heard by God. The project of identity-formation, of constructing a 
theory of the self, cannot overlook the gift of God’s hearing and be true to itself. Being 
heard by God is fundamentally identity-changing insofar as it is wrapped up with the 
soteriological realities of God’s hearing. If God’s hearing entails a sure response, as was 
argued in Chapter 1, it is necessarily efficacious. The being of the speaker cannot but be 
changed. The speaker’s relationship to God is thus changed. She is one who has been heard, 
                                                          
77 It might be wondered whether God’s hearing can be rejected and thus, fail to achieve the status of a 
gift. On Dalferth’s account the “basic passivity” of the recipient would suggest not. This seems right, 
insofar as God’s hearing remains unavoidably advantageous on account of God’s nature, and it does 
something advantageous to the speaker, regardless of the desires of the speaker. While God’s hearing 
may produce different or more preferable advantages for speakers when they embrace God’s hearing 
as a gift, God’s hearing does not fail to be advantageous if it remains undesired. In either case it turns 
the speaker into the recipient of a gift. While this may produce situations in which a speaker becomes 
the recipient of an undesired gift, Scripture testifies to just this reality when God hears, say, the 
grumblings of Israel in the wilderness (Nu. 11:1, 18; 12:2; 14:27, 28). The result of this hearing is 
undesired: God’s judgement. Yet it seems that even God’s judgement, insofar as it is perfectly good 
and just, must be understood as an advantageous good for the grumbling speakers. Scripture does, 
after all, speak of divine judgement, rebuke, and discipline as for the good of the recipients thereof. 
Thus, I would tentatively propose that, following Dalferth’s gift criteria, God’s hearing is always a 
gift even if it is not understood to be such from the perspective of a speaker, and I would further 
propose that this may be a feature unique to God’s hearing. 
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not just by anyone, but by God. In all the particularity of her creaturely circumstances, God 
has gifted her with the hearing of those circumstances such that her relationship with God 
has now undergone a change.  
 The ontological distinction between God and creation was, in the last chapter, the 
impulse for understanding God’s hearing as a gift. Yet a greater explication of the nature of 
gift shows it to be not only a gift, necessarily, for ontological and theological reasons, but 
also for anthropological ones. God’s hearing is a gift that forms creaturely speakers in ways 
that are particular to their wilderness experiences in ways that could not otherwise be 
formed. Being heard by God is thus a gift that affects human becoming in ways that are 
characterized by the goodness and love of the gift-giver and are for the good of the 
creaturely recipient of that gift of hearing. The Psalmist can thus declare with praise: “Come 
and hear, all you who fear God, and I will tell you what he has done for me. I cried aloud to 
him, and he was extolled with my tongue. If I had cherished iniquity in my heart, the Lord 
would not have listened. But truly God has listened; he has given heed to the words of my 
prayer. Blessed be God, because he has not rejected my prayer or removed his steadfast love 
from me” (Ps. 66:16-20). 
 
4.2.4 Transposition of Anthropological Lenses: Deep Hearing as Divine Presence 
Having made a examination of hearing through the lenses of empathy, joint attention, 
attunement, and gift, it must be asked how these varied anthropological tools are to be best 
brought together into a single theological focus. Even if each represents a different 
conceptual lens through which to understand the experience of Rogers’ “deep hearing”—the 
experience of having been heard in a way that produces formative effects—the experience 
of being heard is a unified one. In order to understand not only the intersubjective 
experience of being heard, but of being heard by God, these anthropological concepts must 
be put in their proper domain relative to theology. Again, God’s hearing is not simply 
human hearing, writ large. It is conditioned by the nature of the hearer. It thus calls for not 
only a unified description, but one in an appropriately theological idiom, consistent with 
God’s self-revelation in Scripture.  
Above, it was already proposed that listening is a kind of significant personal 
presence that actively communicates the personal identity of the listener as that listener 
attends to the address of the speaker. Significant personal presence is another way of 
characterizing the mode of listening that is formative. It brings together both the listening 
activity and the character of the listener into a single concept that respects the particularity 
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of that unique dialogical moment. It is a particular person who is performing an action—
namely, listening—that can only be performed by that particular person. Significant 
personal presence consolidates into one concept both the one who is acting and the action 
itself. More than that, it more broadly conceptualizes the anthropological lenses discussed 
above. It is not surprising that empathy, joint attention, attunement, and gift-giving have 
each resisted precise definition, having been mired in investigations of consciousness and 
subjectivity. Yet it is agreed that none are isolated to one particular modality, whether 
visual, auditory, or even tactile. One may experience being deeply heard through the look on 
another’s face, through an unsuspecting embrace, or by comforting words. Thus, feeling 
deeply heard must operate at another, “higher” register. A particular kind of presence, it 
seems to me, better characterizes the kind of activity by which a speaker experiences deep 
hearing. It occurs when another is present in a way that the speaker experiences the effects 
of attunement, shared attention, or empathy from that particular hearer. The presence is so 
significant that it can only be characterized as a gift from hearer to speaker, being 
gratuitously given and being to the advantage of the speaker.  
There are several benefits to employing presence as the preferred way of speaking 
about this formative activity. First, if the experience of being deeply heard or feeling felt, is 
best characterized by the significant personal presence of the hearer to the speaker, then we 
have a broader, more capacious category for understanding the activity of the hearer. 
Presence of this kind can be said to produce the same effects as empathy, joint attention, 
attunement, and gift-giving, yet need not become mired by attempts at definitional 
precision. Second, it allows positive and more concrete statements to be made about the 
activity of the hearer—something which has been avoided until now. Above I proposed to 
make the locus of this chapter’s inquiry the formative experience of the one who is heard. 
This was done to side-step the question of the subjective process and experience of the 
hearer, which is surely no less resistant to description than the experience of the speaker. 
But presence, operating in a different register as it does, may more concretely characterize 
the work of the hearer. The speaker feels felt when the hearer is personally and significantly 
present to her such that these formative effects, inter alia, are produced. Third, 
understanding hearing as God’s significant personal presence provides a way to incorporate 
one important conclusion from the prior chapter: that God is infinitely more present to me 
than I am to myself. When human suffering and pain are brought into view, this conclusion 
becomes all the more relevant insofar as God’s hearing me in my suffering means that God 
is more present to the particularity of my pain than even I am, yet without being subject to 
it. It is that significant personal presence that allows Psalm 139 to declare, “If I ascend to 
heaven, you are there; if I make my bed in Sheol, you are there.” God’s hearing, understood 
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as a kind of significant personal presence, brings human suffering before God in a way that 
is infinitely more proximate, and yet does not make God its patient. God becomes present to 
my suffering, in all its uniqueness and particularity, in a way that no human hearer ever 
could. And yet God need not “feel my pain”. Finally, presence is a rich theological category 
that shakes off much of (though not all of) the anthropomorphic baggage associated with 
categories like empathy, compassion, etc. Rather than struggling to articulate what it might 
mean for God to be empathetic or compassionate yet properly apathetic, it is preferable to 
speak of God’s significant personal presence to creation which, when experienced, produces 
effects that transform creaturely existence. Of course, even “presence” is accommodated 
language; but it sits more comfortably alongside notions of divine perfection than language 
that invites a greater degree of anthropomorphic projection. Scripture has authorized God-
talk that speaks of God’s listening, hearing, inclining God’s ear, etc. Yet it is able to do so 
only in light of an understanding of God’s power and presence that, when encountered by 
creatures, must produce beneficent transformation. 
The above effects produced by the significant personal presence of a hearer to a 
speaker do not exhaust the anthropological import for hearing. It remains to be asked: What 
are the formative effects of not being heard, or worse, silenced? 
 
4.3 Malformed by Silence 
Being deeply heard by another is positively formative for speakers. This is especially the 
case when the contents of that hearing are of significance to the speaker’s theory of self. The 
personal narrative that is the foundation of one’s theory of self is shaped and informed by 
the hearing of another. Yet what happens to that personal narrative when there is no one to 
hear? Whether the result of personal isolation, the absence of interest or care on the part of 
others, fear of transparency, or imposed secrecy, speakers sometimes go unheard. In 
extremis, there is what Dorothee Soelle has called “mute suffering”—the kind of suffering 
in which the pain is so dominant that the sufferer is reduced to silence, making speech 
impossible.78 Indeed, the causes of being unheard are as varied as the effects thereof; but 
those effects are rarely, if ever, advantageous to speakers. More often such unhearing is 
likely to produce a malformed understanding of self. This is especially the case when the 
desire to be heard is great or when there is a therapeutic need to be heard, even if that need 
is unknown to the speaker. In what follows, I will briefly canvas some of the malformative 
                                                          
78 Dorothee Soelle, Suffering (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp. 68-70. 
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effects of being unheard or silenced. This sampling is an attempt to show the damaging 
effects of going unheard for the project of personal identity-formation.  
 First, going unheard results in obstructed access to the values, codes, and meaning-
making frameworks that are constitutive of everyday social experiences. This may develop 
in situations of loneliness or isolation. The speaker is left alone with her thoughts, without 
an other to validate, evaluate, or share in the task of interpreting her experiences. Because 
meaning and value are socially constructed, the project of integrating life’s experiences—
especially painful and traumatic experiences—requires the ears of others.79 Going unheard 
circumscribes and diminishes the context for interpreting one’s life and experiences. The 
immediate context of the speaker is the only available interpretive framework. The result is 
the inhibition of the processes of understanding, judging, and evaluating one’s life.80 
McFadyen has noted the way that life is encoded with a public meaning. Without the 
hearing of an other, personally held information cannot be encoded with public meaning. 
Identity-formation, thus, becomes a solipsistic enterprise, with limited resources at its 
disposal. Indeed, externalizing thoughts and feelings, say, in writing or talking aloud to 
oneself, may be of benefit. One is thus able to “hear” oneself. Yet the pool of resources, 
values, and judgements—the whole framework—for integrating such experiences into a 
theory of self is limited to those antecedently available to the speaker. There can be only one 
perspective because there is only one interpreter. 
It might be objected that one’s theory of self could be developed perfectly well by 
other means, without the need to ever be heard about some particular life experience 
because life experiences inevitably undergo a diachronic evaluation. Over time, it might be 
argued, one might come to better interpret and understand some particularly painful life 
event as it is viewed in the expanding horizons of one’s life, even having never discussed it 
with another. One’s retrospective assessment of the death of a childhood pet may, after fifty 
years, have a significantly diminished meaning for one’s life. Yet it is not time alone that 
brings perspective, but the accumulation of life experiences. The death of the pet, even after 
fifty years, might remain a painful memory, but one that is balanced with other identity-
forming life experiences (e.g., marriage, the joy of a child, the death of a spouse, etc.). It is 
not time alone, but the diachronic interpersonal exposure to social values and codes that 
                                                          
79 Peter Hobson has theorized that thought itself emerges from the interpersonal experiences between 
infants and their caregivers. Under such circumstances, even thought itself becomes impossible in 
extreme isolation. See Peter Hobson, The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
80 Alistair McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust, and the Christian Doctrine of Sin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 69. 
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constitute a meaning-making framework in which life experiences may be situated. It is 
through interpersonal dialogue in general, and the personal evaluation that comes, 
specifically, from being heard, that the values, judgments, and broader interpretive 
framework of a society is brought to bear on a speaker’s own interpretations. In this way, 
going unheard about one particular wilderness experience might not prove malformative for 
human becoming; but such malformation is more likely if the necessary socially encoded, 
interpretive resources are not, or do not become, available to the self. Put another way, the 
meaning-making that is requisite for constructing a theory of the self is an irreducibly social 
project, even when particular experiences remain unheard.  
Correlatively, it could be argued that the greater the significance of the life 
experience for constructing a theory of the self, the more necessary it is to be heard by 
another. Wilderness experiences vary in orders of magnitude. The greater the suffering, the 
more complex and disruptive the experience is likely to be for one’s self-understanding. 
Overwhelming complexity and disruption exceed the interpretive resources available to the 
sufferer in a way that requires an other. Meaning-making abilities can become so 
overwhelmed that the diachronic exposure to social values, codes, and interpretive 
frameworks are never sufficient to the task. The particularity of the experience must be 
brought to the ears of an other, or others, if the project of identify-formation and self-
understanding is to proceed unimpaired. 
This is because, second, going unheard may produce either a disintegrated or an 
incoherent self-understanding. This may develop in situations of isolation or loneliness, but 
also when a speaker is dismissed or ignored. Disintegration or incoherence can vary in form 
and significance. Presumably the malformative effects of a speaker choosing never to 
disclose some case of abuse would be different than one in which the speaker discloses 
abuse and is dismissed or ignored. Varieties of disintegration or incoherence 
notwithstanding, my point is that one’s theory of self is built upon the foundation of a 
sedimented history of life experiences and interpersonal communication about those 
experiences, and a failure to be heard may result in painful life experiences remaining 
unintegrated into one’s self-understanding. In such cases, the wilderness experience remains 
“outside” or “other” to the self. It remains an event, but one with meaning that has not been 
given sufficient influence for self-understanding. Remaining entirely “outside” of self-
understanding, it stands dislocated from one’s personal narrative. This is a description of a 
disintegrated theory of self. An example of integration may serve to clarify the concept.  
Reflecting back, twelve years after the tragic death of his son, Nicholas Wolterstorff 
describes the available options: 
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Rather often I am asked whether the grief remains as intense as when I wrote. The 
answer is, No. The wound is no longer raw. But it has not disappeared. That is as it 
should be. […] So I own my grief. I do not try to put it behind me, to get over it, to 
forget it. I do not try to dis-own it. If someone asks, “Who are you, tell me about 
yourself,” I say—not immediately, but shortly—“I am one who lost a son.” That 
loss determines my identity; not all of my identity, but much of it. It belongs within 
my story. I struggle indeed to go beyond merely owning my grief toward owning it 
redemptively. But I will not and cannot disown it.81 
Putting the event behind, getting over it, forgetting about it—these would each exemplify a 
failure to integrate the pain of losing a child into one’s theory of self. Yet Wolterstorff 
models an integrated approach. Losing a son is now within his story. It informs his identity 
and self-understanding. There is an ownership of it. Importantly and appropriately, it does 
not overwhelm or dominate his theory of self. It is not all of his identity; nor is it his 
immediate response to the question of identity. But it is integrated into his self-
understanding. Additionally, what should not be missed, is that Wolterstorff demonstrates 
the achievement of integration through an imagined dialogue. The question, “Who are you?” 
is what permits the externalizing, the speech toward the ears of another, and exemplifies the 
dialogical nature of integration. It is not coincidence that Wolterstorff frames this 
understanding of integration as a hypothetical dialogue. Even if no such dialogue every took 
place and it remained purely hypothetical, it demonstrates the way that making sense of 
oneself is a project that always involves oneself in relation to others. The who-question is 
always asked and answered in relation to an other. When conceiving of his own identity in 
relation to others, Wolterstorff understands his unique identity and personal narrative to be 
significantly influenced by the death of his son. Who he is, in his uniqueness, to another, is 
one who has lost a son. But this integration has been achieved in relation to others. Indeed, 
Wolterstorff provides only this hypothetical conversation, but it was noted above, following 
Rowan Williams, that the possibility of being heard exerts a pressure on the way thought 
and speech are formed. Even if it could only be said that Wolterstorff is imagining the 
dialogue and attendant experience of being heard (on the unlikely chance that such a 
conversation never actually occurred), that imagined bringing-to-speech and imagined 
hearing of it have contributed to the production of this integrated self-understanding. It is 
unlikely (though, I would not want to suggest impossible) to have been achieved 
immediately or independently of the real or imagined ears of others. It appears that this kind 
of integration is produced diachronically and through the refining of one’s self-
                                                          
81 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Lament for a Son (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1987), pp. 5-6. Italics original. 
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understanding within the horizon of another’s hearing. Wolterstorff’s is, thus, a picture of 
integration against the backdrop of disintegrating strategies: putting the event behind, 
getting over it, forgetting about it. These are strategies for disowning. If we were to explore 
what each of these three strategies have in common, it is, again, not coincidence, that they 
would all require a lack of communication about the event—a failure to bring to the ears of 
another. Disintegration results when wilderness experiences go insufficiently heard. 
Related to disintegration, an incoherent theory of self may result from partial or 
fragmented integration of wilderness experiences. Incoherence results when one’s self-
understanding remains at odds with one’s wilderness experiences. It could be described as a 
life event that remains partially integrated, but with unresolved or unresolvable elements to 
it—elements that do not fit into one’s personal narrative. Another example may illustrate.  
It was in 1944 that Dietrich Bonhoeffer, from his prison cell in Tegel, wrote his 
now-famous poem reflecting on his own identity: 
1 Who am I? They often tell me 
 I would step from my cell’s confinement 
 calmly, cheerfully, firmly, 
 like a squire from his country-house. 
 
5 Who am I? They often tell me 
 I would talk to my warders 
 freely and friendly and clearly, 
 as though it were mine to command. 
 
10 Who am I? They also tell me 
 I would bear the days of misfortune 
 equably, smilingly, proudly, 
 like one accustomed to win. 
 
15 Am I then really all that which other men tell of? 
 Or am I only what I know of myself, 
 restless and longing and sick, like a bird in a cage, 
 struggling for breath, as though hands were compressing my throat, 
 yearning for colours, for flowers, for the voices of birds, 
20 thirsting for words of kindness, for neighbourliness, 
 trembling with anger at despotisms and petty humiliation, 
 tossing in expectation of great events, 
 powerlessly trembling for friends at an infinite distance, 
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 weary and empty at praying, at thinking, at making,  
25 faint, and ready to say farewell to it all? 
  
 Who am I? This or the other? 
 Am I one person today, and tomorrow another? 
 Am I both at once? A hypocrite before others, 
 and before myself a contemptibly woebegone weakling? 
30 Or is something within me still like a beaten army, 
 fleeing in disorder from victory already achieved? 
 
 Who am I? They mock me, these lonely questions of mine. 
 Whoever I am, thou knowest, O God, I am thine.82 
 
Here, on full display, is the experience of a personal identity struggling for coherence. For 
Bonhoeffer, the Tegel experience—in all of its loneliness, exhaustion, and impotence—is 
what dominates his self-understanding. That experience is how he knows himself. Yet it is a 
confident, dignified, collected Bonhoeffer whom others claim to know and experience. The 
question of coherence is just this: “Who am I? This or the other?” The reason for the 
incoherence is made clear in lines 16-25, which have not been heard by others. The result is 
a self-understanding that remains at odds with others’ understanding. It is not hard to 
imagine a progression toward coherence if, say, the “warders” of line 6 deeply heard these 
lines. Yet without the ears of others, Bonhoeffer is left without sufficient resources for 
achieving coherence. His under-resourced attempt at coherence appears in lines 26-31. His 
attempt: perhaps he is both confident of a (eschatological?) victory already won, while his 
daily experience simultaneously bears all the marks of defeat. This is an attempt at 
coherence. Yet “these lonely questions” remain. That this sort of lack of coherence would 
develop in lonely circumstances should not surprise at this point in my argument and gives 
weight to the proposal that coherence of personal identity is a social achievement. Questions 
of personal identity are “lonely questions” when they cannot be brought before the ears of 
another. Going unheard by another in one’s wilderness experiences perpetuates incoherence 
in one’s self-understanding. 
What is most remarkable for the purposes of my argument is that, despite the 
struggle for coherence in his present circumstances, Bonhoeffer does, in fact, acknowledge a 
coherence of identity that is more definitive for his self-understanding. The whole poem is 
characterized by an attempt to answer the question, “Who am I?” Yet the question does not 
                                                          
82 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 347-48. 
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go unanswered. Despite the struggle for coherence, Bonhoeffer acknowledges his identity: 
he is one who belongs to God. It is only in the final line that it becomes evident that the 
whole poem, in all its searching questions, is directed to a “Thou”. This struggle for 
coherence takes place before God and in the hearing of God. Here it is God who hears, and 
it is God who anchors Bonhoeffer’s struggle for self-understanding. There is, then, a level of 
achieved coherence that results from dialogue. It is in the speaking to and being heard by 
God that resolves the incoherence at a more foundational level of personal identity, even if 
by faith in the face of circumstances that run contrariwise. Most important for the project of 
self-understanding is not the disjunction between the claims of “I” and “they”, but the 
coherence supplied by the perfect knowledge of “Thou”. 
Without the ears of another, achieving integration and coherence of personal 
narrative is not possible. Disintegration and incoherence are the product of insufficient 
meaning-making resources and perspectives that can only be expanded by their acquisition 
from others. Of course, in order to be sufficiently formative, the hearing of another must 
achieve the “deep” level of hearing described above. Being ignored or dismissed would be 
examples of unhearing; damaging examples that would contribute to disintegration and 
incoherence of self-understanding.83 Being unheard—whether due to isolation or 
dismissal—is a damaging and malformative influence on human becoming insofar as 
personal narrativity becomes or remains fragmented. Of course, being heard by another does 
not somehow guarantee an integrated and coherent self-understanding; but the absence of 
the ears of another contributes to disintegration and incoherence in significant ways that can 
only be resolved, even if only in part, by being heard. 
Third, there are exceptionally damaging results of going unheard when sufferers are 
enjoined to secrecy. To be enjoined to secrecy is to be cut off from the ears of others, with 
all of the damaging effects already noted. It is enforced isolation and is one means of 
intentionally inhibiting the sufferer from bringing experiences within broader or alternative 
contexts of meaning and understanding, as well as the comfort and assistance needed in that 
suffering. This can be exceptionally damaging for the self-understanding of children, who 
lack the interpretive resources and internal fortitude to appropriately understand and respond 
to the secrecy injunction. McFadyen has reflected at length on the damaging consequences 
of childhood sexual abuse and on the impact of the secrecy enjoined upon that abuse.84 One 
of the unique features of secret-keeping, especially as it relates to abuse, is that it requires a 
                                                          
83 On the impact of dismissing for psychological and neurological integration, see Siegel, The 
Mindful Brain, pp. 204-6. 
84 McFadyen, Bound to Sin, pp. 69-71. 
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justification from the abuser to the abused. There is a need to keep this a secret, because. 
That justification is most effective when it co-opts motives that the abused might have for 
maintaining the secret, such as shame, punishment, personal deficiency, etc. The 
justification then becomes the dominant framework for interpreting abuse. McFadyen notes 
the way that you-messages of the abuser become the I-messages of the abused. The abuser 
might tell a child, “This is because you are dirty and wicked,” or “This is your punishment 
for being so bad.”85 Those justifications motivate secret-keeping and place the responsibility 
of the abuse on the abused. These messages “easily become the sole frameworks of meaning 
by which the child may interpret and evaluate both the abuse and his own identity in its 
light.”86 Even if the child is of sufficient age and development to evaluate the abuse as 
morally reprehensible, her personal identity is still confounded by the ambivalence of the 
relationship with the abuser, who, on account of age, power, and interpersonal status should 
otherwise be trustworthy.87 The particularly disturbing example of childhood sexual abuse 
and the secrecy that accompanies it demonstrate the damaging effects of imposed secrecy. 
The damage is immediate, insofar as it permits the abuse and suffering to continue, but also 
persistent, insofar as it radically confounds the abused’s understanding of self and self in 
relation to others. These damaging effects could only be prevented or resolved by the ears of 
an other. 
Finally, going unheard means the absence of care, concern and understanding 
necessary to be loved. This is the case when a potential hearer is apathetic, uninterested, or 
even positively invested in the suffering of the speaker. In these circumstances, as well as 
those noted above, going unheard makes love impossible. One cannot be known as a person, 
in an I-thou relationship, to use Buber’s terminology. As an unheard person, one becomes 
an impersonal It. To be loved as a person means to be known and understood in a way that 
is only possible through interpersonal communication. Going unheard is, thus, a 
dehumanizing experience insofar as it depersonalizes human experience and makes love 
impossible. This is especially so in more overtly evil circumstances wherein the perpetrators 
of violence oppress and terrorize victims with resolute apathy toward their cries and pain. 
The unwillingness to hear the other is what makes the violence possible. To hear the victim 
is to relate to the victim as another person, as a thou, with an internal world not unlike the 
perpetrator’s. If being heard is a humanizing and dignifying event, then the absence of 
hearing may prove extraordinarily damaging for the psychology and self-understanding of 
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the speaker. Persistent, malicious unhearing may become sedimented into the speaker’s 
theory of self, such that the speaker understands herself to be insignificant, not worthy of the 
human dignity of hearing, deserving of such apathy or malice, or of subhuman value, etc. Of 
course, these pose particularly severe threats to one’s personal narrative and self-
understanding, and are located at the extreme end of the spectrum of potentially 
malformative effects of unhearing. And yet, sadly, they are nonetheless common. 
The above malformative effects, inter alia, might summarily be described as a kind 
of decreation that undermines God’s good design for human relationships. If human 
creatures were not created to be alone (Gen 2:18), then it should be no theological surprise 
that God’s good design for human community comes undone when speakers go unheard. 
That the ears of another are required to make sense of our circumstances, to integrate our 
experiences into a coherent self-understanding, and to lovingly dignify our words and 
thoughts, imbuing them with superlative, human worth—these are not ancillary additions to 
the human experience, but constitute it, qua human experience, by design. Thus, the failure 
or refusal to hear is at odds with the created order. Going unheard is a kind of erosion to 
one’s personal theory of self, just as it is an erosion of human nature. The sedimentation of 
silence, the persistent experience of being unheard, chisels away at one’s self understanding 
because it chisels away at the God-ordained human experience.88 
 
4.4 God’s Hearing and Human Becoming 
Now it remains to demonstrate the most important theological implications of the foregoing 
reflections. If, as I have frequently asserted, God’s hearing is not simply human hearing, 
writ large, and yet Scripture invites us to speak of God as a hearer, especially a hearer of our 
pain and suffering, then it remains to ask: toward what theological ends does Scripture 
authorize such language? If God has revealed Godself to be a hearer, what bearing does this 
have on God’s economy of relations to and with human creatures? If, as I have argued, 
being heard is significantly formative for human becoming and one’s theory of self, how is 
being heard by God formative in similar or different ways? 
 Here, the theological payoff of the foregoing exploration comes into its own. 
Having discussed God’s hearing, as Scripture so often does, within the horizon of human 
suffering, we may now bring the kind of human becoming produced by the hearing of an 
other into sharp relief with another theological strategy for addressing human suffering; 
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see Diarmaid MacCulloch, Silence: A Christian History (New York: Viking, 2013), esp. pp. 191-216. 
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what I will call the “passibilist-liberationist” strategy. This strategy might be generally 
described as follows: the existential burden of human suffering, especially in its most 
horrendous89 and dehumanizing forms, is so great that, in order to offer a satisfying 
existential and psychological response, theology must reject the long-held doctrine of 
impassibility and concede that God, too, is a co-sufferer with humanity; and by doing so, it 
thus offers a means of psychological and existential liberation from the acute sufferings of 
this world. I want to engage two familiar examples of the passibilist-liberationist strategy, 
even if they are by no means the first,90 the only,91 or even most rigorous92 representatives. I 
raise examples within this theological stream, not because it is currently en vogue (it is 
not93), nor because it might make an easy foil (both are ambitious, complex, theological 
arguments). Instead, I raise them because of my sympathies with theologies which aim to 
speak into concrete human misery; more than that, in their own unique ways, I take them to 
be theologies that, by arguing for passibility, are attempting to meet human suffering with 
something akin to divine empathy. I engage with this particular stream of theology because I 
imagine a theology of God’s hearing qualifying and supporting the broad aim of the 
passibilist-liberationist stream insofar as it, too, is a response to human suffering. 
 First, Jürgen Moltmann’s The Crucified God is an extended argument for the 
passibility of the Triune God.94 Yet that argument is oriented toward a particular 
anthropological aim. The seventh chapter of the work, “Ways Towards the Psychological 
Liberation of Man,” is an attempt at psychological hermeneutics, asking, at one level, what 
it might mean to be liberated from the “idolatry” of religion. Moltmann follows, positively, 
                                                          
89 See Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), which I will engage subsequently. 
90 J.K. Mozley’s The Impassibility of God: A Survey of Christian Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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91 For other representatives, see Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988); Terence E. Fretheim, The Suffering of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
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92 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the 
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93 It is telling that, while some have continued to work within the passibilist-liberationist stream, its 
most influential voices remain those from the 1960s and 70s.  
94 The following citations, unless otherwise noted, are all from Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: 
The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1993). Quotations, without endorsement, retain the gender-biased language of the original text. 
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the historical critiques of religion made by Freud and Marx in order to caricature worship of 
an omnipotent, immutable, impassible God as a kind of neurosis from which Christians 
must be liberated. Moltmann understands God, as classically conceived in the Christian 
tradition, as a created, philosophical idol that holds repressive sway over worshippers. 
Following Freud, Moltmann understands that “God” to be nothing more than an exalted 
father figure.95 His concern is for the flourishing and development of the human being. For 
Moltmann, “The homo sympatheticus should be brought into the field of force of the pathos 
of God and the suffering of Christ, where pattern formations condemn man to a life of 
apathy,”96 in order to liberate persons from their psychological repressions. The danger of 
this idolatry is developed in Moltmann’s worry that “the repression of intolerable grief 
makes the patient increasingly apathetic. He becomes incapable of sorrow, incapable of 
loving others; his interest in his surroundings diminishes, because it is directed only towards 
repulsing the threat against him.”97 The solution is to find “freedom in the humanity of 
God,”98 by which is meant freedom by understanding God to be mutable, passible, and 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of creaturely action. The “God of religion,” Moltmann 
observes, numbers among the many repressive idols such as “fatherland, race, class, profit, 
consumption, or anti-social attitudes,”99 noting that these “may not either suffer or die, since 
they have been erected against suffering and dying. They must be omnipotent and eternal, 
because they are meant to help impotent and mortal man and to relieve his anxiety.”100 He 
goes on to propose that  
the crucified God renounces these privileges of an idol. He breaks the spell of the 
super-ego which men lay upon him because they need this self-protection. In 
humbling himself and becoming flesh, he does not accept the laws of this world, 
but takes up suffering, anxious man into his situation. In becoming weak, impotent, 
vulnerable and mortal, he frees man from the quest for powerful idols and 
protective compulsions and makes him ready to accept his humanity, his freedom 
and his mortality. In the situation of the human God the pattern formations of 
repressions become unnecessary. The limitations of apathy fall away. Man can 
                                                          
95 Ibid., p. 300. 
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open himself to suffering and to love. In sympatheia with the pathos of God he 
becomes open to what is other and new.101 
For Moltmann, then, divine passibility is seen to be the necessary means of freeing 
humanity from allegedly repressive concepts of God which prevent human flourishing and 
healthy becoming. In the face of human suffering and death, rather than turning to an 
exalted father figure, it becomes psychologically liberating and emotionally satisfying to 
turn to a fellow sufferer who has renounced the privileges of omnipotence, impassibility, 
and invulnerability. This is one example of the passibilist-liberationist strategy.  
 The second, is James H. Cone’s work, God of the Oppressed.102 Cone’s work is 
oriented entirely toward thinking theologically about liberating black peoples, and 
especially those in North America, from oppression. Cone argues that God is always and 
unequivocally on the side of the oppressed. As such, Cone’s doctrines of God, Christ, 
salvation, and eschatology are all oriented toward the concrete, historical liberation of black 
suffering from the hands of white oppressors. Cone is not unconcerned with spiritual or 
psychological liberation. He declares, “Fellowship with God is the beginning and the end of 
human liberation. The liberated person is the one who encounters God in faith, that is, in 
conviction and trust that one’s true humanity is actualized in God.”103 Yet he is averse to 
“spiritualized” understandings of liberation that do not address the concrete, historical 
realities of oppression. So, when Cone turns to christology, it is from the perspective of 
black suffering. For that reason, it is the Suffering Servant motif of Isaiah 53 that controls 
his reading of Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection. “On the cross,” Cone suggests, “God’s 
identity with the suffering of the world was complete.”104 He goes on to conclude that  
The cross of Jesus reveals the extent of God’s involvement in the suffering of the 
weak. God is not merely sympathetic with the social pain of the poor but becomes 
totally identified with them in their agony and pain. The pain of the oppressed is 
God’s pain, for God takes their suffering as God’s own, thereby freeing them from 
its ultimate control of their lives. The oppressed do not have to worry about 
suffering because its power over their lives was defeated by God. God in Christ 
became the Suffering Servant and thus took the humiliation and suffering of the 
oppressed into God’s own history.105 
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For Cone, God must suffer vicariously for and with oppressed people. Commenting on 
Cone’s theology, Warren McWilliams notes that the cross is “the clearest revelation we 
have of the agony of God for the suffering of the oppressed.”106 Like Moltmann, Cone is 
concerned throughout his work to distance himself from the traditional understanding of 
divine perfections. He argues consistently against what he takes to be the tradition’s 
Hellenized understanding of God, suggesting that “Unlike the God of Greek philosophy 
who is removed from history, the God of the Bible is involved in history.”107 For Cone, if 
God is to address human suffering in its concreteness, then God must be historically 
conditioned and vulnerable to the suffering and oppression of history. 
 Much more could be said about these two representatives of the passibilist-
liberationist strategy. For the sake of space, I will leave aside questions about theological 
method, the extent of “liberation” envisaged by each, soteriology more generally, and the 
varied work that passibility does for each. The observation I wish to make is more specific. 
These representatives are noteworthy because they are each, in their own way, making an 
attempt to triangulate the relationship between the divine nature, the experience of human 
suffering, and anthropological flourishing. In each attempt to coordinate these three, there is 
an assumed incongruity between them that calls for revision. In the passibilist-liberationist 
strategy, it is concluded that the divine nature must be the incongruous element that 
undergoes revision. For this strategy, human suffering is best responded to by the claim that 
God, too, is a sufferer and that by understanding God as such, suffering is acknowledged as 
a reality to which God, too, is subject and is, with human sufferers, working historically to 
overcome. And while space does not permit an extended engagement with these arguments, 
I will simply register that I am unpersuaded by them, and that I worry that whatever 
existential rewards they claim to produce, that they come at too great a theological cost. 
Further, I am persuaded by arguments against the so-called Hellenization thesis,108 and 
against the characterization of substance metaphysics to which these arguments object. 109 
Rather than making modifications to the historical understanding of the divine nature, it is 
my suggestion that in this three-termed equation, it is the divine nature that is able to 
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produce human flourishing in the face of suffering. The passibilist-liberationist departure 
from the received understanding thereof is not warranted. What is needed, rather, is a fuller, 
more attentive understanding of God’s self-revelation as a hearer. For, if God is a hearer in 
the way that has been argued thus far, and if God’s ears are especially inclined to wilderness 
situations, one would expect God’s hearing—God’s loving and just attention that is 
accomplished by means of the significant personal presence of the Triune God, which 
entails a sure response—to produce human flourishing, a way of becoming, within the 
horizon of existential suffering. God’s hearing can be expected to produce formative effects, 
not unlike those above, which form human speakers in ways that bear on their theory of self 
and, ultimately, toward a beneficent and divinely-ordered telos. This is precisely what is 
found in the Scriptures, and in the Psalms in particular.  
Psalm 22 is a uniquely relevant text for consideration due to its overt reflection on a 
wilderness experience and its appearance on the lips of Christ in the passion narratives. Its 
two parts—the cry of extraordinary loneliness, fear, pain, and abandonment (1-21a), and its 
declaration of salvation and divine faithfulness (21b-31)—are characteristic of the 
experience of Israel, as well as the dual experiences of cross and resurrection. The Psalm 
tells of divine forsakenness as well as divine presence. What connects the two parts of the 
Psalm in the world behind the text is unknown.110 There is no internal evidence attesting to 
what transformed the cries of abandonment into rejoicing and praise. Yet some change 
seems to have occurred, whether in the Psalmist’s internal experience of those 
circumstances or, more likely, in the external circumstances themselves. For these reasons it 
has a rich and varied history of interpretation as well as devotional appropriation in the 
Christian tradition. And yet, for all its richness, little has been said about the Psalm within 
the horizon of God’s hearing. This omission is regrettable, given that verse 24 declares, in 
sharp contrast to vv. 1-21a, “For he did not despise or abhor the affliction of the afflicted; he 
did not hide his face from me, but heard when I cried to him.” God’s hearing is, then, the 
way the Psalmist interprets God’s response to his cries and pain. In his affliction and pain, 
what is most astonishing is that God heard when the author cried out. If God’s response to 
vv. 1-21a is to hear, how might that hearing prove formative? 
 Above it was argued that the deep hearing of another liberates from loneliness, 
isolation, and abandonment. The Psalmist cries out, “My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me? Why are you so far from helping me, from the words of my groaning?” The 
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loneliness and abandonment are expressed generally, but also specifically as a distance from 
the Psalmist’s words. If God does not hear the Psalmist, the results are loneliness and 
abandonment. Those are acutely experienced, not only from God, but from others: “But I 
am a worm, and not a human; scorned by others, and despised by the people. All who see 
me mock at me; they make mouths at me, they shake their heads.” Yet God has heard the 
Psalmist in acute loneliness, isolation, and abandonment. Even when it was thought that 
God had abandoned him, God heard him. This is cause for “telling” (v. 22), “praising” (v. 
23a), “glorifying” (v. 23b), and “standing in awe” (v. 23c). God’s hearing has liberated the 
Psalmist—liberated not from psychological subservience to an exalted father figure—but 
liberated from the acute psychological pain of loneliness and isolation. Having been heard 
then forms the Psalmist’s self-understanding, insofar as he is not one who was alone and 
forsaken; but rather is one who was heard by God. More than that, his loneliness is 
contrasted with the ever-widening circle of individuals to whom he declares what God has 
done, beginning with his kindred (v. 22), the great congregation (v. 25), all the ends of the 
earth (v. 27), the dead (v. 29) and future generations (vv. 30-31).111 Having been heard by 
God, the Psalmist is far from alone. 
 It was also argued above that being deeply heard by another is a matter of intense 
intimacy because whether or not an other hears, especially how that other hears, is a matter 
of serious risk, whereby speakers may be affirmed in their self-understanding and theory of 
self, or they may be rejected, dismissed, or ignored. Had the Psalm concluded at v. 21a, the 
reader would be left to imagine the Psalmist in utter abandonment and despair, having been 
unheard or rejected by God. Left would be the image of a person crushed not only by the 
pressures of this life, but by the outright rejection of God. The negative consequences of this 
for human becoming could hardly be overstated.112 Such rejection would be tantamount to a 
rejection of the totality of one’s experience and deeply influential for one’s self-
understanding. Existentially, this would amount to the denial of God’s goodness at best, or 
the affirmation of outright atheism, in extremis. Yet having been heard, the Psalmist is 
accepted, understood and has a self-understanding that is affirmed by God. The effects of 
this identity-affirming acceptance, likewise, can hardly be overstated; for the Psalmist has 
not only known profound pain and abandonment, but has been heard and known in that 
experience. Here God’s infinite proximity is made evident in the experience of the Psalmist. 
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God was not “far from the words of my groaning,” but was, in fact, closer and more 
proximate to the Psalmist than the words themselves. As the Psalmist cries out, “Do not be 
far from me… Do not be far away” (vv. 11, 19), we see that God is, indeed, significantly, 
personally present. 
It has been argued that being deeply heard by another may, implicitly, be a means of 
affirming and dignifying the self-understanding of the speaker. In the first half of Psalm 22, 
in its perceived unhearing, the Psalmist’s self-understanding is called into question. In the 
absence of God’s hearing, there is a sort of totalizing “No” pronounced on the self-
understanding of the Psalmist, a dehumanizing and undignifying rejection. The Psalmist is 
without God’s ears, a worm, scorned, and despised (v. 6). Yet God “did not despise or abhor 
the affliction of the afflicted” in God’s hearing. This hearing is affliction-affirming, insofar 
as in hearing, God issues an implicit affirmation, a “Yes” to the experience of the Psalmist 
and to his cries for mercy. 
 In the absence of God’s hearing, the portrait given to us in Ps. 22:1-21a, the 
malformative effects of going unheard are on full display. The Psalmist is cut off from the 
meaning-making framework necessary to interpret his experience. In sharp appeal and 
protest he cries out, “Yet you are holy, enthroned on the praises of Israel. In you our 
ancestors trusted; they trusted, and you delivered them. To you they cried, and were saved; 
in you they trusted, and were not put to shame. But I am a worm…” He goes on, “Yet it was 
you who took me from the womb; you kept me safe on my mother’s breast…” He is 
grasping for historical narrative, for previous interpretations in which to anchor his 
experience, but knows this immediate experience to be at variance with those historical 
interpretations. This is reflected in the contrasting conjunctions that head verses six and 
nine. Without God’s hearing, the Psalmist is unable to interpret his experience. He gropes 
for narratives in which to situate it, but cannot make sense of it unless God hears. Without 
God’s ears, there is no coherent narrative, and incoherence is the only option. It is as if the 
Psalmist were to say, “I know that our ancestors trusted you. They cried out to you and were 
saved. But I’m crying out to you, and you are not listening. I don’t know how to make sense 
of this.” It is that variance between personal experience and the interpreted historical 
narrative of God’s dealings with the covenant people that make the Psalmist’s experience 
incoherent. And this going unheard means, as was argued above, the absence of care, 
concern, or understanding that constitutes love. The experience of the Psalmist, in all of his 
physical, social, emotional, and psychological pain, stands in sharp relief with the 
covenantal ḥesed of God. The stakes in Psalm 22 are high. If God does not hear, it would 
seem, from the perspective of the reader, that God does not love the Psalmist. The 
malformative result of God’s unhearing is devastating for human becoming. Indeed, if God 
154 
 
did not hear, then pain, suffering, and wilderness experiences in this life could only be 
interpreted through nihilistic frameworks—frameworks that lack the meaning-making 
resources supplied by an Other. This would lend itself to either a practical atheism in which, 
if God exists, God is uninterested and absent and thereby pronounces a denying “No” over 
human experience, or a metaphysical atheism in which there is no God at all. Were the 
Psalm to conclude at verse 21a, there would be left something akin to Munch’s Der Schrei 
der Natur, and human pain and suffering would be the end. 
 Yet Psalm 22 embraces both Egypt and Zion, exile and return, cross and 
resurrection. The former is marked by unhearing; the latter by God’s loving and just 
attention that is accomplished by means of the significant personal presence of the Triune 
God, which entails a sure response. God’s loving and just attention can be understood to 
produce two effects that are only implied in Psalm 22, but do not require much stretching of 
the imagination: the effects of compassion and attunement.  First, it is reasonable to interpret 
the Psalmist’s response as the response of one who has had the experience of God sharing 
attention with him. Above it was suggested, following Stuart Jesson, that the effects of 
sharing attention with another produce an experience like compassion. By attending to the 
Psalmist’s experience—the experience to which the Psalmist is also attending—God has 
wrought a change in the way the Psalmist experiences his circumstances, and probably 
wrought a change in the circumstances themselves. The Psalmist has experienced the effects 
of God’s loving attention in a way that has been efficacious and transformative, and is, thus, 
now able to look upon those circumstances differently. Something similar can be said, 
second, about attunement. While not explicit in the text, I do not think it an imaginative 
stretch, nor a romantic imposition on the text to suppose that the Psalmist has had the 
experience of feeling felt. In one sense, all Psalms of lament are bids for God to attune to the 
feelings of the author. Indeed, these Psalms are often those most marked by emotive 
language. Requests for God to hear should be read not only as a request for God to attend to 
external states of affairs, but to attune to internal ones as well. As in the above investigation, 
the mechanisms whereby one may imagine God doing the psychological attuning are 
irrelevant when the focus is on the experience of feeling felt. I cannot know how God may 
go about hearing or what that might mean, if anything, for God’s life. Yet I do know when I 
have had the experience of feeling felt. In this sense, it is sufficient to suggest that one has 
had an experience of God’s hearing analogous to the experience of being attuned to by 
another human being. It will be remembered from the above discussion of attunement that 
what makes attunement such a worthwhile and interesting result of deep hearing is that it 
produces a neurobiological change in the one heard, the one to whom another is attuned. My 
experience of being attuned to results in enhanced pre-frontal functioning, which includes 
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my enhanced ability to attune to the internal states of others. While I cannot imagine any 
before-and-after brain scans have been performed on those who claim to have been heard by 
God, there is here, at minimum, an interesting hypothesis: that those who claim to be heard 
by God do, in fact, experience enhancements in their pre-frontal cortex and its associated 
functioning. I take it that, if that hypothesis was tested and proved, the results would be of 
little consequence for metaphysics. However, they would be of real significance for 
understanding the experience of the one who reports having been heard by God, namely, 
indicating that she had an experience of being heard by God that was materially similar to 
being attuned to by another human being, and that, resultantly, she was better suited to 
attune to the internal states of others. Both compassion and attunement, then, present real 
possibilities for the way that God’s hearing may prove formative for human becoming, and 
that, especially within the horizon of human suffering and pain. 
 Psalm 22:21b-31 is evidence that God’s hearing is a gift, of the kind outlined above. 
As gift, it changes the recipient who receives it. The recipient, the one who is heard, 
receives with the gift new capacities to do what could not previously be done, sans gift. In 
the absence of God’s hearing, 21b-31 would not have been possible. But having been heard, 
the Psalmist may gladly “tell of” and “praise” God’s name (v. 22) and call others to worship 
and do the same (v. 23, 27, 29). The connection between the gift of God’s hearing and the 
new capacities that result is causally connected in verses 22-24. The Psalmist will tell of and 
praise God, and instruct “all you offspring of Jacob” to praise and glorify and stand in awe 
of God for a particular reason. The causal “for” that heads verse 24 makes explicit this 
reason: that God heard when the Psalmist cried out. God’s hearing, then, is what generates 
this new possibility, that was not previously possible under the shadow of vv. 1-21a.  By 
receiving the gift of God’s hearing, the Psalmist is not only the recipient of new capacities, 
having received something previously external to him; but now he is someone different. He 
is one who has received this gift and its attendant capacities. He is not only someone who 
has something new, but is someone new: a tell-er and praise-er and worshipper. Previously 
he was not these things, but a self-described worm, scorned and despised by others, mocked, 
and poured out like water, bones disjointed and heart like wax, as though laid “in the dust of 
death.” The gift of God’s hearing has, importantly, not erased such experiences, but has 
wrought a transformation in the experience of them, such that these I-predicates are no 
longer totalizing of the Psalmist’s theory of self. Rather, they are integrated into a coherent 
narrative that is dominated by God’s hearing.  
 This brings to the foreground another way of understanding what God’s hearing has 
accomplished for the Psalmist’s personal becoming. It was argued above that being heard by 
another is necessary for interpreting one’s experience in light of broader values, codes, and 
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meaning. Without the ears of another, meaning-making frameworks are absent or supplied 
only solipsistically, thereby impairing one’s ability to interpret life experiences. It was also 
argued that such impairment is all the more dire when those life experiences are 
significantly formative. This is true, a fortiori, with God’s hearing. Marilyn McCord Adams 
has argued that horrendous evil, by which she means “evils the participation in which… 
constitute prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their 
inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole,”113 impose this very kind of 
inhibition on meaning-making. She suggests that “[l]ike light too bright for the eyes, 
horrendous evils overwhelm human meaning-making capacities, prima facie stumping us, 
furnishing strong reason to believe that lives marred by horrors can never again be unified 
and integrated into wholes with positive meaning.”114 Psalm 22:1-21a would certainly be a 
candidate for a description of categorically horrendous evil. And because such suffering 
overwhelms meaning-making capacities, there is the need for an Other to supply the larger 
interpretive framework. Implicit in Adams’ “aesthetic argument” is the notion that the 
contextual “frame” through which evil is interpreted determines one’s ability to attribute 
meaning to that particular evil.115 For Adams, crucial are the questions about the scope and 
stability of the frame in which meaning is interpreted. For my purposes, it is sufficient to 
agree with Adams that it is God and God’s goodness which supply a transcendent frame of 
reference in which the most horrendous of evils must be situated. Here it is enough to say 
that, in the absence of God’s ears, the Psalmist would be cut off from transcendent 
frameworks of meaning and interpretation, the very transcendent resources that are 
necessary to make sense of Psalm 22:1-21a kinds of suffering. The result is the kind of 
incoherence Adams describes: lacking unity, integration, wholeness, and positive meaning. 
But because the Psalmist cries out and because God does hear him, he is supplied with a 
meaning-making framework in which to situate his experience. The Psalm concludes with a 
reflection on God’s eternal kingship and universal dominion. “For dominion belongs to the 
LORD, and he rules over the nations” (v. 28), declares the Psalmist. He continues, “To him, 
indeed, shall all who sleep in the earth bow down; before him shall bow all who go down to 
the dust, and I shall live for him” (v. 29). The Psalmist has been heard by the King of all the 
nations of the earth, by the King to whom the dead shall bow and future generations will 
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worship. It is within a universal, eternal, frame of reference in which Psalm 22:1-21a is now 
interpreted, because God has heard. 
 Finally, the narrative quality of Psalm 22 should be noted for its bearing on the 
Psalmist’s theory of self. The Psalm begins in anguish, horror, and isolation. Effort is made 
to situate this experience in the history of Israel (vv. 3-5), or at least in God’s good 
provision historically (vv. 9-11). Pleas and cries issue from the Psalmist, asking for 
deliverance (vv. 11, 19, 20). In response to those requests, God rescued (or answered) the 
Psalmist (v. 21a). God heard him in his affliction (v. 24). As a result, the Psalmist will 
joyously declare to an ever-expanding audience what God has accomplished. This narrative 
arc—that begins in turmoil, grows in tension and anticipation with each cry to be heard, 
culminates in God’s hearing, and resolves in universal declaration of God’s hearing—is of 
real consequence for theories of self and identity-formation. It is this narrative arc which 
culminates in God’s hearing and which makes the Psalm so dynamic and potent for both its 
author and its readers. Personal identity, as argued above, is the product of the centralized 
organizing of a sedimented history. That history is organized narratively, such that to ask 
one, “Who are you?” is to invite the telling of a story of that sedimented history. However, it 
would be a mistake to think that a person is someone who just happens to possess an 
interpretation of a particular series of historical experiences of which she is the subject. 
Rather, Paul Ricoeur has argued that a person is not distinct from her or his series of 
experiences. She or he “shares the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story 
recounted. The narrative constructs the identity [of the person].”116 Put another way, the self 
just is her narrative. “It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the 
character.”117 Who, then, is the Psalmist? He is one who has endured great suffering, cried 
out to God, been heard, and now makes God’s hearing known to all. Herein lies the potency 
of Psalm 22. In it we find the identity, in its narrative arc, not just of the author behind the 
text, but we find the identity of the people of Israel, of the person of Jesus Christ, and by 
him, all of humanity. 
 There is no narrative with greater identity-forming significance for the people of 
Israel than that of the Exodus, the story of slaves who cried out to God in Egypt and were 
heard (Ex. 2:24) and thus delivered, whom God establishes as a people to make known 
God’s hearing to all. There is no narrative with greater identity-forming significance for the 
person Jesus Christ than the narrative that he is the one who sweat blood in Gethsemane, 
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cried out to be delivered, endured the forsakenness of the cross, but was heard, delivered, 
and vindicated in the resurrection. By this narrative, the Son of God, the Always-heard 
Word, has represented a humanity that cries out to be heard, and by Him, is heard and 
delivered. The result is an ecclesia whose identity has been shaped by this narrative, and 
who now proclaims to all that God is one who hears. The narrative is formative for personal 
identity, for all who inhabit it—interpreting the sufferings and evil of this life in light of it—
insofar as they have come to understand themselves as heard by God. The sufferings of this 
life unavoidably inhabit a personal narrative, a personal theory of the self. However, by 
situating life’s pains, even horrendous evils, within this narrative of God’s hearing, the 
narrative of cross and resurrection, they become visible within the broadest possible vista, 
visible within the most cosmic and timeless frame of meaning. One’s identity is formed in 
relation to an Other. One’s personal theory of self becomes character-ized within the 
expansive, soteriological story of God and God’s self-revealed identity as the God who 
hears.  
Who am I? To paraphrase Bonhoeffer, “Whoever I am, thou knowest, O God, I am 
heard.” 
That identity, then, is of fundamental importance for an inquiry into human 
becoming. For I am principally heard by God, then derivatively heard by others. My identity 
as one heard by God then gives shape and significance to being heard by others. The former 
is primary, the latter secondary and indexed to the former. To whatever extent I am heard by 
others, that I am principally heard by God is the more determinative. Further, as Psalm 22 
makes clear, in some ways I am able to speak to and be heard by others only as the kind of 
person who has been heard by God. More still, as one who has been heard by God, I now 
have a self-understanding (and, potentially, enhanced neurobiological equipment!) that 
better positions me to hear others. This was not lost on Bonhoeffer, who knew well that the 
ministry of listening “has been committed to [Christians] by Him who is Himself the great 
listener and whose work they should share.”118 He concluded that “[w]e should listen with 
the ears of God that we may speak the Word of God.”119  
There is another important sense in which being heard by God is identity forming 
that requires discussion. As one heard by God, whose identity is determined by the story of 
God’s hearing, I am not only better able to hear others; something more fundamental has 
happened. As was alluded to at the beginning of the chapter, if understandings of the imago 
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dei should be derived, not from the Triunity of God, but from the incarnate Logos, Jesus 
Christ, then we might expect to find the anthropological telos of God’s hearing in the person 
of Jesus Christ. For in him we find not only one who is heard by God, but, in the fullness of 
his humanity, one who hears others. Rowan Williams, in his reflection on theological 
anthropology, concludes,  
Jesus has gone before us into the darkest places of human reality. He has picked up 
the sounds that he hears. And think of what those sounds are: the quiet cries of the 
abused child; the despairing tears of a refugee, of a woman in the Middle East, 
surrounded and threatened by different kinds of mindless violence; the fear of a 
man watching a flood or hurricane destroying his family’s livelihood. Jesus picks 
up the cry of the hungry and the forgotten. He hears the human beings that nobody 
else hears. And he calls to us to say, “You listen too.”120 
We have here, then, an imago toward which humanity is to be formed. To be truly human is, 
at least in part, to be one who hears like Christ. When those who have been heard by God 
incline their ears to deeply hear the pain, suffering, and heartache of others, they themselves, 
in such an act, become more who they were created to be. That is not to say by engaging in 
some activity, the act of listening, they become more human. More than that, the one who 
has been heard by God is, like Christ, able to be in a particular kind of way. One becomes 
not someone who performs the act of hearing, but one-who-hears. This way of being in the 
world is borne out of a new self-understanding, out of the identifying narrative of one who 
is one-who-has-been-heard. Like the Psalmist, one’s narrative identity does not terminate in 
God’s hearing, but proceeds, subsequently and outwardly, in ministry to others. Being heard 
by others and proclaiming God’s hearing to others—both being heard by God and hearing 
others—these are constituents of the same narrative, the narrative that identifies the 
Psalmist, the people of Israel, Jesus Christ, and finally, true humanity. 
 The passibilist-liberationist strategy suggests that liberation from human suffering is 
found in God’s solidarity in that suffering. The frame for human suffering is there 
understood to include God as a co-sufferer, struggling mightily toward a glorified, 
eschatological telos. This picture of “suffering love” has a certain, aesthetic appeal.121 But 
more practically, it might be wondered what help a fellow victim to the evils of this life 
might be in overcoming those evils. As weak, vulnerable, and liable to death, what 
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assurances are human sufferers given that God, too, might not be overcome by the horrors 
of this life? I have emphasized that “ears” are connected to whole persons. This is no less 
true of God. There is, then, a great deal that hinges on one’s understanding of the divine 
nature. Were those ears attached to a vulnerable, passible nature that shares in my suffering 
and pain, what assurance do I have that my grief, sorrow, and pain will not overwhelm such 
a god? Would God’s hearing mean more than a shrug and a wish? Would God’s hearing the 
covenant people in Egypt mean anything more than that God just so happened to best 
Pharaoh, that God lucked out, and that it could have gone either way? Yet God’s hearing is 
God’s loving and just attention that is accomplished by means of the significant personal 
presence of the Triune God, which entails a sure response—and that because of to whom 
those ears belong. That is to say, when God hears, it is the hearing of One who dwells in the 
abundance and plentitude of love and goodness, whose strength and constancy know no 
limits. God hears as one who both stands outside the frame of suffering, evil, and death, and 
as one who is intimately and infinitely proximate within the frame, and yet not vulnerable to 
the vicissitudes and evils which befall those in it. Indeed, being heard by God means that it 
is the Triune God who hears in all of God’s perfection, love and goodness. Being heard by 
God is, thus, not the bringing of our cries to the ears of another sufferer, but into the ambit 
of the Triune God’s superabundant love and goodness. Being heard by God is, then, the 
experience of the love of God, that brings life out of death. It is the experience of the 
abundant life (Jn. 10:10). Thus, it is my contention, that the ears of God are better than the 
suffering of God. Were God not impassible, God would be preoccupied not only with my 
deliverance, but with God’s own need for deliverance. But as an impassible hearer, God’s 
salvific and liberating activity is oriented solely toward creation. The hearing of God is, 
then, in all of God’s perfections, a gift of far greater existential blessing than to experience 
God as co-suffering. Put another way, if we attempt to triangulate God’s nature with human 
suffering and human flourishing, it is my proposal that God’s self-revelation as a hearer is of 
far greater existential and pastoral advantage than to deviate, theologically, from God’s self-
revelation as the One in whom “there is no variation or shadow due to change” (Jas 1:17).  
 Of course, this conclusion is given considerable support by the Scriptures, wherein 
we find near ubiquitous celebration of God’s hearing; but a search for the celebration for 
God’s suffering the pains and evils of this world turns up only silence. Of course, there is no 
dispute that the Scriptures speak of God as subject to certain anthropopathisms; but those 
particularly negative anthropopathisms of which God might be described as subject—
suffering, grieving, weakness, etc.—are imbued with no salvific significance. They offer no 
hope and are neither welcomed nor celebrated. They are, rather, most often the cause of 
additional grief and sorrow, especially when incited by Israel’s covenantal failings. Yet it is 
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God’s hearing that restores “to life from among those who go down to the pit,” and turns 
“mourning into dancing,” and “clothes with gladness” (Ps 30).  
 It might be objected that a God who hears fairs no better in liberating from human 
suffering than the passibilist-liberationist strategy. One might object that the cry of the 
neglected refugee, or the distress of the abused child, or the despair of the systemically 
oppressed poor—that their historical circumstances are in no way improved by God’s 
hearing. Perhaps “feeling felt” by being heard by God is simply a sort of psychological 
coping mechanism, a kind of spiritualized and escapist response to the concrete evils of this 
life. What is to be made of this? First, my efforts here have not been oriented toward the—
what I take to be dubious—endeavor of theodicy. Rather, I have asked whether or not God’s 
hearing might prove more existentially liberating, theologically appropriate, and Biblically 
warranted than the passibilist-liberationist strategy. I have shown that it is. Second, it should 
be noted that by jettisoning the doctrine of impassibility, the passibilist-liberationist strategy 
does not attempt to solve the problem of human suffering.122 For Moltmann, the liberation 
that results is a psychological liberation from a particularly Freudian problem, which he 
takes to be symptomatic of belief in an impassible God. For Cone, liberation is 
accomplished by a black God who struggles against white oppressors as one with the 
oppressed.123 Yet by sacrificing God’s impassibility, liberation comes at a high price. I have 
proposed, alternatively, that the underexplored anthropological and psychological benefits 
of being heard produce a more advantageous liberation, and that without sacrificing divine 
impassibility. Third, to suggest that God’s hearing lacks sufficient efficacy to address 
human suffering in its most horrendous and painful manifestations, one need only return to 
the testimony of Psalm 22. If the historical circumstances of the Psalmist are to be taken 
seriously—the circumstances which produced very real anguish, fear, and desperate cries—
then the efficacy of God’s hearing must be taken just as seriously; for the Psalmist sees 
God’s hearing as God’s ultimate “No” to his suffering. If it is to be believed that behind the 
text of Psalm 22 there stands someone who is intimately acquainted with the deepest and 
                                                          
122 Richard Bauckham summarizes Moltmann’s strategy in particular: “In Moltmann’s understanding, 
the cross does not solve the problem of suffering, but meets it with the voluntary fellow-suffering of 
love. Solidarity in suffering—in the first place, the crucified God’s solidarity with all who suffer, and 
then also his followers’ identification with them—does not abolish suffering, but it overcomes what 
Moltmann calls ‘the suffering in suffering’: the lack of love, the abandonment in suffering. Moreover, 
such solidarity, so far from promoting fatalistic submission to suffering, necessarily includes love’s 
protest against the infliction of suffering on those it loves.” See “Jürgen Moltmann” in The Modern 
Theologians, ed. by David F. Ford with Rachel Muers, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 153. 
123 Cone has also had to address questions of efficacy. Citing William Jones, he claims, “There is no 
historical evidence that can prove conclusively that the God of Jesus is actually liberating black 
people from oppression. Thus [Jones] asks: Where is the decisive event of liberation in the experience 




most desperate pains of this life, then with equal confidence we must insist with that person 
that God’s hearing has a bearing on those cries. God’s hearing is a far cry from being a mere 
coping mechanism or an ahistorical and spiritualized response to human suffering in this 
life. Rather, if the above investigation into the anthropology, psychology, and neurobiology 
of hearing has demonstrated anything at all, it has demonstrated that being heard changes 
things, concretely. Finally, if God’s hearing is God’s loving and just attention accomplished 
by the significant personal presence of the Triune God, which entails a sure response, then 
God’s hearing is the beginning of the human experience of the divine acts by which God 
moves to address suffering. Hearing is not the only, but rather, the first in a temporally 
experienced sequence. Because God hears the covenant people in Egypt, God then delivers 
them with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm. Because God heard the cries of Hagar, 
Rachael, Leah, and Hannah, God then gives them children. Because God heard the cry of 
the Psalmist, God then delivers him from his circumstances. God’s hearing, in other words, 
does not exhaust God’s saving and liberating work, but is an important part of that work. 
 East of Eden, human flourishing has been at odds with suffering, evil, and horrific 
pain. The Epistle to the Hebrews reminds us that the blood of righteous Abel still speaks 
today, crying out from the ground; but not for another sufferer, that the blood of God might, 
too, soak the ground. Rather, it cries out to be heard. It is that same cry to be heard that was 
made by the author of Psalm 22, who testifies not only to the injustice and horror of this life, 
but to the reality that God does, indeed, hear, and that this hearing changes everything. It is, 
then, for good reason that on the cross, Christ takes up the words of Psalm 22. Like the 
Psalmist, in anguish and despair, Christ is scorned and despised by others, his bones 
disjointed and his heart like wax; and while his clothes are being divided, he declares his 
God-forsakenness, as his blood is poured out like water. And yet that spilt blood “speaks a 
better word than the blood of Abel” (He. 12:24). It testifies not to the suffering of the divine 
nature, but it speaks a better word, a word that cries out on behalf of the sufferings of all of 
creation, a word that is heard by God. That hearing, God’s “Yes” to Jesus Christ, is then 
God’s “Yes” to all who are found in him. That “Yes” creates a new people, a heard people, 
who, having been heard by God are then, like Christ, able to hear others. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
It has been argued that God’s hearing matters for human becoming—and that in significant 
and concrete ways.  
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First, following McFadyen’s account of personhood, I have argued that persons are 
formed intersubjectively, even if that intersubjectivity is not to be found in the immanent 
life of the Trinity. In an attempt to balance McFadyen’s account, I have suggested that being 
heard is at least as formative as being addressed by an other. We are not only called into 
personhood, but heard into it as well.  
Second, by way of engagement with the social sciences, I have attempted to show some 
of the concrete, formative effects of being heard by an other, while being sensitive to the 
extent to which God’s hearing might prove similar or dissimilar to creaturely hearing. That 
investigation revealed rich and varied ways in which being heard constructively forms one’s 
self-understanding. It also revealed the destructive and damaging consequences of going 
unheard. Whether or not one is heard has considerable influence over one’s self-
understanding and the extent to which one is formed toward one’s God-ordained telos, 
which is found in Christ, the Always-Heard Word who hears others. As we are heard, we 
become more fully human, and better able, like Christ, to listen to others. As such, we are 
heard into a particular kind of being: heard and hearing beings. 
Third, in reliance on earlier chapters, it was suggested that God’s hearing of human 
creatures is best understood as God’s loving and just attention that is accomplished by 
means of the significant personal presence of the Triune God, which entails a sure response. 
Speaking of God’s significant personal presence is a more appropriate theological idiom for 
describing God’s hearing that avoids some (but not all) of the anthropological baggage 
associated with the corporeality and passivity of human hearing.  
Fourth, some of the theological significance of God’s hearing was shown by bringing it 
into conversation with passibilist-liberationist theologies, which argue that the incongruity 
between human suffering and human flourishing requires a revision of the Christian doctrine 
of God, such that God, too, suffers. These theologies, each in their own way, find a kind of 
existential comfort in projecting suffering onto the eternal life of God, and in so doing, are 
seeking the effects of something like human empathy. While supportive of their concrete 
aim toward liberation from pain, suffering, or oppression. I suggested that their revisionism 
was unnecessary, and that the underexplored and undervalued notion of God as hearer is 
more theologically appropriate and pastorally and existentially satisfying than that of a God 
who is weak, vulnerable, and subject to suffering. Being heard by God is liberating, insofar 
as it changes not only one’s existential experience, but may, too, change one’s concrete 
circumstances, as it did for the author of Psalm 22, in ways that a weak and suffering god 
cannot. God’s hearing is, thus, a means by which humans, in the face of concrete suffering, 
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become more fully who they were created to be, and are liberated into interpersonal and 
dialogical communion with the Triune God of love. 
Finally, the reflection on Psalm 22 demonstrated the concrete effects of being heard by 
God. Being heard changed the Psalmist, forming him in particular ways that were consistent 
with our findings from the social sciences. Being heard by God not only changed the 
experience of the Psalmist, but formed him into someone he otherwise would not have been, 
namely, someone who is able to turn outward, speaking to and hearing others. More than 
that, in Psalm 22 God’s hearing was shown to reveal the self-understanding of Israel, Christ, 
and humanity more generally. Here, we find a hint for God’s decision to self-reveal as one 
who hears; namely, that God’s hearing has transformative effects, not unlike human hearing, 
but in ways that are powerfully constitutive of the transformation wrought by God’s savings 






5. CHRISTOLOGY: THE TRIUMPH OF THE ALWAYS-HEARD 
WORD 
 
“…and he was heard because of his reverent submission.”1 
 
I have characterized God’s hearing of creatures as a loving and just attention that is 
accomplished by means of the significant personal presence of God. In view of the 
distinction between creator and creation, God’s presence has been understood in terms of 
non-contrastive transcendence, such that God is ontologically other and distinct from 
creation and is, as such, immanently present in and to creation itself. And yet God’s 
presence to creation takes on a new dimension with the incarnation of the Word. Without 
abrogating God’s distinction from and immanent presence to creation, the incarnation marks 
a moment in which God’s personal presence is made manifest most profoundly. While 
creation was never without God, the incarnation marks the coming of the one called 
Emmanuel, which introduces something new in the creaturely experience of God’s 
presence. First, the event of the Word made flesh introduced a temporal-spatial location of 
God’s presence in a new and unique way; if one were to inquire about God’s presence in the 
incarnation, a time and place could be referenced in a way that it could not have previously. 
Second, the incarnation introduces a fleshly, human, embodied presence of God. God is not 
only temporally and spatially present, but is so as one who personalizes a human body, a 
human soul, and even human ears.  
There are then important questions to be raised: What does the work of God in the 
incarnate Christ mean for God’s hearing? What does it mean for God to hear human 
creatures now that the eternal Word has taken on human ears? How do the events of cross, 
resurrection, and ascension come to bear on God’s hearing? How does the ascended Christ, 
in his priestly or intercessory office, inform the theological picture of God’s hearing?  
These questions are especially important in view of christology’s relationship to 
soteriology. If the work of God in the coming of Christ was “for us and for our salvation,” 
then christology must be soteriologically oriented. Indeed, I have already construed God’s 
hearing in soteriological categories, even without proposing a thoroughgoing soteriology. 
The previous chapter examined the effects of God’s hearing in contrast to passibilist-
liberationist visions of salvation and by considering the extent to which it forms human 
                                                          
1 Hebrews 5:7. 
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speakers in Christlikeness. In my reading of Psalm 22, God’s hearing was understood to 
embrace the soteriological narratives of Israel, Christ, and by him, all of humanity. If God’s 
hearing does, as I have argued, produce a sure response, then that response is efficacious, to 
the advantage of the one heard, and is, like all of God’s opera ad extra, soteriologically and 
eschatologically oriented. So, an inquiry into God’s hearing, understood in this way, must 
ask and answer how it is that God in the incarnate Christ has accomplished this salvation. I 
will gesture toward soteriological conclusions here, but will defer the bulk of them to the 
Conclusion. 
And yet, to avoid misunderstanding, this is not to argue for a purely functional 
christology, if such a thing is even possible.2 Being and act are not easily disentangled, 
epistemically or ontologically. Thus, the subsequent approach requires attention to both the 
person and work of Christ. I want to attend to the presence and activity of the Word made 
flesh, Jesus Christ, as one who is uniquely heard by the Father and who hears his own. So, I 
will proceed by assuming a broadly Chalcedonian christology, while attending to its 
soteriological telos. Further, readers looking for greater emphasis on the Spirit in this 
chapter will be left wanting. Of course, the Word cannot be divorced from the Spirit, neither 
in the ad intra of the divine life, nor in the opera ad extra. The indivisibility of the external 
operations is such that the Father works through the Son and by the Spirit. The Spirit will 
come into focus, below, when considering Christ’s presence following the ascension. This is 
not meant to imply that the Spirit is irrelevant in, say, the earthly ministry of the incarnate 
Word. Yet because my intention is to reflect with acute focus on christology, the Spirit will 
remain largely bracketed from the discussion, even if such bracketing is not possible in the 
being or act of the Triune God. Speech about the Triune God is simply not able to say it all. 
Specifically, it is my intention to think God’s hearing through christologically. 
Preceding chapters have already featured christological conclusions. This is because, “No 
element in a system of theology is unrelated to Christology: to contemplate any of its parts 
is to have one’s mind drawn irresistibly to the name and figure of Jesus Christ.”3 Yet here I 
hope to give a more thoroughgoing and focused account of how God’s hearing is to be 
conceived in light of four christological moments—the incarnation, death, resurrection, and 
                                                          
2 Gerald O’Collins, SJ, comments “[i]t is doubtful that [one] can propose a purely functional 
Christology, one which attends only to Christ’s saving activity on our behalf and refuses to raise, 
explicitly or implicitly, any ontological questions whatsoever about who and what he is in himself,” 
Christology: A Biblical, Historical and Systematic Study of Jesus, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 19.  
3 John B. Webster, “Christology, Theology, Economy. The Place of Christology in Systematic 
Theology” in God Without Measure: Working Papers in Christian Theology Volume 1: God and the 
Works of God, (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 2016), p. 57.  
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ascension—of the Word made flesh. Given that Christ is the Always-Heard Word, it will be 




In the economy of God’s saving work, the incarnation initiates a new mode of divine 
hearing. We have already examined Holy Scripture’s testimony to God’s hearing the likes of 
Hagar, or the enslaved Israelites, or of God’s “conversing” with Moses as one does a friend; 
but now the mode of God’s hearing is fundamentally changed with the coming of God 
incarnate. Because God has eternally self-determined to become present to creation in a new 
way, this new mode of presence produces a corresponding new mode of divine listening. 
This new mode is, of course, not new to God. Newness is not possible for the eternal and 
immutable God insofar as it is a temporal qualifier and implies change. As was argued in 
Chapter 3, following Aquinas, this newness is real to creatures but “non-real” or “logical” to 
God.4 It is in the creaturely experience that God’s presence becomes something other than it 
was. And yet this does not mean it is somehow illusory. It is as real as any other event in 
creation, but is so in a creaturely manner. And it is the metaphysics of this new creaturely 
reality of God’s presence that must be theologically explicated. 
The first observation to be made about this new mode of presence is with respect to 
God’s agency in the sending of the Son. The asymmetry between divine and human agency 
already led to what was only an apparent paradox in Chapter 2, namely, that it was God’s 
hearing that precedes and is the cause of human speech unto God. This prioritization of 
God’s hearing, following Barth and some feminist theologians, resulted in an understanding 
of petitionary prayer wherein Jesus Christ is God’s antecedent answer to human petitions. 
Human petitions are made possible by God’s gracious act of hearing. Human prayer to God, 
then, is the result of God’s initiative and activity. We saw that this asymmetry of divine and 
human agency means that it is God who prays and God who hears. Petition, I argued, is the 
receiving of the gift and answer already given in Christ. And it is that already that 
characterizes God’s hearing of human petition.  
If the incarnation of the Word is the already of God’s hearing, and God’s complete 
and sufficient response to human need, then it is possible to make the claim that God’s 
                                                          
4 Webster is particularly clear on this matter: “In the course of his movement from immanent origin 
to economic goal, the Word acquires nothing, remains immutable and simple, entirely resolved and 
composed.” in ibid., pp. 47-48. 
168 
 
eternal self-determination to become incarnate just is God’s act of hearing—a self-
determination to hear that precedes not only human acknowledgement and petition, but even 
the act of creation itself. This is the natural conclusion drawn from Barth’s declaration that 
“Of all the things that are needed by man, and needed in such a way that he can receive 
them only from God, that only God can give them to him, there is one great gift. And to all 
the true and legitimate requests that are directed necessarily to God, there is one great 
answer. This one divine gift and answer is Jesus Christ.”5 The incarnation of the Word is 
God’s already and God’s sure response. This manifestation of the significant personal 
presence of God in Christ is the outworking in time of God’s already hearing in eternity. 
There is then no separating God’s hearing from the incarnation. That the two are in fact one 
is reinforced by the “sure response” of our working definition and is supported also in 
Barth’s claim that God “wills not only to hear but to hearken [nicht nur hören, sondern 
erhören will].”6 God’s hearing just is God’s hearkening. If God hears, God hearkens. God 
has heard (or, more properly, “is hearing”) in eternity and has eternally willed the 
hearkening: the sending of the Son. It is in that hearkening, that sure response, that is the 
already of God’s hearing human speech unto God. It is its foundation, its formal cause, and 
the means by which it becomes possible. The event of the incarnation just is God’s hearing 
of creatures, already eternally willed, which brings about human speech to God. If the 
incarnation is the definitive manifestation of the significant personal presence of God by 
which God justly and lovingly attends to creation, then it should come as no surprise that the 
incarnation can be theologically conceived in terms of God’s hearing. And by conceiving of 
it in this way, God’s agency is prioritized, even as it is understood to be asymmetrical and 
incommensurable with human agency. 
If the incarnation just is God’s hearing and is a new mode by which humans 
experience God’s hearing, then what is to be made of the old mode of hearing? Here I think 
it is sufficient to claim that that hearing remains what it is: the loving and just attention of 
God that is accomplished by means of God’s significant personal presence to the hearer. Yet 
that hearing, that significant personal presence, can only be a proleptic version of the kind of 
hearing accomplished by the incarnation. It is fundamental Christian doctrine that the 
incarnation is a distinct and definitive kind of personal divine presence. Such a conviction 
does not deny the real and significant presence of God prior to the incarnation. Rather, it 
sees the incarnation in continuity with that presence insofar as it is the same God who 
becomes present to Moses and to Peter. Yet the incarnate Christ is the significant personal 
                                                          
5 Barth, CD III/3, p. 271. 
6 Barth, CD II/1., pp. 511-12 = KD II/1, p. 575. 
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presence of God such that Jesus Christ is identified with Godself in a way that a burning 
bush, pillar of cloud, or shekinah glory could not be. The pre-incarnate hearing of God, then, 
can be said to anticipate the definitive kind of presence to creatures found uniquely in the 
incarnation. 
There is a second way in which the incarnation of the Word comes to bear on God’s 
hearing. It is not only itself God’s act of hearing and hearkening, but it is also the medium 
by which creatures now experience being heard by God. In this new mode of divine 
presence, God becomes present to creatures by uniting Godself, hypostatically, with the 
human nature of Jesus of Nazareth. By the hypostatically uniting of divine and human 
natures, Jesus Christ, the God-human, becomes the locus of God’s significant personal 
presence, such that when God hears, it is by means of Jesus Christ.7 To speak of the locus of 
God’s presence and hearing is not a new development with the incarnation. Indeed, the 
temple was understood to be the place of God’s dwelling and significant personal presence, 
and that in a way that did no injury to divine omnipresence. Solomon’s temple dedication, 
examined in Chapter 1, establishes the point insofar as no matter the whereabouts of the 
pray-er, petitions directed toward the temple would be heard by God (1 Ki. 8:28-49; 2 Chr. 
6:19-42). Now, Emmanuel becomes the locus of God’s listening presence toward whom 
prayers are directed. More will be said about this subsequently in its relation to Christ’s 
resurrection and ascension, as well as the role of the Spirit. Here a few observations must be 
made concerning this new and specific medium by which creatures are heard by God. 
The medium by which God hears is new because it unites the infinite and the finite, 
the eternal and the temporal, immutable and changeable, the uncreated and the created in a 
manner that, following Chalcedon, is unconfused, unchangeable, indivisible, and 
inseparable. Indeed, Robert Sokolowski has argued that conciliar christology was 
fundamentally about maintaining the distinction between creator and creature. Thus, it has 
import for how that distinction is to be maintained and understood with respect to God’s 
hearing. The distinction, Sokolowski argues, is not “an inert background for more 
controversial issues; it enters into their formulation and helps determine how they must be 
decided.”8 This “bringing together” of the infinite and the finite is the project of Nicaea, 
Constantinople, and to an even greater extent, of Ephesus and Chalcedon. These hard-fought 
conciliar formulations sought to take seriously the unity of God and humanity in Christ 
                                                          
7 Of course, to speak instrumentally is to do so with reference to the divine economy.  
8 Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), p. 34. For a more current 
account of the uniting of the finite and infinite, see Rowan Williams, Christ the Heart of Creation 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2018). 
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without compromising the fundamental distinction between the two. The resulting single-
hypostasis, dual-nature christology provides the orthodox grammar by which unity and 
diversity are to be maintained; but that grammar was especially contentious in the Nestorian 
controversy. In Cyril of Alexandria’s dispute with Nestorius, the use of the communicatio 
idiomatum became the theological impasse. How are we to speak properly of Christ’s 
properties if some are properly predicated of Christ’s divine nature and others of his human 
nature? For Nestorius, it was theologically clumsy to speak of Mary as “theotokos” or to 
speak of Christ as “suffering impassibly,” as Cyril does.9 Yet for Cyril, to speak in such 
ways is to reinforce the single-subject which hypostasizes the two natures. For Cyril, to call 
Mary merely “christotokos” did not do justice to the single divine subject. It was God and 
no other whom Mary bore. This deployment of the communicatio idiomatum is, according 
to John McGuckin, “like an intellectual firework, a condensed cipher of all that [Cyril] holds 
to be important in Christology and faith.”10 McGuckin goes on to explain that “the 
communicatio is shorthand for [Cyril’s] whole doctrine of the incarnation itself as a 
transforming transaction whereby human nature is appropriated by God and deified in the 
process.”11 When the communicatio is understood in this way, it allows seemingly 
paradoxical things to be said of the incarnate Christ, not with the intent to obscure the 
distinctiveness of the divine and human natures, nor to simply further confound thinking on 
the mystery of the incarnation. Rather, it permits seemingly paradoxical claims to be made 
in order to take seriously the single divine subject of which properties are predicated while 
acknowledging the distinctiveness of each nature.  
Why this detour into the Nestorian dispute? This is crucial background for a concise 
yet profound claim for the incarnation and God’s hearing—a thread that will run throughout 
my argument: the ears that were formed in Mary’s womb are God’s ears. The young ears 
that listened to the teachers in the temple are God’s ears. The ears that traveled throughout 
Galilee hearing the voices of the lame, afflicted, and oppressed are God’s ears. By way of 
the communicatio idiomatum, those ears are rightfully called the corporeal ears of the 
incorporeal God. What is profoundly new about God’s hearing in the incarnation is that God 
has taken to Godself human ears by which God now hears. The eternal hearing of the 
immanent Trinity—God’s hearing of God’s Word in the eternal, blessed, glory of God’s 
immanent life—that hearing, which was argued for in Chapter 3, is now, mutatis mutandis, 
turned outward, economically, such that God now hears with human ears. Were we to query 
                                                          
9 John McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004), p. 190. 
10 Ibid., p. 191. 
11 Ibid., p. 192. 
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the means of God’s hearing before the incarnation, the answer given would be different than 
the one supplied after the incarnation. Antecedent to the incarnation, God’s hearing has been 
understood analogously, and of far greater dissimilarity than similarity to human hearing. 
That analogical understanding is not abolished by the incarnation. To speak of the incarnate 
Christ’s hearing with human ears is not to speak of God’s hearing in an equivocal manner; 
for that hearing remains the hearing of a divine hypostasis. It is characterized by the divine 
perfections and is not vulnerable to postlapsarian corruptions that characterize human 
hearing. Yet there is a sense that in the incarnation God now hears in a more creaturely 
mode insofar as God has self-determined to be present in this manner. Whatever it may have 
meant for Moses to converse with God face to face as one does a friend, in the incarnation 
God is now spoken to, unequivocally, face to face. 
To claim that God hears by way of human ears is to make the incarnate Christ the 
locus of a certain kind of qualified receptivity. The human ears of the Word hear all manner 
of creaturely locutions—praises and petitions, truths and falsities, questions and challenges. 
These are actively received by the attention of the incarnate Word. As has been argued 
previously, hearing is active insofar as it requires a certain kind of attention and presence, 
and yet it acts upon that which comes from another and is in that sense receptive. While 
much theological reflection is focused upon the acts of the incarnate Christ, there has been 
less theological attention paid to the character of receptivity introduced by the incarnation. 
That is not to claim that receptivity is somehow theologically novel. It has frequently found 
its dogmatic home in considerations of Christ’s priestly office by which he mediates 
between God and humanity, receiving from both and giving to the both. Yet the priestly 
office and its resultant soteriology have too often been restricted to Christ’s death (often 
derived from particular readings of the Epistle to the Hebrews where Christ is read as 
sacrifice)12 or to Christ’s ascension (where the mediatorial role is understood to culminate in 
the uniting of heaven and earth).13 Yet Athanasius understood the incarnation to effect the 
beginning of the priestly office of the Word due to the taking on of human flesh. In the same 
way that Aaron put on the priestly garments and thus functioned in his priestly office, 
                                                          
12 For a recent argument breaking with the tradition of Christ as victim, see David M. Moffitt, 
Atonement and the Logic of Resurrection in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Leiden: Brill, 2011), esp. 
Chapter 4. 
13 For example, Ian A. McFarland, The Word Made Flesh: A Theology of the Incarnation (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2019) maps the munus triplex onto the creed, associating the 
priestly office with “he ascended”. Though, McFarland acknowledges the priestly office is not strictly 
limited to the ascension; ibid., p. 173. Wolfhart Pannenberg has argued that the earthly ministry of 
Jesus is best understood in prophetic terms alone. See Systematic Theology Vol II, trans. by G. W. 
Bromiley, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), pp. 445-46; Jesus—God and Man, trans. by Lewis L. 
Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), pp. 208ff. 
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Athanasius argues that, likewise, the Word put on human flesh in order to serve as high 
priest.14 O’Collins and Jones come to the same conclusion in two of their “Twelve Theses 
on Christ’s Priesthood,” claiming in Thesis Two that “The Son of God became a priest, or 
rather the High Priest, when he took on the human condition,” and in Thesis Three that “The 
priesthood of Christ and its exercise began with the incarnation.”15 The priestly office is thus 
to be understood to span the entirety of the Word’s incarnate life, such that the receiving and 
giving, the mediatorial role, is not limited to any one christological moment but runs the 
compass of the earthly ministry, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension.16 To adopt such a 
perspective invites a priestly interpretation of Christ’s receiving and giving, of divine-
human mediation that illumines a christological understanding of God’s hearing across the 
scope of the incarnate work of Christ, which we will trace subsequently. 
If the incarnate ministry of the Word, who is always heard by God, is to be 
understood as a priestly activity, then it should be asked in what sense this is so. In his 
discussion of Christ’s priestly office, Kenneth Oakes claims, “As priest, Jesus Christ is 
humanity’s representative before God, intercedes on our behalf before the Father, fulfils the 
Law by remaining obedient in life (active obedience), and atones for the sin of humanity by 
his suffering and death (passive obedience).”17 While remaining an incomplete profile of the 
priestly work of the incarnate Christ, such a description provides an instructive framework 
for considering God’s hearing by way of the priestly ministry of the incarnate Word—a 
framework that will also extend to cross, resurrection, and ascension. 
First, Jesus represents humanity before God. As one who hears with human ears and 
is always heard by the Father, Jesus speaks to the Father on behalf of his disciples, and he 
speaks to his disciples on behalf of his Father. This mediatorial and representative role is 
richly, if compactly, described in the Fourth Gospel’s so-called “High Priestly Prayer”. 
Whether or not the designation is entirely appropriate, the prayer contains mediatorial and 
representative features.18 Here, Jesus looks back to survey the compass of his earthly 
                                                          
14 Athanasius, “Four Discourses Against the Arians” in Philip Schaff (ed.) Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. 4, Athanasius: Select Works and Letters (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), 
2.8. 
15 Gerald O’Collins, SJ and Michael Keenan Jones, Jesus our Priest: A Christian Approach to the 
Priesthood of Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 241-42. 
16 See also Kenneth Oakes, “Normative Protestant Christology” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Christology, ed. by Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 579. 
17 Ibid., p. 577. 
18 The designation of the prayer as such is most often attributed to 16th c. Reformed theologian David 
Chytraeus, but its priestly features are noted as early as Cyril of Alexandria’s commentary on John 
(11.8). Attridge nonetheless notes that “we can affirm that the Fathers… and other scholars who have 
found priestly allusions in this text are not simply fantasizing.” in Harold Attridge, “How Priestly is 
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ministry, and looks forward to his return to glory. He declares to the Father, “for the words 
that you gave to me I have given to them, and they have received them” (17:8). Jesus has 
spoken the words of the Father to his disciples. His disciples have heard those words and 
received them. Jesus spoke to his disciples on behalf of the Father. He now speaks to the 
Father “on behalf of” his disciples (17:9). Jesus, as the locus of this bi-lateral speaking, is 
one who addresses earth with the words of heaven and heaven with the words of earth. Yet 
it ought not to be missed that this bi-lateral speaking is a function of his bi-lateral hearing. In 
this particular prayer, Jesus addresses his Father and in so doing speaks “these things in the 
world” (17:13). The phrase is relevant because expositors link this public prayer with Jesus’ 
public prayer at the raising of Lazarus (11:42) when he both declared himself the Always-
Heard-Word and prays aloud for others to hear. Barrett remarks,  
If ταῦτα refers to the prayer, cf. 11.42, where Jesus prays aloud διὰ τὸν ὄχλον. He 
himself, as the eternal Son in perpetual communion with the Father, has no need of 
the formal practice of prayer; but this human practice is the only means by which 
the communion he enjoys can be demonstrated to human observation, and forms 
the pattern for the communion which his disciples will subsequently enjoy.19 
The priestly prayer of Chapter 17 and the prayer at Lazarus’ grave in Chapter 11 are both 
didactic. Jesus intends to be overheard. By overhearing, the disciples have learnt that Jesus 
is not only always heard by the Father, but that he speaks to the Father on their behalf. His 
disciples have heard the Father’s word from Jesus (17:14). They have overheard Jesus pray 
their needs to the Father at the tomb of Lazarus (11:41-2), in the upper room (17:9), and 
presumably elsewhere. They have overheard that Jesus is always heard (11:42). They have 
been invited, as an audience, into the dialogical communion between the Father and Son. 
And yet Jesus’ prayer is that the disciples would be more than an audience who has heard 
his words. The prayer concludes with a purpose: “I made your name known to them, and I 
will make it known, so that the love with which you have loved me may be in them, and I in 
them” (17:26). Indeed, all that the disciples have heard is for the purpose that the love of the 
Father for the Son—a love that includes God’s listening ear—may be in them. The disciples 
overhear in order that they, too, may be heard by the Father. This is a constitutive element in 
the love between Father and Son. 
                                                          
the ‘High Priestly Prayer’ of John 17?” in The Catholic Biblical Quarterly, Vol. 75.1 (Jan 2013), p. 
11. 
19 C.K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1978), p. 509. See also, D.A. Carson, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), p. 564. 
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 To summarize, the incarnate Christ, the Always-Heard-Word, the one who hears 
with human ears, hears the words of his Father and speaks them to his disciples. Further, he 
hears the words of his disciples and speaks them to his Father. This loving, dialogical 
communion between the Father and the Son is to be manifest in the disciples. And the 
priestly office of the incarnate Christ, insofar as it is marked by bi-lateral speaking and 
hearing, effects a salvific outcome, namely, that the disciples may speak to and be heard by 
the Father (though, not in the exact same way that the divine Son is heard by the Father). 
While Jesus prays that this dialogical love of the Father “would be in them,” he adds, “and I 
in them.” Indeed, Jesus remains mediatorial, even in the disciples’ experience of the filial 
love. The disciples do not replace him as mediator, but Jesus prays that his dialogical 
communion with the Father would be experienced in them. 
 Second, in his priestly office, the incarnate Christ is one who fulfills the law by his 
active obedience. In Chapter 1, we observed the consistency with which the Scriptures 
declare that God wills not to hear covenant unfaithfulness. It was observed that Jesus’ 
obedience to the Father’s commandments (Jn 15:10) was grounds, inter alia, for the 
Father’s unwavering hearing of the incarnate Son. The point is supported here from the 
priestly perspective. The Epistle to the Hebrews makes the most substantial case for 
understanding Christ’s law-fulfillment as a priest in connection to God’s hearing. Hebrews 
4:14-5:10 emphasizes the humanity of the divine Son and the accompanying obedience as a 
high priest. This is done in two ways. First, v. 15 insists that “we do not have a high priest 
who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but we have one who in every respect has 
been tested as we are, yet without sin.” Here there is an implicit acknowledgement of the 
impeccable obedience of the Son as high priest and mediator. To have a tempted-yet-
obedient mediator is grounds for a bold approach to the throne of grace in v. 16. Yet the 
connection between the Son’s obedience in v. 15 and the “bold approach” in v. 16 is only 
tacit. The connection is only fleshed out in what follows. The humanity of the divine Son 
and his faithful obedience as high priest is further spelled out, second, in v. 5:7: “In the days 
of his flesh, Jesus offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, to the one 
who was able to save him from death, and he was heard because of his reverent 
submission.” Here Jesus is portrayed as a high priest who makes an offering, not of the 
blood of bulls and goats, but an offering of “prayers and supplications, with loud cries and 
tears.”20 Significantly, he is heard on account of his “reverent submission” (ἀπὸ τῆς 
                                                          
20 While Attridge insists that this is not a reference to Gethsemane, as it is often taken to be, Bruce 
McCormack suggests that it is “Attridge’s own solution to this problem that opens the door to [the 
possibility that it refers to Gethsemane].” See Bruce L McCormack, “With Loud Cries and Tears” in 
The Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian Theology, ed. by Richard Bauckham, Daniel R. Driver, 
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εὐλαβείας)—a notoriously vexed translation.21 But whatever may be made of the translation, 
the logic of the passage connects God’s hearing of Jesus “in the days of his flesh” with the 
broader themes of sinlessness (4:15), obedience (5:8), and perfection (5:9), which account 
for Jesus being “designated by God a high priest according to the order of Melchizedek” 
(5:10). The notions of priesthood and obedience are brought together here and then 
connected to God’s hearing. Moreover, it seems that, for the author of Hebrews, Jesus has 
been designated a priest by God on account of his obedience that resulted in Jesus being 
heard. If this is the case, Jesus is heard because of his covenant faithfulness and obedience; 
and that obedience and resultant hearing are the grounds of his priestly office. He fulfills the 
law and is heard by the Father. He is, thus, one who may represent God’s people before 
God. This perfectly obedient priest who fulfills the law of God and lives faithfully to the 
covenant is the one who is, as such, always heard by God. 
 The incarnation is then the hearing and hearkening of God to creatures, but also the 
how of God’s hearing. The sending of the Son is God’s act of hearing which precedes and 
thus prompts human petition to God. And insofar as it is the taking of human ears to 
Godself, the incarnation is now the how of God’s hearing. The incorporeal God hears with 
the corporeal ears of Jesus of Nazareth. The incarnate Christ’s priestly office, which spans 
the compass of the incarnate life of the Word and is marked by both receiving and giving, is 
the mediatorial lens through which God’s hearing may be illumined. In his priestly office, 
the incarnate Christ gives and receives, mediates between God and humanity, and does so 
perfectly, as one who has fulfilled the law faithfully and, on account of his doing so, is 
always heard by the Father. 
 
5.2 Death 
With the trial and crucifixion of the Incarnate Word, we approach a new christological 
moment that invites further reflection on God’s hearing. Considered from the perspectives 
of Biblical narrative, conciliar christology, and the priestly office, light is shed upon the 
character of God’s hearing in and through the Incarnate Christ. If the incarnation is the how 
of God’s hearing, its means, then, something must be said about the who of this how. If ears 
                                                          
Trevor A. Hart, and Nathan MacDonald (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
2009), p. 65. 
21 Attridge notes that the translation is troubled by both the preposition, which could just as easily 
mean “from”, and the noun, which has “caution” or “circumspection” as its basic sense. Yet he notes 
that the εὐλαβ- word group in Hebrews is most often a reference to awe or reverence for God. That 
this reverence or awe is marked by a kind of submission or obedience is then, by most translations, 
inferred from what follows in verse 8. See Attridge, Hebrews, pp. 151-52. 
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are attached to whole persons, as was claimed in the preceding chapter, then we must ask 
what it means for God to hear by means of the Crucified One. What does the who of the One 
who was crucified in humility, anguish, and silence mean for the how of God’s hearing in 
Christ? 
 First, a consideration of the Biblical narrative of the Always-Heard-Word’s trial and 
crucifixion is revealing. The Who? question is fundamental to the trial, insofar as the 
ambiguity of Jesus’ special relationship to the Father is an inciting (but by no means 
solitary) cause. The question put to Jesus by the Pharisees in John 8, “Who are you?” is the 
question around which the Johannine trial is structured. And it is no surprise that Jesus 
responds to their question with the declaration that he is the one who has heard from the 
Father (8:25). He then proposes how that identity will be confirmed: “When you have lifted 
up the Son of Man, then you will realize that I am he, and that I do nothing on my own, but I 
speak these things as the Father instructed me” (8:28). Thus, the Who? question is central 
and could be paraphrased, “Is this the one who truly hears from God and is always heard by 
God in the special way in which he claims?” The claims of being heard by the Father and 
truly hearing from the Father are central to the authority which he tacitly claims for 
himself—an authority that brings him into conflict with the religious leaders.22 That the 
incarnate Word is willing “to be pushed out of this world onto the cross,”23—to use 
Bonhoeffer’s famous description—on account of his claim to be the Always-Heard-Word 
who truly hears from the Father—this is revealing for the character and nature of God’s 
hearing. 
 Rachel Muers, following Bonhoeffer, has pursued the question of christological 
hearing with special focus on the Who? question. She notes that “Christ appears in 
Bonhoeffer’s writings as the ‘humiliated one,’ offering no unambiguous manifestations of 
power, speaking in a way that cannot enforce a hearing.”24 Without a wholesale 
endorsement of Bonhoeffer’s christology, there is much to be gleaned by reflection on 
God’s hearing in and through the humility of the incarnate Word. For, despite being the one 
always heard by the Father, and the one who truly hears the Father, the incarnate Christ is 
one who comes in humility such that he may go unheard by the world. That humility reveals 
a fundamental characteristic of God’s hearing. It is marked by the same humility that does 
not exercise force or dominating power. God’s ears are attached to this one who is patient 
                                                          
22 Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology vol. II (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), pp. 334-43 
for an explication of this conflict of authority.  
23 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 360. 
24 Rachel Muers, Keeping God’s Silence (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 77, 118ff. Here I 
am broadly following Muers’ argument.  
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and long-suffering of human speech, enduring its infelicities and even its violence, out of 
love. The character of this patient hearing is on full display in the ironic silence of God’s 
Word before Pilate, and it finds its consummate demonstration at Golgotha, where humility 
and long-suffering are exercised to the limits of human life. Considering the crucifixion in 
this way permits two possible conclusions. First, God’s Word prioritizes listening over 
speaking. The incarnate one is not only God’s Word but also God’s ears. As such, Jesus’ 
earthly ministry may be viewed from the perspective of speaking and listening. If that 
earthly ministry is viewed in its entirety, such that the whole of it is characterized by its 
violent terminus at the cross, then we find a prioritization of reception over activity, 
humility over power, listening over speaking. In the crucifixion we find the consummate 
prioritization of humble, receptive listening over controlling, active speaking. As I have 
consistently argued, this humble, receptive listening is not passive, but active. The case is 
made more strongly at the cross, for the crucifixion was the will of the incarnate Word, who 
claimed, “No one takes [my life] from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have the 
power to lay it down, and I have the power to take it up again” (John 10:18). When we ask 
about thecharacter of God’s hearing revealed in the crucifixion of the incarnate Word, we 
find a prioritization of listening over speaking that is a listening-even-unto-death. Second, in 
the humility and long-suffering that terminates in the crucifixion, we find a hearing that 
gives abundant dignity, agency, and freedom to the other. This kind of listening makes room 
for human speech unto God, even corrupted, violent speech. At the cross, the hearing of the 
incarnate Word has bestowed a dignity on human freedom and agency insofar as it is 
allowed to be what it is, and is not overpowered, diminished, or spoken down by the Word. 
The freedom to speak, even wrongfully, is permitted by the ears of God which hung on the 
cross. The principle is evident in the Psalter, as accusations, frustrations, and 
disappointments are brought before the ears of God. Now, at the cross, the principle is 
consummately displayed as error and even violence are permitted on account of the dignity 
of human freedom and agency permitted by the ears of God. The one who listens with long-
suffering and patience, even unto death, will not contravene on human freedom in order to 
be heard. 
 Second, if we ask the Who? question from the perspective of conciliar christology, 
we are reminded that in the crucifixion of the incarnate one the listening of God is crucified. 
The crucifixion is the human rejection of God’s listening ears. If God’s listening is God’s 
loving and just attention accomplished by God’s significant personal presence—a presence 
that is supremely manifest in the coming of the incarnate Word, then the crucifixion is the 
outright rejection of God’s personal presence that just is God’s listening. If the incarnation 
is, as argued above, God’s act of listening itself, then the crucifixion of Christ is just the 
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rejection and crucifixion of the listening of God, of God’s personal presence. In the 
crucifixion we find the rejection of God’s hearing and the acceptance of flawed and self-
assured human speech. The world’s “no” to God’s presence and “yes” to self is manifest at 
the cross. It is a rejection of God’s prioritization of listening over speaking by the shouting 
down of God’s listening presence. The cross is the triumph of human speech over divine 
listening, a guilty verdict pronounced on God’s listening, and an affirmation of the human 
word over the divine Word. The one who is both God’s Word and God’s ears is crucified in 
a wholesale rejection of God. This rejection is, then, not only the rejection of God’s hearing 
presence, but of the formative soteriological benefits of God’s hearing. If, as the previous 
chapter argued, human beings are formed by being heard, then the crucifixion is a rejection 
of that advantageous formation that attends God’s hearing.  
Yet the crucifixion is not only the rejection of God’s hearing but also the gracious 
means by which that rejection is overcome. This is evident, third, when the crucifixion is 
viewed from the perspective of Christ’s priestly office. The cross is the place where the one 
who is both the Word and ears of God fulfills the Law through active obedience and atones 
for the sin of humanity. Here I do not intend an endorsement of any particular theory of 
atonement, but only wish to suggest that the incarnate Word, from the perspective of the 
priestly office, has fulfilled the Law through active obedience unto death. The claim is 
supported with unique insights for God’s hearing, again, from the Epistle to the Hebrews. 
The epistle’s themes of sinlessness, law-fulfillment, and obedience are taken up again in 
Chapter 10 with regard to atonement. If it was “impossible for the blood of bulls and goats 
to take away sins” (10:4), as the author argues, then it must be asked how the incarnate 
Word as priest is able to do so “once for all” (10:10). Here I simply wish to demonstrate that 
the effectiveness of the gracious, atoning work done by this priest is accomplished, in part, 
due to his ears. 
The passage is a quotation of Psalm 40:6-8 (LXX 39:7-9) and is the crux of the 
argument being made in Hebrews. The author of Hebrews makes the incarnate Word the 
speaker of the quotation. The author claims that “when Christ came into the world, he said, 
‘Sacrifices and offerings you have not desired, but a body you have prepared for me; in 
burnt offerings and sin offerings you have taken no pleasure. Then I said, “See, God, I have 
come to do your will, O God.”’” The passage has been the site of debates about atonement 
theory and whether or not Christ’s death is a satisfaction of some divine precedent. Having 
neither desire nor knowledge to adjudicate the question, it is my intention to make a more 
modest, if slightly speculative, observation that illumines a feature of the Word’s hearing 
with regard to the atonement. The argument of Hebrews is that the incarnate Word, as high 
priest, has made an offering for the atonement of sins. The question in dispute is what it is 
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that has been offered. The author of Hebrews is in clear reliance on the Septuagint, which 
diverges significantly from the Masoretic Text. While the LXX reads, “a body you have 
prepared for me,”25 the Hebrew text reads, “ears hast thou dug for me” or as the NRSV 
translates, “you have given me an open ear.” If we follow the Hebrew text rather than the 
LXX, we have a specific reference to the incarnate Word describing the human ears given 
him by God. It remains an unresolvable question why the LXX translated ֶזן  as σῶμα,26 but א ֹ֫
the Hebrew, had it been available and quoted by the author of Hebrews, would have been 
consistent with the argument being made. For whatever the extent the body of this priest is 
relevant for the argument, the theme of obedience is consistently present throughout. 
Attridge suggests that the Hebrew text of the Psalm and its “vivid image of hollowing out 
the ears, in the Hebrew original, suggests the willing obedience that stands ready to hear and 
execute God’s command.”27 This willing obedience of the open ear stands in contrast to the 
sacrifices and offerings that God did not desire (Heb 10:5, Ps. 40:6) and is consistent with 
the “See, God, I have come to do your will, O God” of Hebrews 10:7 and the “I delight to 
do your will, O my God” of Psalm 40:8. Put more concisely, the Hebrew Psalmist is ready 
to hear and obey the word of the one who hollowed his ear, and he understands this obedient 
hearing to be preferable to animal sacrifices. To hear and obey the word of the one who 
created the ear is a superior offering, and that upon which effective atonement is predicated. 
If we return to the text of Hebrews and its implications for the hearing of the 
incarnate Word, several conclusions might be drawn. First, the obedient hearing of the 
incarnate Word gains greater focus, as it shifts the balance of imagery in the text away from 
the sacrifice of a body, even if not entirely.28 In the light of Psalm 40, it could be suggested 
that Christ’s obedient hearing of the father is more fundamentally the grounds for the 
atonement, rather than the offering of his body. While this is hardly a radical or unorthodox 
conclusion, it does bring special emphasis to the incarnate Word’s hearing of the Father in 
the atonement discussion and more central to understandings of the crucifixion. So, when 
we attend to the Hebrew text of Psalm 40, we find greater reason to see the cross and 
accompanying atonement as the result of the Always-Heard Word’s obedient hearing of the 
Father. Second, this reading of the Hebrews text confirms Barth’s nicht nur hören, sondern 
erhören will as well as the “sure response” of our working definition. The incarnate Word’s 
                                                          
25 Attridge notes that later LXX revisers, Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion corrected “body” to 
“ears”, Attridge, Hebrews, p. 274, n. 70. 
26 Attridge’s suggestion that it is simply “an interpretive paraphrase for the obscure Hebrew phrase” 
seems plausible. Ibid., p. 274. 
27 Attridge, Hebrews, p. 274. See, esp. n. 83 where Attridge acknowledges a similar imagery and 
purpose in Is. 50:5. 
28 The sacrifice of the body still features in 10:10. 
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hearing is hearkening. The obedience of the Son is as sure as his hearing of the Father. The 
Son’s hearing of the Father is the Son’s hearkening to the Father. Third, if the image does 
not entirely shift away from the body of the incarnate Word, and if that “body” is a kind of 
interpretive synecdoche for the “ears” that have been “hollowed out” of the body of this 
high priest, then it may be suggested that not only the body but more specifically the 
obedient ears of the incarnate Word have been crucified to accomplish the atonement. From 
the Johannine perspective, it is the Son’s unwavering obedience to the Father that results in 
his trial and crucifixion. The one who hears and obeys is the one who is crucified on account 
of that hearing and obeying. Obedient ears get one crucified. Fourth, with respect to 
atonement theory, this reading offers additional insights to exemplar models insofar as the 
incarnate Word, in humility and long-suffering, hears the word of God and hearkens, 
perfectly, even unto death. If Christ’s obedient hearing of the Father is grounds for the 
salvation of the world, then the beneficence of such an obedient hearing should not be 
underestimated. 
Yet the death of the Always-Heard Word does not exhaust the christological 
implications of God’s hearing. For the crucifixion is, by some measure, the silencing of the 
one who claimed to hear and be heard, and the stopping up of those ears by which he hears. 
The Word that claimed to be Always-Heard by the Father, who claimed to perfectly hear 
and hearken at the voice of the Father, and who claimed to hear the words of his disciples 
and speak them perfectly to the Father—this one is crucified as a blasphemer for this very 
hearing and speaking. The trial and crucifixion are, in one sense, predicated on the 
questions: Does this one truly hear from God? Is this one truly heard by God in the special 
way in which he claims? 
 
5.3 Resurrection 
In the resurrection we find the vindication of the one who made such claims about his 
communicative relationship with the Father. Following the Biblical narrative, four distinct 
claims made by the Son are vindicated by the Father’s raising him from the dead. First, the 
resurrection vindicates the claim that Jesus is the Word who is always heard by the Father 
(Jn. 11:42). This claim was, of course, questioned by Jesus’ enemies in his own day. In the 
dispute over the man born blind whom Jesus healed, it is implied that Jesus’ enemies 
thought he could not be heard by God because they understood his actions, especially 
apparent sabbath violations, to violate the Law. Quoting back to Jesus’ enemies their own 
understanding, the healed man asserts, “Here is an astonishing thing! You do not know 
where he comes form, and yet he opened my eyes. We know that God does not listen to 
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sinners, but he does listen to one who worships him and obeys his will” (Jn 9:30-31). The 
narrative gives us this ambiguity: is Jesus a sinner to whom God does not listen or is he the 
one he claims to be, the one heard by the Father? If Jesus is tried and crucified as a 
condemned Law-breaker and blasphemer in light of this ambiguity, the resurrection may be 
understood as the Father’s vindication of Jesus’ claim to be heard. 
 Second and correlatively, the resurrection vindicates the claim that God is the 
Father by whom Jesus claimed to be heard. The resurrection is God’s “yes” not only to 
Jesus as the incarnate Word, but is God’s “yes” to Godself insofar as the Father confirms 
that he both speaks to and hears the Son, just as Jesus claimed. Jesus’ bold assertion that 
“When you have lifted up the Son of Man, then you will realize that I am he, and that I do 
nothing on my own, but I speak these things as the Father instructed me” (Jn. 8:28)—this 
anticipates the vindication of not only Jesus, but of the truthfulness of the Father who 
instructs him.  
 Third, the resurrection vindicates the claim that the Son has heard from the Father 
and truthfully spoken what he has heard. This is the claim that Jesus makes in the farewell 
prayer. Speaking to the Father, Jesus acknowledges, “the words you gave to me I have given 
to [the disciples], and they have received them and know in truth that I came from you; and 
they have believed that you sent me” (Jn 17:8). In the resurrection we have the Father’s 
confirmation of this claim. The Father has spoken to the Son. The Son has heard the voice 
of the Father and spoken the Father’s words truthfully to his disciples.  
 Finally, the resurrection vindicates the claim that the Son has heard his disciples and 
truthfully spoken to the Father on their behalf. The words offered “on behalf of” in the 
farewell prayer (Jn. 17:9, 20) are vindicated by the Father’s “yes” to the Son, confirming 
that the Father has heard the prayers of the Son, which include prayer for his present and 
future disciples.  
The resurrection, then, is God’s “yes” to the incarnate Word and the claims made 
regarding the hearing and speaking between Father and Son, as well as the hearing and 
speaking between the incarnate Word and his disciples. These claims to bi-lateral speaking 
and hearing, which were foundational for the ministry of the Word in the Fourth Gospel, are 
validated and confirmed by the Father’s raising of the Son. In the resurrection, the Son is 
confirmed to be the one he claimed to be, the Always-Heard Word who hears his Father, as 
well as his disciples, and speaks truthfully what he hears.  
 When we return to the perspective of conciliar christology, to the notion that the 
corporeal ears of Jesus of Nazareth are, in fact, the ears of God, we are confronted with a 
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new way the resurrection informs our understanding of God’s hearing. If the presence of 
God in Jesus of Nazareth is properly understood as God’s listening presence, God’s very act 
of hearing, then the resurrection, first, is the triumph of God’s listening over fallible, 
erroneous human speech. God’s listening has the “final word” so to speak. Sinful efforts to 
“shout down” the Word incarnate appear successful at the cross but are revealed as 
unsuccessful and impotent in the resurrection of God’s listening presence. The resurrection 
of God’s listening presence is God’s gracious provision to hear and overcome corrupt 
human speech. It is the unstopping of God’s ears which were stopped at the crucifixion. 
God’s listening presence, which is loving and just, endures and overcomes despite the 
human speech that intentionally or unintentionally opposes it. In the raising of God’s 
listening presence, God affirms God’s own listening presence in and to a world marked by 
erroneous, corrupt human speech. 
 Second, in God’s “yes” to God’s own hearing of human sin and rebellion, this act of 
grace makes real and present in God’s listening the transformative effects discussed in the 
preceding chapter. To be lovingly, justly, and graciously heard by God, in all the fallibility 
of human speech makes possible the transformative effects that result from being truly and 
perfectly heard and understood by an other. Liberation from loneliness, interpersonal 
intimacy, the ability to love without fear, a fundamental change in self-understanding, etc.—
these are all made possible on account of the resurrection. More still, God’s gracious 
listening that is “closer” or infinitely more proximate to human speech than the speaker 
herself—this listening permits an honesty and safety of the most authentic of existential 
human thoughts and feelings to be spoken to God. God’s listening triumphs over those 
thoughts and feelings, no matter how unholy. The rawness of human experience, so 
frequently displayed in the Psalms, can be brought to God in the confidence that if God’s 
listening was not overwhelmed by its rejection at the cross, it will certainly not be 
overwhelmed by any other human speech brought to God. In the resurrection, the 
omnipotence of God’s listening is put on display as it overcomes, endures, and transforms. 
 Yet in the first chapter it was argued that God will, in fact, decline to hear covenant 
unfaithfulness. Here, in the resurrection, we find God’s gracious triumph over covenant 
unfaithfulness. The result is that, third, in the resurrection God has made a way to for the 
sinner to be heard anew by God. The resurrection’s triumph over human sin, over the 
rejection of God’s listening presence, is the triumph of God’s willingness to hear those who 
have made themselves unhearable. The resurrection is good news for human speech of even 
the most error-laden and corrupt kind, because in the raising of God’s listening presence, 
God makes Godself available anew to hear those who have rejected God’s listening 
presence. There is a new and living hope for covenant-breakers. While God may decline to 
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hear, this need not be the final word. In its triumph over sin and death, the resurrection 
demonstrates the victory of God’s hearing—a victory that is eschatological and has the final 
word. In the darkness of human rebellion which God declines to hear, there remains a hope 
that God will, in the end, hear. 
Related, fourth, is that the Always-Heard Word was crucified for listening to the 
most unlikely of human speakers: the poor, prostitutes, tax collectors, and other so-called 
“sinners”. In the resurrection, the one who hears the unheard is vindicated in that hearing. 
Consistent with God’s hearing those in the wilderness, as examined in Chapter 1, the 
resurrection authorizes the listening ministry of the incarnate Word as a listening consistent 
with God’s self-revelation in the Old Testament. God’s hearing of the Israelites in Egyptian 
slavery, or the cries of barren women, or the Psalmist crying out from a place of alienation 
and fear—God’s ear is again shown to be especially inclined to the marginalized, as this 
hearing is carried on in the earthly ministry of the incarnate Word and is then vindicated by 
the resurrection. The resurrection, in this way, makes good on God’s threat to Israel in 
Exodus 22:21-27, where God warns Israel not to oppress the alien, widow, or orphan, for 
just as God heard the Israelite cries in Egyptian slavery, so too would God hear the cries of 
those whom Israel oppresses. The incarnate Word is crucified, in part, for his listening 
presence among those outcasts. As a result, he himself becomes an outcast. And as one who 
has become the oppressed enemy of Israel, who “suffered outside the city gate”, he, too, is 
heard on account of that oppression and alienation, is delivered from death, and raised to 
new life. 
Lastly, in the resurrection we have not only the triumph and vindication of God’s 
listening, but also its glorification. The resurrection of God’s listening presence inaugurates 
an eschatological and proleptic reality for God’s listening that exceeds the finite, ante-
glorified limitations of the incarnate Word. Scripture and theology have reflected on the 
unique properties of the glorified body of the incarnate Word and its relation to created 
history. The glorified Christ continues to hear with the corporeal ears of Jesus of Nazareth, 
but does so in a way that transcends prior spatiotemporal constraints. Limits of space do not 
permit an argument for the resurrected Christ’s relationship to spatiotemporal history. 
Others have noted its continuity and discontinuity.29 Here, if the discontinuity is to be 
                                                          
29 Scripture speaks of Christ appearing and disappearing before the disciples (Lk. 24:36-37, Jn. 20:19, 
26). Recently, Ian A. McFarland has argued that the resurrection cannot be conceived as an historical 
event insofar as it does not happen in the “spatiotemporal matrix of cause and effect,” in The Word 
Made Flesh, p. 165. Barth desired to maintain greater continuity, insisting that the resurrection must 
belong to human history, but argued that the resurrection occupied a kind of “second history” that 
follows after any normal person’s history would end. Cf. CD III/2, p. 441. Similar to Barth, T.F. 
Torrance sought to maintain the resurrection’s continuity with human spatiotemporal history but also 
acknowledged its discontinuity in that it “bursts through the structures and limitations of space and 
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acknowledged, even minimally, then it becomes conceivable for the glorified body of the 
incarnate Word to continue hearing corporeally, but to do so in a way that is supratemporal 
and supraspatial. For the ears of the incarnate Word, which are the ears of God, are now 
glorified human ears. This anticipates, proleptically, the eschatological means of God’s 
hearing, whereby God continues to hear through the God-human ears of the incarnate Word. 
The resurrection makes possible the christological shape of God’s hearing in the eschaton, 
when the incarnate Word will hear all and everywhere, and do so by means of his incarnate, 
corporeal faculties. 
 Finally, how does the resurrection inform the priestly office? To return to Hebrews 
5:7, this high priest was heard, with loud cries and tears, on account of his reverent 
submission or obedience. The resurrection is God’s hearing of the perfect offering of this 
high priest on behalf of fallen humanity. This is more than simply claiming that the 
resurrection vindicates the claims of the incarnate Word in his earthly ministry. It goes 
further, as the ultimate and final hearing of the Father, of this high priest’s offering on 
behalf of the world. There is dispute about whether or not the “loud cries and tears” are a 
reference to Gethsemane.30 If Gethsemane is taken to be the apex of Jesus’ agony in prayer, 
then there is good reason to think that phrase, while not necessarily exclusively referring to 
the garden, ought at least to include it in its purview. One might wonder how the earliest 
readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews might have understood this phrase. It seems probable 
that those familiar with the passion narrative, as recorded in the Gospels, could have 
imagined this as a reference to Gethsemane. Additionally, that these prayers are offered to 
“the one who was able to save him from death,” certainly brings the passion (and with it, the 
resurrection) into view alongside the “loud cries and tears.” Regardless of whether the 
referent is specific to Gethsemane or to some more general, composite understanding of the 
tenor of Jesus’ prayers,31 the picture Hebrews supplies is of a high priest, offering not an 
animal sacrifice, but offering (προσφέρω) prayers and supplications to the one who was able 
to save him from death. That this high priest was heard is an indication that the offering of 
prayers and supplications was accepted. And that hearing was proved in the fact that he was 
delivered from death—not by avoiding it, but by overcoming it, in God’s raising him from 
                                                          
time as we know them where historical, social and human institutions in a fallen world are hopelessly 
infected by sin and selfishness,” Space, Time and Resurrection (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1976), p. 88. 
30 Attridge notes no less than seven commentators who take this as an allusion to Gethsemane. Yet 
Attridge notes that the Gospels lack this description of Jesus’ prayer and that it would be difficult to 
claim Jesus’ prayer for the cup to be removed had been heard. Attridge, Hebrews, p. 148. 
31 Attridge also notes that the description is consistent with the “traditional Jewish ideal of a righteous 
person’s prayer” Hebrews, p. 148-49. 
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the dead.32 Such a conclusion is consistent with the theological reflection of Psalm 22 in the 
previous chapter. The one who cries out, “My God, my God” is the one who is heard, 
consoled, and delivered. In Hebrews, that this high priest who cried out in loud cries and 
tears and was, in fact, heard, is proven by the resurrection itself. This deliverance from 
death, then, becomes the ultimate hearing of the incarnate Word, the accepting of his 
offering that was heard on account of his “obedient suffering”.33 
 The resurrection, then, is good news. It vindicates the claims of the incarnate Word 
to be the one who hears from and is heard by the Father, as well as the one who speaks 
truthfully what he hears from his Father to his followers and from his followers to his 
Father. The resurrection means that God’s hearing triumphs over human speaking; it 
realizes the gracious effects of God’s hearing for those who cry out to God; it makes those 
who have made themselves unhearable able to be heard as it overcomes covenant 
unfaithfulness and human sin, and it proves once more, and ultimately, that God will hear 
those whom the world will not, the marginalized and oppressed. The resurrection is God’s 
ultimate act of hearing, wherein we find God’s hearing of God’s own incarnate Word and 
God’s “yes” to the offering of the high priest who intercedes in prayers, supplications, and a 
life of obedience, for a fallen world.  
 
5.4 Ascension 
With the ascension we are confronted no longer with the presence but the absence of the 
incarnate Word, the absence of the very listening presence of God. With the cessation of 
post-resurrection appearances and with Christ’s move into “the direction of the mystery of 
divine space, which is utterly concealed from man,”34 we are confronted with a new 
christological moment. If God’s hearing is conceived of as significant personal presence, 
how is God’s hearing to be understood in light of Christ’s removal from created time and 
space? It cannot simply mean a return to the pre-incarnate experience of being heard by 
God, as if the incarnation was without continuing effect. No, the Always-Heard Word is 
now with the One who always hears him. The one who heard others and spoke to the Father 
                                                          
32 That the author of Hebrews understands “able to deliver him from death” as realized in the 
resurrection seems certain, in contrast to the more suspect notion that Christ was not, in fact, 
delivered due to his death on the cross.  
 33 Here I am in broad agreement with Muers’ treatment of the resurrection as God’s act of hearing 
Christ, but am neglecting the broader, important theme of silence with which she is concerned; see 
Keeping God’s Silence, pp. 72-73. 
34 Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline (London: SCM Press, 1949), p. 125. Italics original. 
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on their behalf is now with the Father who hears him, at his right hand. The corporeal ears of 
the incorporeal God—the ears by which God has self-determined to hear creatures—are 
now exalted to the “place” of God’s omnipotence. If this exaltation and session mark the 
completion of the mission of the Son, the ascension, then, may be understood as “the goal of 
[the Son’s] activity on earth and in history.”35 It is, as Barth argues, the bringing together of 
God’s grace and omnipotence. As such, it informs the christological shape of God’s hearing 
in several ways. 
 First, the marriage of grace and omnipotence at the ascension reveals the incarnate 
Word’s ongoing listening presence. Matthew concludes his Gospel by overtly bringing 
together divine power (“All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me.”) and 
the ongoing grace of divine presence (“And remember, I am with you always, to the end of 
the age.”). In so doing, Matthew anticipates the new mode by which God’s power and 
gracious presence are experienced by those who are heard by God. While the human nature 
hypostasized by the Word no longer occupies the same earthly spatiotemporal matrix, his 
power and presence remain undiminished. The incarnate Word remains God’s listening 
presence; and that presence is in no wise diminished after the ascension. It becomes, rather, 
the significant personal presence of the incarnate Word now mediated by the Holy Spirit. 
The argument is made concisely by Ian McFarland when he claims,  
Because (as Paul puts it) ‘the Lord is the Spirit,’ through the Spirit we are enabled 
to see ‘the glory of the [incarnate] Lord,’ with the result that we ‘are being 
transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another’ (2 Cor. 3:17-
18; cf. 1 Cor. 6:17; 15:45). In this way (and contrary to the impression one might 
get from passages like John 14:16-17; 15:26; 16:7), the Holy Spirit is not a 
replacement for Jesus, but that which mediates Jesus’ own presence.36 
It is for this reason that Holy Scripture sometimes refers to the Holy Spirit as “the Spirit of 
Jesus Christ” or “the Spirit of the Son” (Phil 1:19; Acts 16:7; Gal 4:6). The Holy Spirit of 
God is the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. As such, the Spirit mediates the very 
listening presence of the incarnate Word, as a gift of grace, to those who speak to him in his 
risen and ascended state. The new space and time of the incarnate Word, who is present at 
God’s right hand of power, is mediated in a new way by God’s Spirit such that he continues 
to hear corporeally, but in a new way.  
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 McFarland, The Word Made Flesh, p. 188. Italics original. 
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 The new presence of the incarnate Word—this listening presence—should not be 
understood as lesser on account of his invisibility, but greater, on account of his indwelling 
Spirit. It was, indeed, better that Jesus go away (Jn 16:7). The corporeal hearing of the 
incarnate Word is not diminished on account of the ascension but perfected, because 
consistent with the non-contrastive account of transcendence developed and maintained 
throughout this work, the ascended Christ’s corporeal ears are not now more distant, but 
rather nearer, as the indwelling Spirit mediates the presence of those ears to human hearts. 
While it may appear paradoxical to suggest that the ascended Christ’s ears could be both 
corporeal and more proximate in their absence, I take the claim to be coherent on account of 
two convictions: that the Word remains incarnate and corporeal, even at God’s right hand, in 
God’s place and time; that the Word’s presence is, post-Pentecost, mediated perfectly by the 
Spirit. I take the apparent paradox to lie not in the notion of corporeal ears that are absent 
but proximate to creatures, but in the nature of eschatological reality that is mediated by the 
Spirit and proleptically experienced in the present. It is, thus, for good reason that Ephesians 
connects Christ’s ascension with gift giving (Eph. 4:7-14). This gracious gift of divine 
presence, mediated by God’s Spirit, accounts for the proximity and perfect hearing of the 
ascended, incarnate Word’s corporeal ears—an eschatological gift given proleptically to 
those in whom the Spirit of Jesus dwells, and that for the good of the Church. 
Second, the marriage of grace and omnipotence at the ascension reveals the 
incarnate Word’s ongoing mediatorship. It is at the ascension that the priestly ministry 
reaches its apex. Because the Always-Heard Word is now with God, at God’s right hand, in 
God’s space and time, yet infinitely proximate to his own via God’s Spirit, he is able to hear 
and intercede on behalf of those who speak to him in an ultimate way. Hebrews describes 
this high priest as one who has “passed through the heavens” (4:14), one who “sat down at 
the right hand of the Majesty on high” (1:3), one who was told to “sit at my right hand until 
I make your enemies a footstool for your feet” (1:13), and one who is now “crowned with 
glory and honor” (2:9). This high priest has been exalted in this way because, although like 
a high priest who entered “the inner shrine behind the curtain” (6:19-20), he didn’t enter “a 
sanctuary made by human hands, a mere copy of the true one, but he entered into heaven 
itself, now to appear in the presence of God on our behalf” (9:24). Thus, in the words of 
Hebrews, “the main point in what we are saying is this: we have such a high priest, one who 
is seated at the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens, a minister in the 
sanctuary and the true tent that the Lord, and not any mortal, has set up” (8:1-2). This rich 
temple imagery reveals the exalted, ascended, incarnate Word who hears from and 
intercedes for his people, as absolutely present in God’s place, triumphantly mediating 
between God and humanity. In the ascension the mission of mediation is accomplished and 
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fulfilled by a cosmic high priest who continues to hear with human ears, but does so in 
God’s place and time at God’s right hand of power.  
 Hebrews’ teaching on the mediatorship of this ascended high priest is supplemented 
and pneumatologized by Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Triumphantly, 8:34 declares, “It is 
Christ Jesus, who died, yes, who was raised, who is at the right hand of God, who indeed 
intercedes for us.” It is on account of the death, resurrection, and ascension that Paul so 
triumphantly declares that “If God is for us, who is against us?” For Paul, Christ’s ascension 
and intercession at God’s right hand are at the heart of the gospel of grace. God’s grace and 
God’s power are so triumphantly brought together here in the intercessory work of the 
ascended mediator that Paul cannot fathom anything capable of overcoming this act of 
divine love (8:35-39). But how is such victorious power and grace to be experienced by 
God’s people? Paul, just prior to this triumphant declaration reflects on human weakness 
and frailty. Here, instead of speaking of Christ’s intercession, he speaks of the Spirit 
interceding “with sighs too deep for words,” declaring that “God, who searches the heart, 
knows what is the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints according to 
the will of God” (8:26-7). We might say that the Spirit brings the words of Jesus’ followers 
to Jesus’ ears, and Jesus’ words to the Father’s ears. There is no need to entertain a double 
intercession or mediation—one of the Spirit and one of the Son. Rather, if the Spirit is the 
Spirit of Jesus, then we have here another description of the operative mode of Christ’s 
mediating presence. He continues to hear his own and intercede for them, even when they 
do not know what to say. He does so by his Spirit—even as this remains an indivisibly 
singular act of the Triune God. 
Third, the marriage of grace and omnipotence at the ascension brings human nature, 
and with it, human ears, into God’s time and space. The bringing of human nature into 
God’s place “is the source of our hope and the fountain from which every good thing flows 
from God to us. Since Christ has entered the heavenly kingdom in our own flesh, we can 
hope to inherit eternal life with him.”37 When human nature and, with it, human hearing are 
brought into God’s place, they are glorified and, in one sense, deified. That is, with the 
ascension there is hope that human hearing will, in glory, become God-like in its freedom 
from sinful self-interest, fallibility and frailty, and less constrained when brought to God’s 
“place”. If the ascended, incarnate Word continues to hear with corporeal ears, and 
continues by his Spirit as God’s listening presence among creatures, then there is hope that 
that very corporeal hearing will be one of the blessed benefits of eternity with God. This is 
                                                          
37 Randall C. Zachman, “The Christology of John Calvin” in The Oxford Handbook of Christology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 293. 
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not to claim that all who are in Christ will exercise, identically, the privileges of the one 
who sits at the right hand of God. Rather, it is to suggest that there is hope that, in the 
gracious taking of human hearing into God’s place, that human hearing itself will 
experience in its own way the unique power of God found in God’s place. 
Such hope should not become too individualistic in its focus, lest the ecclesial 
dimension of the ascension be neglected. It is not only that Christ has ascended in human 
nature, but that he has ascended with the hope and promise that his destination in God’s 
“place” is, too, the destination of his Body-Bride.38 Ascended with him is not any one 
individual, but those whom he calls his own. Thus, there is established a hope not only for 
persons, but for a people, the Church. And insofar as the ascension promises a hope of 
perfected human hearing, it offers no less hope for a perfected hearing by Christ’s people, 
qua people. If Christ is ascended, but present among his people by his Spirit as the very 
listening presence of God, then the Church is not only a community of the Word spoken to 
her, but also a community of the ear, which hears her. Bonhoeffer correctly observes that “It 
is God’s love for us that He not only gives us His Word but also lends us His ear.”39 
Ascended as king is the one who hears perfectly from God’s right hand. The community that 
lives under the reign of this king is, then, a community which must reflect that rule and 
reign with not only its words but with its ears. In the ascension and glorification of Christ’s 
human ears there is found a kingly mandate for those united and ascended with him to 
manifest his listening presence in the world. The grace and power of God’s “place” united in 
the ascension are to be mirrored on earth by those united to God’s ascended listening 
presence. It is a power and grace experienced not only by the Head, but also shared by the 
Body. In this way, the ascension is the grounds for the listening ministry of the Church. 
 Finally, the marriage of grace and omnipotence at the ascension ensures the 
constancy of God’s listening by the corporeal ears of the incarnate Word through his Spirit. 
There is a confidence provided by the ascension on account of Christ’s session. The gift of 
Christ as God’s listening presence is guaranteed, in perpetuity, on account of Christ’s 
enthronement as King who reigns from God’s “place” of power and grace. It guarantees the 
constancy of God’s listening presence in Christ and is established as an enduring gift to 
those united with him. Barth notes the ascension’s relation to constancy when he declares, 
“Whatever prosperity or defeat may occur in our space, whatever may become and pass 
                                                          
38 Here there are relevant conclusions to be drawn for feminist theology insofar as the ascending of 
the bridegroom means the dignity and worth of the bride who is both presently and not yet ascended 
with him. See Michele M. Schumacher, “Feminist Christologies”, ibid., p. 419. 
39 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1954), p. 97. 
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away, there is one constant, one thing that remains and continues, this sitting of His at the 
right hand of God the Father.”40 With the session of the mediator, the one who is God’s 
listening presence, the one who has already heard his own, the one who is always heard by 
God, his presence and activity, as such, are enthroned as constitutive of his enduring kingly 
rule. There is then, additional confidence, that those who cry out to him will be heard. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
It remains only to recapitulate some christological conclusions—some from prior chapters 
and some from the present one. I hope to have shown in four christological moments that 
God’s hearing is revealed to be fundamental to God’s relationship to creation and to God’s 
saving work for God’s people—a work that is grounded in the incarnation, death, 
resurrection, and ascension of the eternal Word. The incarnation was argued to be a 
fundamentally new experience of God’s hearing for creatures. In it, God’s significant 
personal presence, that just is God’s listening, is manifest in the incarnation of the Word, 
such that the incarnate Word becomes the means by which God hears. In this sense, it is not 
an overstatement to claim that Christ is not only the Word of God but also the ear of God. 
The sending of the Word recalls Barth’s argument that God has already heard creatures and 
that Christ is the singular response to all their petitions. The incarnate Word speaks and 
hears bi-laterally, as the perfect mediator, the high priest who is always heard by God. In the 
death of Christ, obedient ears result in crucifixion. Yet these ears belong to a particular who, 
and by reflecting on the Who? question, we came to understand the nature of God’s hearing; 
namely, that it is characterized by humility, patience, and long-suffering, even unto death. 
And yet, even as God’s ear is rejected, God continues to hear in a way that overcomes that 
rejection. This hearing-unto-death prioritizes hearing over speaking, graciously granting the 
freedom of speech that is marred by sin and error. That prioritization of hearing over 
speaking is central to what is atoned for at the cross. In the resurrection, God’s hearing is 
vindicated. Sinful human speech does not have the last word over God’s ear. Christ’s claims 
of bi-lateral hearing and speaking are vindicated. God’s listener is resurrected in triumph 
over covenant unfaithfulness that now permits a boldness before the throne of God—a 
boldness characterized by existential honesty that is confident, like the Psalmist, that the 
most desperate and demanding human speech does not threaten to overcome God’s hearing. 
Further, the resurrection confirms that God does, in fact, hear the marginalized and 
outcasts—those in the wilderness to whom Christ listened in his earthly ministry—just as 
                                                          
40 Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 126. 
191 
 
God was shown to do throughout the Old Testament. In the resurrection, God’s listening is 
itself glorified—perfected and liberated from its earthly constraints. In it, God hears God’s 
own Word, the one by whom God hears the world. Finally, in the ascension, the significant 
personal presence of God is both corporeally absent, but infinitely nearer by the Spirit of 
God’s listener. The ascension guarantees the ongoing mediatorship of the One who hears, 
because that One is now in God’s “place” where he continues to be heard. With the 
ascension, God’s listener has brought human ears into God’s “place” with him, sourcing a 
hope that human hearing will—both individually and ecclesially—enjoy the eschatological 
power and grace of that “place”. The session of Christ ensures the constancy of God’s 
listening, an additional source of hope for those who continue to cry out to God. 
 When these four christological moments are viewed within the horizon of God’s 
love pro nobis, it becomes clear that God’s hearing—which is so inextricably wrapped up 
with the person and work of Christ—is fundamental to the good news of the whole sweep of 
God’s saving work. That God hears, and does so through the Son and by the Spirit, is central 
to the redeeming work of God among creation. It is for this reason that Augustine, when 
reflecting upon God’s redemptive work, can declare: “When I see all he has done for me, all 
he has wrought on my behalf, how could I not believe that the Lord has bowed his ear down 
to me?”41 
 
                                                          




CONCLUSION: “O THAT I HAD ONE TO HEAR ME!” 
 
To conclude this inquiry into God as a hearer, I would like to sharpen the relief between my 
proposal and one of its alternatives. Doing so will allow for a rehearsing of some of the 
conclusions for which I have argued. It will also allow me to gesture toward some additional 
soteriological and ethical implications for those who are heard by God. The distinctiveness 
of my argument might best be summarized by way of contrasting two works of literature, 
the first from the world of existential philosophy, and the second from the canon of Holy 
Scripture. 
 Albert Camus’ play, The Misunderstanding, was written during World War II, when 
Camus was under threat of death as a known part of the French resistance. The play tells the 
story of a successful and wealthy man, Jan, who has, after living twenty years overseas, 
returned to his hometown with his new wife, Maria. There he finds that, though his father 
has died, his mother and his sister, Martha, are operating a small guest house, alongside an 
irritable, mostly silent, old manservant. The mother and sister do not recognize Jan upon his 
arrival at the guest house. Unknown to Jan is that his mother and sister have made their 
living murdering and robbing their guests, always drugging and then drowning their victims 
in the nearby river. Jan keeps his identity a secret, despite his wife’s urgings, preferring to 
observe his family as an outsider. By doing so, Jan hopes to determine how he might best 
make his family happy. Toward that end, he uses a pseudonym to book a night at the guest 
house without his wife Maria, who will return the following morning. He dies at the hands 
of his sister, Martha, who serves him a poisoned cup of tea, and then proceeds with her 
custom of taking his money and drowning him in the river. In the morning, upon discovery 
of Jan’s passport, Martha and her mother realize that they have murdered their brother and 
son. The mother, overcome by grief, takes her own life by drowning herself in the river. 
Martha is left alone, angry about all that has transpired. Jan’s wife, Maria, arrives at the 
guest house to find Jan missing. After Martha initially lies about his whereabouts, she 
confesses to murdering him. Realizing the gravity of the situation—that she has killed her 
brother and is now without her mother—Martha decides to follow her mother, by taking her 
own life at the river. Before departing to do so, she offers weighty, metaphysical-loaded 




And now—before I go, let me give a word of advice; I owe it to you, since I killed 
your husband. Pray your God to harden you to stone. It's the happiness He has 
assigned Himself, and the one true happiness. Do as He does, be deaf to all appeals, 
and turn your heart to stone while there still is time. But if you feel you lack the 
courage to enter into this hard, blind peace--then come and join us in our common 
house. Good-by, my sister. As you see, it's all quite simple. You have a choice 
between the mindless happiness of stones and the slimy bed in which we are 
awaiting you.1 
Maria, overwhelmed by grief and confusion, responds with a desperate cry to be 
heard by God, “Oh, God, I cannot live in this desert! It is on You that I must call, and I shall 
find the words to say. I place myself in your hands. Have pity, turn toward me. Hear me and 
raise me from the dust, O Heavenly Father! Have pity on those who love each other and are 
parted.”2 
 At this point, Maria is left alone in the guest house with only the old manservant 
who has been sitting silently throughout. Barely budged from his silence, the old 
manservant asks, “What’s all the noise, did you call me?”3 Maria responds, startled by his 
address to her: “Oh!... I don’t know. But help me, for I need help. Be kind and say that you 
will help me.”4 The play concludes with the manservant’s response: “No.”5 
 With gripping aesthetic appeal, Camus makes his case for both the absurdity of life, 
as well as God’s “deaf” and “blind” disposition toward that absurdity. The old manservant, 
who overtly represents God, sits silently throughout the play as the “misunderstanding”6 
unfolds. Martha understands the old manservant. She has observed his silence as she has 
murdered guest after guest. His is a kind of happiness that comes from a heart of stone and 
ears that have remained “deaf to all appeals”. There are only two responses to the absurd: 
either the “mindless happiness of stones” or death. Maria disregards these options. She cries 
out desperately, and the old manservant is hardly disturbed by her desperate cries and pleas. 
“What’s all the noise?” he asks, seemingly irritated that his mindless happiness and silence 
would be disrupted. His final, monosyllabic, declaration that is followed by the curtain-drop 
is Camus’ final verdict on God. God is silent, “deaf”, and “blind” to the absurdities of this 
                                                          
1 Albert Camus, “The Misunderstanding” in Caligula and Three Other Plays (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1962), p. 133. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid p. 133-34. 
5 Ibid, p. 134. 
6 How Martha describes the whole affair. Ibid., p. 124. 
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life, and will not be inconvenienced by them. This god will not entertain a disruption to his 
“mindless happiness”, no matter how great the absurdity or how desperate the pleas to be 
heard. Like Dionysus, Camus’ god has ears of stone. These ears will not hear. 
 Of course, Camus’ is not an abstract metaphysical reflection on just any concept of 
God. Very specifically, he has in mind the Christian tradition—a fact revealed in even the 
subtler details of the play, such as the characters’ names. Importantly, three times in the play 
Jan imagines his return to be with his family to be like the return of the prodigal son. His 
self-description as the return of the prodigal son is most pronounced just as he drinks the 
poisoned cup of tea. This prodigal son is not welcomed while still far off, as Jesus’ parable 
recounts. He is not welcomed back with joy and celebration. Rather, his return goes 
unacknowledged. The feast thrown for Jan is, at first, a beer, and now a poisoned cup of tea. 
This unrecognized son and brother who has returned from a far country is not met with the 
greeting he deserves. Just before he is made to drink the cup, he prays, “O God, give me the 
power to find the right words, or else make me abandon this vain attempt and return to 
Maria’s love.”7 He then drinks the cup that leads to his death.  
 The ironic, Biblical imagery is palpable. Barth appropriated some of the same 
imagery when he envisioned Jesus Christ as the son who traveled into a far country, as both 
son and brother.8 And he was not recognized as either. In the Garden of Gethsemane, just 
before his death, Jesus cries out to God. He is then made to drink the cup of death. He is put 
to death by those who should have known him as brother and the son of their father. As 
Camus sees things, Jesus, like Jan, goes unheard by God and meets his end in the grave. 
Jan’s father, not coincidentally, has died some time ago. God is either dead or is silently 
enjoying mindless, “deaf” happiness in a corner. God does not hear Jesus Christ; nor does 
God listen to those who cry out concerning the absurdities of this life.  
It is the metaphysically petrified “No” of Camus’ “deaf” Old Manservant which has 
been in the crosshairs of my argument. In contrast to all of Camus’ aesthetic and literary 
energy directed toward making metaphysical sense of the absurdities of life, it has been my 
contention that the Biblical God which Camus finds so metaphysically deficient—that this 
God’s faithfulness to hear is not “No” but “Yes” in Jesus Christ (2 Cor 1:20). The “Yes” of 
God is seen, profoundly and clearly, in a very different and more ancient literary work. 
                                                          
7 Ibid., p. 108. 
8 Barth, CD, IV/1, §51. 
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 The story of Job is well known and needs little rehearsing. Like the characters of 
Camus’ play, Job has suffered complex and agonizing loss. The loss of his property and 
servants, the death of his children, and the deterioration of his health—these all contribute to 
a different kind of “misunderstanding”. Ambiguity surrounds Job’s personal responsibility 
for the ills that have befallen him. He knows not why he has become the victim of such 
evils, but is confident in his righteousness before God, despite the increasingly determined 
accusations of his friends. Even though Job’s “misunderstanding” is traditionally framed as 
a question of divine justice, it is not unlike the absurdity of life that is the concern of 
Camus’ play. Job’s sufferings are similarly mysterious to him, and the concern about divine 
justice is not entirely distinguishable from Camus’ metaphysical critique. Both narratives, 
interested as they are in the absurdity of this life’s sufferings, confront the reader with 
questions about the divine nature. What kind of God is it that governs a world in which 
these sufferings torment human creatures? What is God’s relation to those experiences of 
suffering? What is God’s responsibility for them? Significantly for this study, both 
narratives pivot on one fundamental question by which they seek to answer the many others: 
Does God hear? 
 After Job has endured several rounds of accusation from his friends (4-28), and 
before young Elihu dares to offer his determined and self-assured assessment of the matter 
(32-37), Job makes his final defense (29-31). He has had the experience of divine absence. 
He has suffered long enough to reflect on the many ways in which his life has been altered 
by his misery. That misery has been protracted, such that it has taken a toll on every aspect 
of his life. Speaking to God, he declares, “I cry to you and you do not answer me; I stand, 
and you merely look at me” (30:20). He continues on: “Surely one does not turn against the 
needy, when in disaster they cry for help” (30:24). Job’s experience would seem to be like 
Maria, who cries out to God for help and is met with an irritable “No”. For Camus, God will 
not be disturbed from petrified, mindless bliss. Job’s experience might be seen to 
corroborate Camus’ metaphysical conclusion. And yet Job continues his protest (31:5-40). 
He has lived righteously. Thus, he asks, “Does [God] not see my ways, and number all my 
steps?” (31:4). Exasperated, Job sighs again, just as he did at the beginning of his final 
defense (29:2). Taking a deep breath, he expresses his wish: “O that I had one to hear me!” 
He then continues with the language of the courtroom: “Here is my signature! Let the 
Almighty Answer me!” (31:35) Job wishes to have his defense heard in the cosmic 
courtroom. He offers his “signature”, his “tav”, the final letter of the Hebrew alphabet, 
indicating the conclusion of his statement, as well as a declaration of his innocence. His 
accuser has remained silent. Job has already requested a formal indictment (13:22) and now, 
before the courtroom of the universe, declares his innocence, despite still not having been 
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served a formal charge from God to explain why he has endured such suffering. If Job had a 
formal charge from God, he declares that he would wear it around on his shoulder or on his 
head like a crown (31:36). It might serve to explain to himself and to others the misery that 
has befallen him. Thus, this request to be heard by God has been called a moment of 
“electrifying tension”9 since Job has called God into the courtroom to give an account for 
the sufferings endured at the hands of the latter. As part of the final “signature” of Job’s 
defense, the request to be heard is a pivotal moment in the narrative. Will God hear Job? 
Will God give an account? Or will God remain silent, undisturbed in mindless, stony 
happiness? If Job is, as he claims, innocent and undeserving, then it is God, it seems, who is 
guilty of wrongdoing.  
 Of course, God does hear Job and answers him, according to what God has heard. 
Unlike Camus’ “No” to God’s hearing and helping, the book of Job gives a “Yes”, but of a 
very different order than that expected by Job and his friends. With an overwhelming 
display of divine knowledge and power, God answers Job in the interrogative mood. The 
response is, at one level, a metaphysical claim about God’s omniscience and omnipotence 
that is beyond human capacity to comprehend. Neither aloof nor silent, God’s response 
reveals the extent to which the intricacies of the universe are known and sustained by God’s 
knowledge and power. Neither “deaf” nor stony, God’s knowledge and power exceed 
human understanding and demonstrate not only God’s ability but willingness to hear and 
hearken to human speech. God’s response has satisfied Job, who declares, “I know that you 
can do all things and that no purpose of yours can be thwarted”, and goes on to confess, “I 
have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful for me, which I did not know” 
(42:2-3). God’s hearing has prompted a response that relativized Job’s speech and asking. 
Job’s speech has now been framed within the cosmic context of God’s knowledge and 
power that can only produce humility and repentance in Job: “I despise myself, and repent 
in dust and ashes” (42:6). 
 “O that I had one to hear me!” is the existential, human cry on which this entire 
inquiry has been built. And God’s “Yes” to Job’s plea to be heard serves to recapitulate 
several of the conclusions for which I have argued.  
 First, Job is heard by God in the absurdity of this life’s sufferings. I have proposed 
that Holy Scripture reveals the extent to which God’s ear is especially inclined to those in 
the wilderness. Evidence for this claim was found in the Abraham-Sarah-Hagar narrative, in 
the desperate cries for help in the Psalms, in the Lazarus narrative of John 11, and finally in 
                                                          
9 Christopher Ash, Job: The Wisdom of the Cross (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2014), p. 319. 
197 
 
Gethsemane, where the Always-Heard Word cries out to be heard. In Job we find an 
additional occurrence of God’s hearing cries that arise from the wilderness. And yet the Job 
narrative underscores the incredible delay in the creaturely experience of God’s hearing. 
Only after a protracted period of suffering and protest does God reveal to Job that the latter 
has been heard. For some time, Job’s experience of his suffering bears considerable 
similarity to Camus’ “No”. The pain, loss, and evil that have been suffered are not 
immediately redressed at Job’s first protest; nor does God’s hearing guarantee that it will be 
redressed. Rather than the immediate restoration of Job’s fortunes at the first utterance of 
protest, God gives something different in God’s hearing: further revelation of Godself. In 
the wilderness, Job has called God to account for the absurdity of this life, and God has 
heard and responded in a way that is more than sufficient for Job. “I had heard of you by the 
hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you” (42:5). Job’s “vision” of God has been 
expanded by God’s hearing the former’s wilderness cries. The Job narrative underscores the 
reality that God hears those who cry out from the wilderness, that God self-reveals to those 
who do so, and that God’s power and knowledge are not diminished on account of the 
absurdity of the wilderness, but have the ability to relativize and reframe it. 
 Relatedly, second, God’s hearing of Job reveals the power and knowledge that 
characterize that hearing. I have argued, following Holy Scripture as well as the theology of 
Karl Barth, that God’s hearing is characterized by an always and an already, respectively. 
God always hears the Son and those united to him. And while Job’s status in relation to the 
covenant people of Israel is an ambiguity of the narrative,10 God’s response to Job serves the 
purpose of situating God’s power immeasurably beyond human comprehension. Camus’ 
Old Manservant hardly attended to the recurring murders perpetrated by Martha and her 
mother, and he hardly notices Maria’s cry for help, asking, “What’s all the noise, did you 
call me?” In contrast, God self-reveals to Job to be the one who attends to every detail of the 
cosmos with absolute and perfect power and knowledge. Beyond the scope of human 
understanding, God attends to the cosmos in a way that reinforces God’s ability to always 
hear that which God chooses to hear. Similarly, the already of God’s hearing is supported as 
God’s response to Job reveals the asymmetry of divine and human agency. “Where were 
you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding,” challenges 
God. From God’s good and perfect eternity does God create. The already of God’s hearing 
is on account of this prioritization of divine agency. Human speech unto the hearing God 
was shown to be not the cause, but the effect of God’s good and perfect hearing. Speech 
unto God is the result of God’s hearing, not its cause. Rather than undermining prayer to 
                                                          




God, this prioritization of divine agency is the grounds for great confidence in God’s 
hearing. God is neither aloof nor incapable. Rather, God’s power and knowledge are 
revealed to comport with the metaphysics of the Christian tradition, which has been 
foundational for my argument. God’s hearing is better, not worse, on account of God’s 
perfect power and knowledge. 
 Third, Job is changed by being heard, both in his self-understanding and also in his 
concrete circumstances. I have proposed that human creatures are heard into personhood, 
that human becoming is wrapped up with being heard by an other. Indeed, the coherence 
and integrity of Job’s self-understanding is challenged by his friends. Job’s claim is that 
they have not heard him. Rather, they dismissed his speech, which I have argued may 
produce a disintegrated or incoherent theory of self. Without being properly heard, Job’s 
experience of his losses and suffering remain unintegrated, “outside” of his self-
understanding. His identity is of one who has suffered immense loss and remained misheard 
in his loss. Additionally, he also runs the risk of having an incoherent theory of self, insofar 
as he cannot reconcile his experience with how others have heard his description thereof. 
Job claims that his experience has occurred in the context of a personal commitment to 
righteousness. His friends claim such acute calamity can only be the result of God’s 
righteous judgement on unrighteousness. These two perspectives are unreconcilable. This 
disintegration and incoherence are the cause of Job’s cry to be heard by another. He has 
gone unheard by his friends and needs another to hear if his theory of self is to be an 
integrated and coherent one. Thus, it is God’s response to Job’s plea that produces 
profoundly formative and advantageous effects. God’s hearing produces a theory of self that 
allows Job to encode his sufferings within a personal theory of self. That self-understanding 
is revealed in Job’s I-statements: “I am of small account; what shall I answer you? I lay my 
hand on my mouth” (40:4); “I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful 
for me, which I did not know” (42:3); “I despise myself, and repent in dust and ashes” 
(42:6). Job’s suffering is now reframed and encoded in his theory of self as a result of the 
hearing of God, which has relativized Job’s suffering in light of the mystery of God’s power 
and knowledge. Significantly, his suffering has not been evacuated of significance or 
meaning for his theory of self. Rather, instead of being viewed through the lens of justified 
or unjustified sufferings on account of Job’s behavior, they are now understood to belong to 
God’s mysterious dealings with creation that are characterized by perfect power and 
knowledge. In the light of God’s hearing, Job’s plight may be integrated and understood 
coherently in view of God’s mysterious workings. They need not remain “outside” of Job’s 
self-understanding nor exist in conflict with his self-understanding. Job is now one who has 
suffered immensely; but he is also one who has been heard by God in those sufferings in a 
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way that coheres with God’s perfect power and knowledge, such that Job may now 
construct a theory of self in a way that was not available had he only been misheard by his 
friends. 
 Further, God’s hearing of Job has produced not only an advantageously formative 
theory of self, but has also produced a change in Job’s concrete circumstances. I have 
argued that being heard by an other produces concrete, this-worldly, tangible changes for 
the speaker. These included neuro-biological changes, increased ability to hear others, the 
experience of comfort and compassion, and the advantages of being “gifted” with the 
attention and presence of an other. But the Scriptures also testify to God’s hearing 
producing real deliverance from dangers, enemies, and sufferings more generally. Psalm 22 
revealed God’s hearing to be paradigmatic of the salvific activity among God’s people. 
God’s hearing delivered Israel out of Egypt and, later, out of exile. It delivered the Psalmist 
from his enemies. It delivered the incarnate Word from death itself. Here, God’s hearing has 
produced a different kind of salvific outcome: repentance and a restoration of fortune. While 
Job’s children are not raised to life, the narrative is emphatic that “the LORD restored the 
fortunes of Job… the LORD gave Job twice as much as he had before,” (42:10) and “The 
LORD blessed the latter days of Job more than his beginning” (42:12). While Camus’ Maria 
cried out, “Hear me and raise me from the dust, O Heavenly Father!” and was met with a 
“No”, Job does the same and is not only heard, but on account of that hearing is also raised 
from the dust. 
 Fourth, the Job narrative anticipates several of my christological conclusions, and in 
so doing establishes a stark contrast between Camus’ Old Manservant and the God and 
Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. Job claims to have suffered unjustly. As he cries out to be 
heard, he invokes the language of the courtroom to declare his innocence before a cosmic 
court. He has declared himself to be righteous. In his cry to be heard, he declares that if he 
had a written indictment from his enemy, he would bind it on his head like a crown. His 
body bears the marks of his suffering. He longs to be vindicated by one who will truly hear 
him. For Camus, there is no vindication, no helping, no hearing. Absurdity is the conclusion 
of the matter, for God is either dead or asleep. Yet in the Job narrative we find the 
anticipation of an ultimate vindication accomplished by God’s hearing of God’s incarnate 
Word. The incarnate Word suffered unjustly, bore the marks of that suffering in his body, 
and stood trial with his indictment over his head like a crown. He patiently endured the 
sinful human speech of those who refused to hear him. He cried out to be heard and was 
gloriously vindicated on account of his “reverent submission” before the eyes of those who 
challenged his claims to righteousness. That vindication is the overcoming of the sinful and 
error-laden speech of accusers and mockers. More still, it is a vindication that may now be 
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participated in as the vindicated Word that is always heard by the Father has ascended to 
God’s place and continually mediates bi-laterally between his Father and those who cry out 
to be heard. 
 Finally, the protracted nature of Job’s suffering in the narrative gestures toward a 
conclusion yet unacknowledged: that God’s hearing is, finally, an eschatological reality. The 
immediate “No” of Camus’ Old Manservant stands in stark contrast to Job’s prolonged and 
enduring desire to be heard. I have argued that God’s hearing entails a sure response and 
that God’s hearing means God’s hearkening. Yet the immediacy of God’s hearkening is 
nowhere promised. Indeed, neither Job nor Jesus experience immediate hearkening on 
account of God’s hearing. It was not until the third day that the incarnate Word was 
gloriously vindicated, and his final vindication remains a sure but unresolved and 
eschatological matter. The Job narrative, portrays a life that has endured sufferings for such 
a duration that it has been altered so greatly as to be unrecognizable. And while Job’s 
fortunes are restored and his latter days are more blessed than his beginning, God’s hearing 
and hearkening does not guarantee those outcomes in this life—and that for good reason. 
The Job narrative, enclosed as it is in its literary and canonical form, has a beginning and 
end. But human life lived before the ears of God is open-ended, with its terminus at the end 
of time and human history, when it will rest in the new creation of God’s time and place. 
Until then, the creaturely experience of God’s hearing remains incomplete. For good reason 
is God’s sure response eschatological in character. For until Christ returns to judge the quick 
and the dead and all are called to “give an account for every careless word” uttered (Matt 
12:36), God’s ears remain open to human speech. God’s eschatological hearing will mean a 
sure hearkening, but the character of that hearkening must be wrapped up with the 
contingencies of God’s just and final judgement of human speaking. And the most glorious 
hearkening of that eschatological event will be the sure response to the speech of God’s 
Always-Heard Word on behalf of creatures. 
 The eschatological horizon of God’s loving and just attention that will finally be 
accomplished by God’s significant personal presence and will entail a sure response—this 
horizon invites some ethical reflections on how those who are united to the Always-Heard 
Word might be called to hear. While those ethical implications have been mentioned 
throughout this inquiry, emphasis demands their summary, even if space permits only the 
briefest treatment. 
 Insofar as the Christian theological tradition has prioritized word and speech to the 
detriment of hearing and listening, there is now need to redress this imbalance not only in 
theology but in Christian living, where the temptation persists to be, in contrast to the letter 
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of James, quick to speak and slow to listen. There are, then, ethical imperatives for those 
united to the Always-Heard Word to hear with that same character. Again, Bonhoeffer: 
“[we] should listen with the ears of God.”11 And if this listening conforms to the character of 
Christ’s listening, then the prioritization of hearing over speaking means sharing in the risk 
of being similarly “pushed out of this world”.12 To share in that risk is to prioritize reception 
over activity, humility over power, listening over speaking, even to the limits of human life. 
This does not mean there is not a time to speak. There is, indeed, “a time to keep silence, 
and a time to speak” (Ecc 3:7b). But it is the former that has been less observed by those 
united to the Always-Heard Word, and that somewhat surprisingly, given his silence before 
his accusers, even unto death. I take the risk of hearing unto death to be very much wrapped 
up with Jesus’ call to discipleship, which involves taking up one’s own cross. This kind of 
hearing may prove costly and cruciform in nature; but to the extent that it is costly, it 
reflects a sharing in Christ’s sufferings, becoming like him in his death, with the hope, too, 
of sharing in the vindicating resurrection from the dead (Phil 3:10-11).  
Further, as those who have been heard by God on account of the person and work of 
the Always-Heard Word, those united to him enjoy the advantageous formation that results 
from such hearing. If, as I have argued, being heard is advantageously formative, such that 
those who cry out to be heard by God receive not only consolation but enhanced capabilities 
and proclivities to hear others, there is then an accompanying ethical imperative to hear such 
that we “console those who are in any affliction with the consolation with which we 
ourselves are consoled by God” (2 Cor. 1:4). For, as Paul continues, there is a degree to 
which God’s hearing finds its telos in human hearing of others: “if we are being consoled, it 
is for your consolation” (2 Cor 1:6). Vertical hearing is for the purpose of horizontal 
hearing. Being heard by God may be the special privilege of God’s people, as argued above, 
but that does not make it a special privilege to be hoarded. Rather, in being so “gifted” by 
God’s hearing, that gift is turned outward, and given to others, such that others are heard 
unto speech, in a way analogous to the way God has heard God’s own people unto speech. 
 In all of this, like God’s hearing, the ethics of being heard by God is an 
eschatological matter. The coming of the incarnate Word who was always heard was the 
breaking in of God’s kingdom in a profoundly new way. The incarnation, I argued, was the 
supreme manifestation of God’s loving and just attention which God accomplished by 
means of God’s significant personal presence. The listening presence of God in Christ is 
constitutive of God’s rule and reign. With the inbreaking of God’s rule and reign in the 
                                                          
11 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1954), p. 99. 
12 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 360. 
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person of Christ, God’s kingdom is revealed to be a listening kingdom, ruled by a listening 
God. Those who live under this rule and reign are, then, called to be a listening people 
whose lives reflect the character of the listening ruler to whom they submit and follow. 
When God’s people listen in a way that reflects and conforms, even if only analogously, to 
God’s listening, then God’s rule and reign are experienced as a present reality. An ethic of 
Christian listening then, insofar as it reflects God’s rule and reign, may prove to be of 
profound ethical and political significance.  
 This inquiry into the concept of God as a hearer may have run the same risk as Job, 
the speech of whom was guilty of “darkening counsel without knowledge”. Such is the risk 
of all speech about God and the theological enterprise more generally. Yet insofar as I have 
sought to faithfully listen to the Scriptures and the voices of the Christian tradition, I have 
proposed that God’s response to the creaturely need to be heard is not “No” but “Yes” and 
that that “Yes” is wrapped up with the incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and ascension—
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